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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the global spatial surveillance of Indigenous peoples,
nations, and territories in the twenty-first century through a multi-site relational analysis
of colonial surveillance and Indigenous cartography in the United States, India, and
Palestine. Analyzing Indigenous graphic novels, video games, virtual reality,
performance protests, and visual art, I demonstrate how air and the aerial perspective
actively shape what happens on and below the ground. I argue that Indigenous
experiences of and responses to colonial and counterinsurgent surveillance are not limited
by the geographic and legal bounds of nation-states but are rather linked through global
histories of militarization and colonialism. Furthermore, Indigenous cartographic
expressions of sovereignty and self-determination challenge both the immutability of
settler states and colonial ways of seeing. This project intervenes in cultural studies and
Indigenous geography to consider the volume of Indigenous territory above, below, and
on the surface of the earth.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
All of humanity emerged from a rock on my family’s rice field. This is what I was
taught. The field, though small, boasts a perennial spring that comes out from below the
rock that is the source of all of humanity, keeping the field permanently flooded and
amenable for growing rice. The first time I descended the stone terraces from the
village to the field, my aunties and uncles showed me where to place my hands on the
rock to feel the polished grooves where, they say, the first people stepped and climbed up
into the world, in what is now our small rice field.
Our rice field and village are in Nagaland, an Indigenous territory at the junction
of India, Myanmar, and China, which is simultaneously a state of India within India’s
most northeast boundary, and a nation that declared its independence from British rule
before India, Pakistan, or Myanmar declared their independence. Nagaland is often
unknown, in India or elsewhere, and deeply connected to Indigenous internationalist
movements since the early twentieth century. Rice is grown in terraced fields below the
village, built into hillside slopes. Natural springs emerge on the surface where
groundwater is underlaid by an impermeable rock layer, causing the water to flow out to
the surface instead of down through the stratigraphic layers. On the surface, water flows
from one terrace to the next, keeping all the rice fields irrigated simultaneously, as any
overflow in higher terraces naturally flows to lower terraces. Narrow rock walls between
terraces create breaks so that water can pool, and people can navigate between terraces
and fields. Expansion of rice plots in this part of the village is impossible, as these
ancestral fields are built into the hillside and are bounded on either side by steep slopes.
Thus, each terraced rice field is not just a node in a network of connection, but the
production of rice in these fields is dependent on ongoing relations between people,
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water, land, and rice. These are inherently spatial relations that extend below and above
the surface into three-dimensional space.
I begin this dissertation with the rock, stream, and rice field in order to suggest a
mode through which we might consider Indigenous space, place, and territorial
sovereignty. Indigenous territory is not a bounded two-dimensional space. Instead,
Indigenous territory is markedly volumetric space in which the aerial, surficial, and
subterranean are interconnected and inseparable. How do these categories of volumetric
space resonate within the context of contemporary colonialism and counterinsurgency
globally? If Indigenous territory is volumetric, how might we understand Indigenous
sovereignty as volumetric? How do relationships between the aerial, surficial, and
subterranean figure in Indigenous visual representations of territory, sovereignty, and
nationhood? The landscape representations analyzed in this dissertation provide ways of
thinking about sovereignty through relationality and kinship beyond Westphalian notions
of sovereignty. These representations push back against the policing of normative
understandings of territory and sovereignty.
I ask: How has the aerial perspective been normalized as way of seeing
Indigenous territory? What does this remote mode of seeing reveal about how we relate
to colonial state violence? How do militarized modes of seeing generate a structure of
feeling such that we can sense from a distance? How do militarized spatial technologies
shape not only how we look, but what we look for? In this study of the impact of
surveillance technologies on the ongoing colonization of Indigenous nations, I argue that
everyday practices of surveillance have become integral to contemporary Indigenous
experiences of colonialism. Furthermore, I contend that geospatial surveillance
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technologies enable colonial practices of territoriality to transit the globe smoothly and
with speed, thereby creating a methodological template for how imperial and colonial
forces attempt to police and control Indigenous peoples in the current moment.
Ultimately, my research asks: Are Indigenous politics geopolitics?
I examine India, Palestine, and the United States, three former colonies of the
British empire, linked in the twenty-first century through a shared network of training
facilities, weapons, and techniques of counterinsurgent warfare. I use a comparative
framework to consider how these nation-states use geospatial surveillance methods to
further colonial occupation and governance. In each chapter, I examine the volume of
territory and how colonial nations represent territory in order to lay claim to and control it
and, in contrast, how Indigenous nations represent themselves and their territories in
methods that challenge colonial ways of seeing.
In section one, I examine the realm of the aerial. Focusing on environmental and
counterinsurgent surveillance in India-occupied Nagaland, I consider how the aerial
perspective operates as a means to know and claim Indigenous and occupied territories.
Here, I investigate Indian constitutional categories which limit claims to Indigeneity and
sovereignty. I then look at contemporary practices of geospatial surveillance and control,
such as environmental data collection and internet blackouts, which enforce those legal
and constitutional categories, even when they are in opposition to international human
rights law. In section two, I consider the earth's surface through crowd sourced data and
the production of digital interactive maps in Palestine and traditional embroidery
processes integrated with digital design that imagine Palestinian landscape futures. In this
section, I examine the use of geospatial technologies such as GPS, GIS, and public map
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resources like Google Maps, as well as political dialogue around these technologies. I
consider the 7amleh Arab Center for Social Media Advancement’s investigation into
Google Maps’ representation of Palestine and what 7amleh proposes in opposition to the
perspective represented by Google Maps. Here, I consider how the aerial perspective
flattens and simplifies the political topography of territory and in so doing creates
conditions of danger and fear in some populations, while protecting others. In section
three, I examine the subterranean. I consider Indigenous movements for environmental
justice in the U.S. to query how cultural production pushes back against the colonial idea
that the subterranean can be claimed independently from the earth's surface. I examine
activism against pipelines and mining through cultural production that addresses both
two- and three-dimensional conceptions of Indigenous territory, including analysis of the
Zuni Map Art Project, video game Thunderbird Strike, and virtual reality Poise/end.
This project is in conversation with work in transnational American studies on
violence and visual culture. My research applies visual analysis to examine geospatial
surveillance of Indigenous territories as a technique of ongoing colonization in the
twenty-first century. As a method of cultural studies, visual analysis informs how I
interpret representations of Indigenous territory within a legal, geopolitical context, from
visualizations of quantitative data made with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to
Indigenous-created video games. I seek to understand not only what these examples of
visual culture appear to do, but also what arguments and claims they make or reinforce
and how those claims are enacted geopolitically. As I will summarize in this introduction,
scholars of visual culture assert that visuality is not merely a reflection of war and
violence, it is an active player in war and violence. Thus, I examine visual evidence in
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this project as agents maintaining, growing, surviving, or resisting colonial power. This
engagement of visual culture makes space to consider how the aerial perspective shapes
colonial and imperial practices of domination.
While I focus in large part on geospatial technologies used to surveil, police, and
terrorize Indigenous peoples, this projects also takes seriously the ways in which these
technologies and the theories that undergird them intermingle in quotidian life of
domesticity, work, and pleasure. For example, in chapter two, I examine GPS tagging of
birds as a mechanism to surveil Indigenous peoples. However, I am interested here in
how these technologies allow non-military personnel to participate in the practice of
surveilling Indigenous peoples through a seemingly innocent activity: armchair bird
watching. Similarly, in chapter three, I examine how seemingly open-access maps
increase the risk of arrest and detainment or limit the movement of subaltern others.
Building on the work of scholars who demonstrate how geospatial technologies are used
to mark and kill precision targets, collect intel, and sense remotely, I seek to demonstrate
how these technologies insidiously infiltrate social and political life.
Indigeneity is inseparable from territory, whether in definitions used by United
Nations or at the local scale. Likewise, land is the defining element and object of settler
colonialism. Drawing on Stuart Elden’s challenge to consider the volume of territory, this
project intervenes in contemporary scholarship in Indigenous studies, transnational
American studies, and critical political geography to reimagine the volumetric
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sovereignty of Indigenous nations, thereby understanding Indigenous politics as
geopolitics. 1
India, Israel, and the United States
India, Israel, and the United States are linked in the twenty-first century through a
shared network of training facilities, weapons, and techniques of counterinsurgent
warfare. Overt military connections are strengthened by economic and technological
relationships. Since 9/11, these three countries have increased their network of
connections via shared anti-terror efforts, making the war on terror a global project of
multiple collaborating imperialisms, not just a project of the United States. 2 In 2020, the
U.S., India, and Israel announced a collaboration to develop and share an interoperable
5G communication network that will allow them to collect and share data between
nation-states, a development they celebrate as an act of “transparency.” 3 This
collaboration further imbricates these three imperial powers, making digital and distant
the sharing of counterinsurgent knowledge and practices already in place between these
three states.
While the defense and technological relationships between the U.S. and Israel
have been well documented, India’s role in this triangle of relations is less well known.
In 2005, India brokered a deal to purchase radar and surveillance systems from Israel,

Stuart Elden, “Secure the Volume: Vertical Geopolitics and the Depth of Power,”
Political Geography 34 (2013): 35-51.
2
Oza, Rupal, "Contrapuntal Geographies of Threat and Security: The United States,
India, and Israel," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25, no. 1 (2007): 932.
3
“India, US, Israel Collaborating in 5G Tech: Official,” The Economic Times September
8, 2020, https://m.economictimes.com/industry/telecom/telecom-news/india-us-israelcollaborating-in-5g-tech-official/articleshow/77989265.cms
1
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followed by subsequent purchase of rifles and other weapons for use by India’s
counterinsurgency forces. 4 India soon became the top export target of Israel’s defense
industry. 5 Since Narendra Modi was elected prime minister, India has accelerated its
relationships with Israel and the U.S. to develop and import defense technologies. 6 In
addition to importing drones, radar trackers, missiles, and trained dogs, in 2014 India and
Israel signed an intelligence-sharing agreement to collaborate in their counter-terrorism
efforts. 7 The trilateral relationship to develop defense technology was formalized in
2020. 8
While scholars speculated that India had the most to gain, this formal agreement
also secures Israel and the U.S. an ally in south Asia in a state bordering both Pakistan
and China. In addition, India’s primary site of export of defense technologies is Africa, so
a relationship with India provides a route for the U.S. to reach the African defense
market. 9 In India, this formal relationship marks a dramatic shift of India’s geopolitical
4

Aman Sharma, “CRPF gets Israeli assault rifles to combat Maoists,” India Today,
November 7, 2011, accessed April 19, 2022,
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/crpf-gets-israeli-made-assault-rifles-to-fightmaoists-145079-2011-11-07
5
N.C. Bipindra and Natalie Obiko Pearson, “Modi Revives India-Israel Ties as Terrorism
Threat Grows,” Bloomberg, November 19 2014.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-19/modi-revives-india-s-ties-withisrael-as-terrorism-threat-grows
6
“India, US, Israel Collaborating,” 2020.
7
Ibid.
8
“India, Israel, and US Cooperating on Digital Leadership and Innovation,” Financial
Express, September 8, 2020, accessed April 19, 2022,
https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/india-us-israel-collaborating-in5g-tech-official/2077544/ ; Sameer Patil, “Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defense
Technology Cooperation,” Gateway House, April 15, 2021, accessed April 19, 2022,
https://www.gatewayhouse.in/inserting-india-into-us-israel-defence-technologycooperation/
9
Elizabeth Roche, “India, Israel, US Can Carve Out Trilateral Cooperation on Defense
Technology: Report,” LiveMint April 18, 2021,

9

relations with Israel in particular. Historically, India expressed solidarity with Palestine.
India voted against the inclusion of Israel in the United Nations, prohibited travel to
Israel and South Africa on Indian passports, voted in support of UN resolution 3379
which marked Zionism as a form of racism, produced a postage stamp with Indian and
Palestinian flags and the caption “India supports the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people.” India was the first country to recognize the state of Palestine.
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A relationship with India secures the U.S. and Israel a major ally in what is
increasingly being referred to as the “Indo-Pacific.” This term began to pick up traction
in the late 2010s and is used broadly to refer to the Asia-Pacific and the Indian ocean as a
single interconnected region, linking South and Southeast Asia to Africa, Australia, and
other Pacific Island nations. 11 U.S. interest in this formulation has led to critiques that
this conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific is a geopolitical strategy to sideline China and
enable a greater U.S. presence in the region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
2019 statement “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” refutes this critique, asserting that
the Indo-Pacific is a linking of two regions to enable greater cooperation and shared
economic development. 12 The Indo-Pacific, ASEAN argues, is “a perspective of viewing

https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-israel-us-can-carve-out-trilateralcooperation-on-defence-technology-11618753859087.html
10
Rupal Oza, “Tracing a Tectonic Shift: India’s Relations with Israel and Palestine,”
Society and Space, September 18, 2014, accessed April 19, 2022,
https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/tracing-a-tectonic-shift-indias-relations-withisrael-and-palestine
11
Rory Medcalf, "Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific," in International
Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier: ASEAN, Australia, and India, eds. Gilbert Rozman
and Joseph Chinyong Liow (Springer, Singapore, 2018): 9-28.
12
“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
accessed April 18, 2022, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlookon-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

10

the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a
closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic
role.” 13 However, the U.S. State Department’s official statements on the Indo-Pacific do
exactly what critics say they do. The first statement regarding the Indo-Pacific issued by
the U.S. State Department in 2019, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared
Vision,” builds on former President Donald Trump’s 2017 priority of U.S. engagement in
the Indo-Pacific. It begins with a claim that centers the United States: “The United States
is and always will be an Indo-Pacific nation. From our first trading ships that departed for
Canton just after the American Revolution to our first consular presence in Kolkata in
1794, U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific is a story of trade, exchange, shared sacrifice,
and mutual benefit.” 14 Later that year, the U.S. Department of Defense published a
strategy report that unequivocally stated “The Indo-Pacific is the Department of
Defense’s priority theater.” 15 President Biden has further developed the concept of a “free
and open Indo-Pacific.” The February 2022 update “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United
States” published by the White House begins with an even stronger claim than that of the
previous administration: “The United States is an Indo-Pacific power.” 16 This publication

13

Ibid., 2.
“A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision,” U.S. Department of
State, 2019, 5, accessed April 18, 2022, https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf
15
“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked
Region,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2019, 4, accessed April 18, 2022,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OFDEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF
16
“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” White House, 2022, 4, accessed April 18,
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-PacificStrategy.pdf
14

11

defines the Indo-Pacific as “stretching from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean.” 17
This spatial claim attempts to naturalize U.S. presence in Asia through references to
physical geomorphology. If the U.S. borders the Pacific, it must be part of the IndoPacific. This vision of the region effectively gives license to the U.S. to engage in trade,
development, and geopolitical relations with nearly the entire global south.
The terms counterinsurgent and counterterror refer to an overlapping set of
strategies and tools of low intensity warfare. The use of the word counterinsurgency in
printed media has peaked three times in the past 60 years, first increasing dramatically in
the 1960s, then again in the mid-1980s, exceeding the peak in usage of the 1960s, and
increasing exponentially after 9/11. Counterterror came into usage in the 1940s, increased
in the 1980s, and increased in usage exponentially after 9/11. Both terms were at their
highest usage level from 2008-2012. 18 While both terms refer to political and military
actions taken against people who have been deemed a threat to the state, counterterrorism
conveys a certain urgency and legitimacy in popular understanding. It functions as a sort
of post-9/11 rebranding of counterinsurgency to ignite public imagination.
Counterterrorism evokes the U.S. war on terror and the associated surveillance
efforts domestically that people in the U.S. experience when, for example, we remove our
shoes and pose with our hands above our heads in an Advanced Image Technology (AIT)

“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 2022.
This data comes from Google Books Ngram Viewer. Google Book Ngram Viewer
generates graphs based on the number of times the word or words a user provides appear
in a corpus of books over a selected period of time. For my analysis, I searched for data
from all books published in English from 1800 to 2019. See:
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=counterinsurgency%2C+counterterror&
year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=26&smoothing=3&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cco
unterinsurgency%3B%2Cc0%3B.t1%3B%2Ccounterterror%3B%2Cc0
17
18
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scanner at the airport for Transportation Security Administration. The U.S. context for
counterterrorism is tied to 9/11 and U.S. Islamophobic projects domestically and abroad.
These strategies and tools of the post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts are increasingly also
applied against Black and Indigenous political movements within the borders of the U.S.
state, most notably in the use of tanks at 2014 Ferguson protests over the police shooting
of Michael Brown and in the surveillance tactics against water protectors at Standing
Rock by TigerSwan, a security firm that contracts with the U.S. military for its
counterinsurgency efforts in the Middle East and in the borders of the U.S. and Mexico
with the Border Patrol Tactical Unit. 19
This proliferation of counterinsurgency tactics is part of what scholars such as
Nikhil Pal Singh, Alex Lubin, and Ronak Kapadia refer to as the “global war on terror”
or the “forever war,” an ongoing war by nation-states against those they deem to be
threats to state authority. 20 This approach understands the war on terror within a historical
context of imperial and colonial warfare against Indigenous and land-based peoples and
sees it as transmogrifying between places and times. If the opponent fought in the war on
terror is “terror,” and terror is defined by the state, then the war on terror can indeed be
understood as a forever war and any group can be targeted by the state as the source of

19

Steven M. Radil, Raymond J. Dezzani, and Lanny D. McAden, "Geographies of U.S.
Police Militarization and the Role of the 1033 Program," The Professional Geographer
69, no. 2 (2017): 203-213; Alleen Brown, Will Parrish, and Alice Speri, The Intercept,
May 27, 2017, accessed April 19, 2022, https://theintercept.com/2017/05/27/leakeddocuments-reveal-security-firms-counterterrorism-tactics-at-standing-rock-to-defeatpipeline-insurgencies/
20
Nikhil Pal Singh, Race and America's Long War (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2017); Alex Lubin, Never-Ending War on Terror (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2020); Ronak K. Kapadia, Insurgent Aesthetics, (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2019).
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terror. Similarly, the war on terror is so abstract as to be placeless; it can be fought both
domestically and abroad, by the United States and other nation-states. Israeli discourse
about Palestine represents Palestinians as terrorists and Israeli occupation as a defense
against terrorism. Similarly, the intensification of Hindu nationalism in India and global
Hindutva can be read as an imperial reinforcement and proliferation of the war on terror,
in which proponents of Hindutva take up the language of the U.S. war on terror to serve
their own interests in a project of global Islamophobia. 21
The U.S. is not the only state to conflate its Islamophobic and anti-Indigenous
agendas. Israel and India have taken up the language of the war on terror to describe both
Palestinian movements and Kashmiri movements, respectively, while simultaneously
enacting settler colonial policies on Palestinian and Kashmiri lands. India refers to
Adivasi and tribal peoples in India alternately as insurgent, terrorist, Maoist, and
secessionist, and continues to dispossess Adivasis of their lands by expelling them from
forest areas “protected” for environmental conservation efforts and accusing tribal people
in northeast India of poaching protected species. 22 In India, mechanisms such as the 2020
Citizenship Amendment Act create a pathway to Indian citizenship for “illegal
immigrants” of five religions, but this act excludes Muslim immigrants. Protests erupted
in states in northeast India, which is home both to many Indigenous peoples as well as
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many migrants from neighboring countries. Muslim migrants protested their exclusion
from the CAA, while Indigenous peoples in Assam protested the act for fear that granting
citizenship to migrants of any religion would make Indigenous peoples minorities in their
own lands. 23 Islamophobic and anti-Indigenous projects are intertwined.
The U.S.-Israel-India project of multiple imperialisms in collaborative
counterinsurgent warfare is an anti-Indigenous colonial project as much as it an
Islamophobic project. In fact, Islamophobia and anti-Indigenous counterinsurgency are
overlapping and mutually reinforcing imperial epistemologies that must be considered in
relationship to each other. While scholars from Transnational American studies, political
science, and critical ethnic studies have examined connections between these sites via
analyses of Islamophobia and U.S. imperialism, I am interested in how imperial and
colonial practices take meaning through control and surveillance of Indigenous territory.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine this trilateral techno-imperial coalition as a
fundamentally colonial project of Indigenous land theft, displacement, exclusion, and
genocide. Furthermore, I argue that while these imperial projects coexist in the
contemporary moment, anti-Indigenous colonial projects undergird and serve as testing
grounds for counterinsurgent war domestically and abroad.
Indigeneity
Indigeneity is defined and taken up unevenly as a category across these three
states. In later chapters, I will discuss in detail how the state polices and surveils
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Indigeneity towards its own security as well as how Indigeneity is taken up (or not) and
mobilized against the settler state. For the purpose of foregrounding this conversation, I
will briefly discuss here how Indigeneity as a subject position is defined and put in to
play both by the states of interest in this dissertation and by the land-based peoples whom
these states surveil. Rather than assume that Indigeneity is clearly defined within first
world Anglo settler states and tenuous elsewhere, I assert that Indigeneity is complex,
contested, and continually reexamined globally. There need not be agreement within a
particular land-based community on the definition of Indigeneity, or on a singular route
to take to assert sovereignty, self-determination, or nationhood, in order for Indigeneity to
be taken up as an analytic to understand the complex creation and severing of relations
through colonialism.
I follow Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel in understanding Indigenous peoples
as those who are “Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention
with the colonial societies and states that have spread out from Europe and other centers
of empire.” 24 Indigeneity is marked both by a political relationship to the colonial nationstate and by a cultural identity marked by a community’s shared language, polity,
spiritual practices, and other characteristics that are distinct from those of the occupying
state. Both these political and cultural identifiers, however, are based on Indigenous
peoples’ historic and ongoing relationships to the lands they inhabit, which Alfred and
Corntassel call an “oppositional, place-based-existence.” 25 The oppositional politics
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operating in their definition is at the core of George Manuel’s 1974 articulation of the
“Fourth World,” a global movement of and for Indigenous nations who were excluded
from the formal process of decolonization in the mid twentieth century. 26 Manuel
explicitly articulated the Fourth World as a global project:
Our celebration will embrace the aboriginal peoples of the world: The
Indians of the Americas, the Lapps of Northern Scandinavia, the
Polynesian and Pacific Basin peoples, the Basques of Spain, the Welsh
and Celts of Great Britain, the Maori and Australian aborigines. These are
the peoples whom we know, but there are more. Within the Soviet Union,
China, Japan, and Ceylon are numerous peoples unknown in the Western
world who share the status and perhaps the fate of the Western
aborigines. 27
Geographer Bernard Nietschmann elaborated on this notion of the Fourth World in an
examination of the relationship between the Third World and the Fourth World. While
Third World countries emerged from former European colonies, Nietschmann argues, the
development of the Third World is “achieved by the invasion and forced annexation” of
the Fourth World. 28 Nietschmann distinguishes between what he terms “nation peoples”
and “state peoples.” While a nation is made up of a common people who share a
geographically bounded territory, a state “is a centralized political system, recognized by
other states, that uses a civilian and military bureaucracy to enforce one set of
institutions, laws and sometimes language and religion within its claimed boundaries.” 29
The Indigenous Fourth World, then, is made up of “nation peoples” with their
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relationships to their land at the core of their identity as nations, and the war on the
Fourth World is fundamentally a geographic, territorial war to annex Indigenous lands.
Nietschmann describes how “nation peoples” are rarely identified on their own terms, but
are instead referred to by terms that attempt to depoliticize, such as peasants, minorities,
or ethnic groups, or by terms that erase their identities as nations in order to represent
them as a violent threats to the state, such as terrorists, insurgents, and separatists. 30 To
identify as Indigenous, then, is a fundamentally political stance as well as a geographic
and spatial stance.
Settler colonial studies frames first world Anglo nation-states, including the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as different from other nation-states
with regards to Indigeneity due to their formation as imperial colonies that became
independent states on the territories Britain colonized. These states stand in contrast to
other nation-states which were formed in the period of decolonization when imperial
powers withdrew from the territories they colonized. 31 While the United States
acknowledges the presence of Indigenous peoples within its borders, it resists
identification as a colonizing entity. The Salt Water Thesis, promoted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1960 in the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” asserted that only colonized territories that were
separated from the colonizing power by ocean were eligible for decolonization and self-
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determination. 32 This made Indigenous nations in places like the United States ineligible
for decolonization through the rubrics of the United Nations.
The boundaries of the category of Indigenous remain troubled and unsettled. In
addition to sovereign-to-sovereign treaties between Native nations and the state, tribal
sovereignty in the United States is defined through a number of federal acts and supreme
court cases such as the Marshall trilogy, three Supreme Court cases which affirmed that
private citizens could not purchase land from Native nations, established Native nations
as domestic dependents of the U.S., and determined that only the federal government
could deal with Native nations, excluding state governments from these dealings. Today,
the U.S. federal government recognizes 574 tribes within the 48 contiguous states. These
tribes are recognized to have tribal sovereignty, however limited, and entitled to specific
benefits and protections based on their relationship to the federal government. 33 Defining
Indigeneity within the United States is heavily influenced by the federal government’s
definition of the “tribe” and reliant on formal processes of recognition by the federal
government. 34 In this way, treaty-based tribes are ascribed validity by the federal
government as Indigenous, while the Indigeneity of non-treaty-based tribes, such as
Indigenous peoples from Latin America or the U.S./Mexico borderlands, is often erased

32

Sheryl Lightfoot and David B. MacDonald, "The United Nations as Both Foe and
Friend to Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination," in The United Nations: Friend or
Foe of Self-Determination? ed. Jakob R. Augustin, (Bristol: E-International Relations
Publishing, 2020): 32-46; “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples,” United Nations General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, accessed
April 19, 2022, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1514(XV)
33
“Federally recognized Indian Tribes and Resources for Native Americans,” USA.gov,
accessed May 13, 2022, https://www.usa.gov/tribes
34
Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2011)

19

or called into question in the U.S. context. Joanne Barker argues that “the erasure of
Indigeneity from Indigenous Africans, Central and South Americans, and people from the
rest of the world when they are in the U.S. and Canada is another means by which the
state claims its jurisdictional authority to identify who is or is not Indigenous.” 35 As in
the 1960 General Assembly of the UN, the United States continues to have an outsize
influence on how Indigeneity and Indigenous rights are defined globally.
India simultaneously claims that all Indian citizens are Indigenous and that no one
in India is Indigenous. After India voted in favor of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, it later presented a statement on India’s position
regarding the report of the 9th Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The representative of India
reiterated the definition of Indigeneity used in ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989,
concluding: “Consistent with this definition, we regard the entire population of India at
the time of our Independence, and their successors, to be indigenous.” 36 The
representative went on to contest the use of the term “Indigenous” to be synonymous with
“tribals,” as was done in two reports submitted to the Permanent Forum that year. “We
would like to reiterate that we have a clear understanding on the distinction between the
two terminologies,” India’s representative said, but did not further clarify this distinction.
Furthermore, he asserted that the use of the term Indigenous by so-called “minority
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groups” was in fact diverting attention and resources from “indigenous issues.” 37 These
claims echoed India’s position in 2007 when it signed UNDRIP. At that time, India
expressed that it supported Indigenous peoples’ rights and asserted that Indigenous
peoples could only be those under “foreign domination” and could not apply to
“sovereign Independent states or to a section of a people or a nation.” 38 In this statement,
India effectively reiterated the Salt Water Thesis of the 1960s to distance itself from any
notion of Indigeneity within India’s borders.
The distinction between “tribal” and “Indigenous” is also troubled within Indian
law. India’s constitution establishes a category that distinguishes Scheduled Tribes from
other citizens of India. Scheduled Tribes, while not explicitly defined with the Indian
constitution, are identified by characteristics of difference from Indian society writ large.
This category is used to “mark out a group of people different in physical features,
language, religion, custom, social organization and so on.” Scheduled Tribes are often
described by the lands they inhabit as “hill and forest tribes.” 39 Since at least the 1980s,
members of Scheduled Tribes have increasingly identified as Indigenous and used the
term to express a specific subject position in relation to the Indian state. Furthermore,
many scholars argue that “while India is understood as “postcolonial” …the Indian state
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functions like an imperial, colonizing entity in its tribal and borderland territories.” 40
These scholars engage theories from critical Indigenous studies, Native American and
First Nations studies, and global Indigenous studies to examine the politics of Indigeneity
and Scheduled Tribes in India. 41
While scholarly discourse recognizes Israel as a settler colonial state, Indigeneity
in Palestine/Israel is a fraught question. The ambiguity of defining Indigeneity and its
multiple iterations mean that both Zionists and Palestinians have made claims to
Indigeneity, not to mention the colonial imaginary of Palestine/Israel as a homeland and
rightful place for American Christian Zionists. Scholars and activists engage in
comparative and relational discourse linking Native experiences in the United States to
those of Palestinians, making their individual experiences of colonialism legible on a
global scale. 42 This also marks Palestinian experiences as part of global and historical
practices of colonization rather than as ahistorical, individual, and isolated circumstances.
40
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This relational discourse refers to a historicized understanding of spatial occupation of
territory, such as Sa’ed Adel Atshan’s critique of Joy Harjo’s acceptance of a residency
in Tel Aviv in which he referred to “our shared history as indigenous peoples who have
faced ethnic cleansing by European colonists.” 43 Mark Rifkin examines how apartheid
and settler colonialism are taken up as descriptors of Israel and considers what work these
framings do in scholarship and political movements for Palestine. Rifkin argues that both
framings overshadow Indigenous self-determination and suggests that Indigeneity as an
analytic exposes Zionist exceptionalism and puts Palestine studies in conversation with
global scholarly work about settler colonialism. 44 In these relational approaches,
Palestinian Indigeneity is defined through shared experiences of ongoing colonialism and
a political relationship to an occupying state.
Within the recognition frameworks of international bodies such as the United
Nations, Palestinian Bedouin of the Naqab are recognized as Indigenous peoples. As
such, Palestinian Bedouins have attended meetings of the UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues and the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 45
The UN does not have an absolute definition of Indigeneity, but rather, the UNDRIP
expresses a number of characteristics from which Indigeneity is often defined. Palestinian
Bedouins were recognized as Indigenous on the basis of cultural distinctiveness,
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continuity of cultural practices, and inhabitance of the Naqab prior to the formation of the
state of Israel. Scholars such as Lana Tatour argue that the emphasis on cultural
distinctiveness and continuity of cultural practices reduces Indigeneity to an assessment
of cultural authenticity and erases the political claims of Indigenous peoples. In the
process, non-Bedouin Palestinian identification as Indigenous is ignored as not culturally
distinct enough to be legitimate. Tatour writes:
As Palestinians, our right to land is political, not cultural. So is our
indigeneity. Our understanding of indigeneity stands in contrast to the
ways in which indigeneity is defined under international law. As
Palestinians, we know that we are indigenous and we do not need
international law to confirm this. We know that we are the natives of this
land. And we know that we are the rightful owners of the land. Our
indigeneity is not a product of our culture. It is the result of our encounter
with the Zionist movement as a settler colonial enterprise. 46
Tatour critiques the rubrics of international law for recognizing Indigeneity based on
cultural aspects. Instead, Tatour defines Indigeneity as an identity that emerges from
political relationship between prior inhabitants of a place and a colonizing, occupying
state.
In summary: The United States recognizes Indigenous peoples within its borders,
but closely polices who is included within its definition of Indigeneity. The U.S. has
limited and continues to limit the extent of tribal sovereignty through multiple
mechanisms including recognition, assimilation, genocide, blood quantum, and the
installation of western governance systems as tribal government. 47 India rejects the
notion of Indigenous peoples within its territorial borders while simultaneously
recognizing Scheduled Tribes which are differentiated from the general population of
46
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India by the distinctiveness of their history, culture, language, religion, polities,
governance, and relation to land. India marks this difference as an indication of
“backwardness” and has created both the category of Scheduled Tribe and policy
“reservations” for these peoples who are seen as in need of improvement. Within Israel,
Palestinian Bedouins are recognized by the United Nations as Indigenous based on
cultural distinctness. However, glossing over territorial claims and experiences of
colonization in favor of cultural difference erases Palestinian assertions of sovereignty
and peoplehood. While Indigeneity is not taken up uniformly in scholarship about
Palestine or by Palestinian scholars, Indigeneity has increasing momentum as an analytic
through which to understand Palestinian experiences of settler colonialism.
Indigenous Cartographies
In this dissertation, I understand Indigenous mapping as a process of visualizing
space, place, and relation, a mode through which Indigenous peoples mark their historic,
contemporary, and ongoing relations to space and place, other-than-human species,
landscapes, water, air, and volumetric territory. While normative Western cartography
arguably also marks relationships between places, the use of the aerial perspective is
designed to conceal the relation of the mapmaker to the places, territories, and routes
represented on the map. Map projections are designed to privilege some aspects of real
space and place at the expense of distorting others. For example, the familiar Mercator
project is a cylindrical projection that preserves the angles and shapes of objects on the
map but distorts the size of the objects at latitudes further from the equator. At its
extreme north and south edges, the Mercator projection drastically exaggerates the size of
the Arctic and Antarctic. Visually, this means that northern regions, such as western and
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northern Europe, falsely appear to have greater areas relative to other regions. Map
projections are subjective expressions of spatial relationships but they are used as if they
are objective representations of the world as it is. They conceal the cultural
epistemologies and ontologies that undergird the maps. Indigenous mapping not only
generates and strengthens relations to space and place, but it makes explicit the
relationship of the mapmakers to the spaces and places mapped and often requires the
viewers to attempt to situate themselves in relation to the spaces and places depicted.
I engage scholarship on space, place, and mapping in order to theorize the
relationship between colonial territoriality and counterinsurgency. The literature on maps,
mapping, and imperial and colonial practices of claiming land and creating borders is
wide ranging, varied, and applied across disciplines. Critical scholarship is extensive
within the field of geography, including critical approaches to cartography and
Geographic Information Systems. With regards to mapping and Indigenous politics, there
has been an increase in scholarship and debate around the role of geographers and
geographic methods in the past ten years. 48 Following the recent Bowen expeditions
scandal, in which the U.S. Department of Defense funded community mapping projects
in Indigenous communities in Mexico and used the data collected as counterinsurgency
intel, members of the American Association of Geographers erupted in debate over the
role of geographers in Indigenous research. This led to a resurgence of interest in
Indigenous geographies, Indigenous mapping, and Indigenous research methods within
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geography, resulting in the formation of Indigenous geographies as a recognized subfield
within the field of geography. 49
To a colonial imaginary, “empty” territory is free for the taking. The concept of
terra nullius, or empty land, was first articulated in the Americas through the Doctrine of
Discovery, a European legal principle used to facilitate European colonization throughout
the world. The Doctrine of Discovery gave Europeans the right to claim ownership of
lands they “discovered” and establish political sovereignty and economic systems in
those territories. 50 Under this doctrine, Indigenous people in these places had no claims to
sovereignty, territory, or even presence. 51 Thus, European-discovered lands were
considered to be terra nullius, regardless of the presence of Indigenous peoples. Even
when Europeans acknowledged Indigenous presence, they questioned Indigenous
ownership of the land in order to justify colonization and European territorial claims. 52 In
cases where there was land that was unoccupied, many of these places had previously
been inhabited by Indigenous peoples who died as a result of European disease or
conquest. 53 Terra nullius remains an operating principle of the settler state. In this
dissertation, I suggest that contemporary practices of surveillance not only operate under
the assumption of terra nullius, but also strip territory from the space above and below it,
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such as that the air and the subterranean are not only empty and free for the taking but are
also completely divorced from the surface that separates them.
In contrast to European ways of conceiving of Indigenous space and place as
alternately empty, savage, and unclaimed, scholars of Indigenous studies articulate
Indigenous space and place as a contemporary lived experience and process which asserts
Indigenous presence, sovereignty, resistance, and resurgence. 54 For some scholars,
Indigenous space and place are articulated through cosmologies. Johnson argues that a
sense of place stemming from cosmology is key to Indigenous ontologies and identities. 55
Akana illustrates Indigenous cartographic representations of Indigenous space through
performance and place names. 56 For others, Indigenous space and place take form
through political and legal struggles. Razack articulates how Indigenous place becomes
racialized space through the law of the settler state. 57 Biolsi follows Indigenous space and
place through Indigenous sovereignties, complicating dominant notions of Indigenous
political space to articulate Indigenous sovereignty beyond the confines of the
reservation. 58 Some authors see space and place as integral to Indigenous resistance and
resurgence. For Simpson, Indigenous space and place are the material from which
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Indigenous epistemology, resistance, and resurgence emerge. 59 For Hunt, Indigenous
spaces are those spaces in which Indigenous peoples assert Indigenous ontologies,
whether that be a potlatch or an academic conference. 60
Indigenous space and place are not limited by strict binary boundaries articulated
through points, lines, and polygons on a Cartesian map. Rather, Indigenous space and
place are continually articulated and shaped through Indigenous ontologies and
epistemologies. 61 Indigenous spaces and places are made known in a variety of ways
including through cosmologies, stories about place, sovereignties, land uses, and both
Western and Indigenous mapping practices and processes. 62 Indigenous spaces include
both rural and urban spaces and take into account time, fluid boundaries, and
subjectivities. 63 Indigenous space and place cannot be separated from Indigenous politics.
Instead, they are intimately linked to Indigenous sovereignties that look beyond Western
notions of sovereignty delimited by strict boundaries and within specific bounds of time
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and space. 64 Indeed, Indigenous space and place are integral to Indigenous ontologies and
epistemologies and shape Indigenous political action. 65
I understand Indigenous mapping as including and participating in the history of
counter-mapping or counter-cartography, but Indigenous mapping is not exclusively
made up of these projects. Counter-cartography is often conceived of as “mapping-up,” in
which the direction “up” indicates a hierarchical relationship between mapper and those
being mapped. Mapping-down is the realm of traditional cartography, for example
mapping down would be the realm of a map made by Columbus of the lands he claimed
to have discovered in 1492. Mapping-up indicates that those who have the greater amount
of power are being mapped by those with less power: for example, a map of eviction
notices in San Francisco by the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project. 66 However, mapping-up
is at risk of continuing to center normative relations of power, continually re-centering
the colonial state as the subject or primary actor and reinforcing the binary between
colonizer and colonized. Indigenous geographies, attuned to sovereignty, selfdetermination, and nationhood, offer cartographic practices that neither center the
colonizing state nor work solely within its logics.
In quantitative spatial theory, scale on a map illustrates the mathematical
relationship between space-on-the-map and space-on-the ground. The greater the scale,
the greater the margin of incompleteness. In visual terms, the more space-on-the-ground
64
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that is condensed into a small space-on-the-map, the more information that must be left
out of the map. Scale tells us something about the relationship between two objects or
subjects. Centering a map on one place makes representations of distance, scale, shape,
and size most accurate for that place. But this throws everything else out of proportion,
grossly exaggerating some aspects of a map, while shrinking other aspects to oblivion.
This is a map’s projection. Every projection, then, is a geographic imaginary, marking
space as the map maker sees it or wants others to see it.
Digital approaches to cartography, called Geographic Information Systems (GIS),
allow cartographers to jump between different projections and scales, attempting to
rectify what one map leaves out by stacking many map layers on top of each other and
bringing one to the top or bottom of the stack to highlight its contents. None of the layers
offers a complete, accurate, and precise landscape representation on its own, but together
these layers attempt to give a more complete view of the subject.
Through reliance on both the aerial perspective and on militarized ground patrol,
counterinsurgent efforts claim that the space-on-the-map (e.g. the aerial perspective) is
equal to the space-on-the-ground (e.g. militarized occupation). This is physically
impossible. The aerial perspective is important to counterinsurgent efforts because it
represents the ability to see all. But the further elevated the observer is from the subject,
the less detail and accuracy the perspective preserves. The aerial perspective provides
only a momentary snapshot view of the surface. Central to colonial spatial
representations of Indigenous territory is the ability to visualize and therefore presume to
know that space. In this chapters that follow, I draw on scholars within and outside of
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transnational American studies who write about the aerial perspective, 67 visual culture of
war, 68 technologies of surveillance, 69 counterinsurgency, 70 and terror. 71
Decentering the State
To understand the techno-imperial collaborations of the U.S., India, and Israel, I
engage Edward Said’s notion of contrapuntalism to examine the imbrication of culture
and politics across space and time. Contrapuntalism is a methodology to study relational
histories without privileging one history over another, but rather by uncovering the
connections and disruptions between histories that are often seen as separate and
unrelated. Contrapuntalism requires reading across archives that are not often read
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together and reading against the grain of archives to find the interstices at which
seemingly disparate histories convene and intersect.
Edward Said develops the concept of contrapuntalism as a methodological and
reading approach in his 1993 monograph Culture and Imperialism. Said argues that
Western literature carries a trace of imperial and colonial conditions, revealing how
important imperialism is to notions of modernity and cultural identity formation. For
Said, a contrapuntal analysis reveals the connection between, for example, English
coronation rituals and nineteenth century Indian durbars. 72 Such an analysis highlights
the connection between “the experiences of domination and being dominated,” making
possible new emancipatory visions through what Said calls a nomadic, migratory, and
anti-narrative energy.” 73 Said borrows the idea of contrapuntalism from music theory,
writing:
In the counterpoint of Western classical music, various themes play off
one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular
one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an
organized interplay that derives from the theses, not from a rigorous
melodic or formal principle outside the work. In the same way, I believe
we can read and interpret English novels, for example, whose engagement
(usually suppressed for the most part) with the West Indies or India, say, is
shaped and perhaps even determined by the specific history of
colonization, resistance, and finally native nationalism. At this point
alternative or new narratives emerge, and they become institutionalized or
discursively stable entities. 74
Said developed this concept from his previous work on pianist Glenn Gould’s
recordings of Bach's Goldberg Variations. 75 These fugues are based on a counterpoint in
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which the pianist's hands move simultaneously along at least two separate melodic lines.
While seemingly independent, these melodic lines frequently converge on a shared note,
cross to enter the other's register as the pianist's hands cross along the keyboard, and,
even when the melodic lines seem to diverge, create harmonies. Composed for a 2manual harpsichord with two parallel keyboards stacked on top of each other, the
independent melodies of Bach’s counterpoint are spatially separated on the instrument,
even when they play in melodic unison. Moments of dissonance resolve into unexpected
harmonies which reveal relationship or even imitation between the hands. The melodic
lines are independent in rhythm and contour (or time and space) but are harmonically
interdependent, such that each independent melodic line converges into a polyphonic
whole. The melodic contour of the fugue as a whole is different from the two melodies
that form it even as it is dependent on those independent melodies. For Said, the interplay
between culture (as read in literature) and imperialism (as read in international
geopolitics) forms a contrapuntal relationship like the hands on the keyboard. According
to Keith Feldman, Said also saw contrapuntalism as a method of studying relational
histories or “thinking together” of seemingly disparate histories. 76
Contrapuntalism provides a means through which scholars can decenter the U.S.
and American exceptionalism by examining U.S. culture, history, and imperialism as one
thread of a polyphonic arrangement of histories, cultures, exceptionalisms, colonialisms,
and imperialisms. Said’s theory of contrapuntalism helps scholars of American studies
see transnationalism as a method, in addition to transnationalism as subject, object, or
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political aim. 77 Contrapuntalism as method highlights the links, relations, overlapping,
and conflicts that transnational American studies seeks to uncover. While the
transnational turn in American studies generates approaches that go against a more
comparative, state-oriented internationalist scholarship, contrapuntalism as a method
enables scholars to further decenter America in American studies, such that one might do
American studies within a project that is not strictly Americanist. Contrapuntalism can be
operationalized in hemispheric approaches or can be used to develop a critique of
American exceptionalism, but it also provides an opportunity to zoom out, as it were, and
examine the transnational impulses and oscillations that reverberate whether or not our
focus is on “America.” Here, the goal is not just to critique American exceptionalism,
thereby re-centering America through its critique, but to decenter America and American
exceptionalism through examining them in relation to, or in counterpoint with, other
global narratives. In this project, I highlight the imperial projects that link together
Indigenous experiences of colonial surveillance across continents.
This project uses interdisciplinary methods, drawing from archival, visual, and
geographic methods. Like many scholars within American studies, I conceive of my
archive broadly, extending from legal documents and transcripts, to letters and writings,
to cultural production such as graphic novels and film. Legal documents provide a
window into the colonial processes at work and the formal ways in which analogous
claims between nations, peoples, and contexts are made. These legal documents allow me
to consider how colonial law attempts to supersede an Indigenous polity by policing
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Indigenous peoples through the politics of recognition or the creation of political and
spatial imaginaries to attempt to limit Indigenous sovereignty and territory. I draw on
informal texts that circulate as community archives to illuminate how Indigenous peoples
work within or subvert global systems of power and inequality in service to transnational
Indigenous struggles for decolonization. Cultural production reveals how anti-colonial
politics are taken up within the imaginations and everyday lives of Indigenous peoples.
This broadly conceived archive enables me to consider the formal and informal ways in
which Indigenous peoples confront ongoing colonialism and how the concept of
Indigeneity transits internationally.
Aerial Perspective
Inspired by scholarship on ocean and archipelago as a method of querying
colonial and imperial transit, I take up the concept of air as method. Considering air's
materiality, I examine how, though commonly conceived to be empty, air is full,
inhabited, and moving. Air is not stagnant. It has currents and takes shapes informed by
the landscape and climate with which it interacts. Air can cross human borders but is still
affected by the conditions of life in different places (e.g. pollution). Air circulates and
distributes qualities, so that people and places can be affected by conditions of life far
removed from them geographically. This is an aerial take on Said’s notion of
contrapuntalism - seemingly disparate places and experiences may be linked through the
air they breathe, affected by movements and currents, and may catch drifts across fields,
however unseen. Air circulates, flows through currents, and is transnational. It is not
empty, but active. It is not simply full, but moving, its constituents in a given place
changing and moving over time. Air is also shaped by the conditions on and below the
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ground. Landforms affect wind currents, limiting both their horizontal and vertical
movement. Meanwhile, what happens underground, such as mining, drilling, and
fracking, can change the load of particulate matter in the air or deplete ozone. Taking up
air as a material through which to understand contrapuntal relationships of colonialism, I
seek to demonstrate how the aerial perspective actively shapes what happens on and
below the ground.
Caren Kaplan asserts that the aerial perspective is reified as the “ultimate
objective representation.” 78 Today, phrases like the “30,000-foot view” are invoked to
insinuate a big picture perspective of an issue or situation, suggesting that this view, from
the cruising elevation of a commercial jet, provides one with the perspective to see all
elements involved and enabling one to critically assess and strategize based on this view.
Christopher Schaberg challenges this figure of speech. Contrary to assumptions of the
aerial view as a data-rich emblem of planning and oversight that is imbued with a sense
of awe consistent with aerial perspective as God View, Schaberg asserts that the 30,000foot view is, in fact, quite limited and subjective. The view out of a passenger window on
a commercial jet is a narrow, oblique view of a small fraction of the surface below, if that
surface is not obscured by clouds. Even the flight tracker on the screen in the back of the
seat of a commercial jet provides limited information, showing only the plane’s latitude
and longitude in relation to the major cities and borders over which it passes. This is not
the all-seeing, all-knowing perspective it purports to be. 79
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The ascendance and persistence of the aerial view as a means through which to
understand the world indicates the centrality of the aerial perspective to both
contemporary colonial governance and fears of insurgency. In fact, colonial and imperial
investments in technologies based on the aerial perspective seek to gain a monopoly on
surveillance via the view-from-above. Scholarship on the aerial perspective and the visual
culture of war examines the figure of drone as an imperial investment that attempts to
combine the omniscient view of the aerial perspective with the precision and intimacy of
first-person experience on the ground. 80 In recent years the U.S. has increased regulation
to meet the rapid increase of commercial and hobby drones held by private individuals.
For example, on August 3, 2021, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the
birthplace of the atomic bomb in northern New Mexico, issued a press release to remind
the “drone flying public” that the LANL is a “No Drone Zone.” LANL’s press release
stated that unauthorized drone flights had been detected over LANL which is designated
restricted airspace by both the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Nuclear
Security Administration. The August 3 press release issued a warning, emphasizing its
use of Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (CUAS) to detect, intercept, and destroy
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unauthorized unmanned aerial vehicles within the territorial boundaries of Los Alamos
National Laboratory:
“The drone flying public should be reminded that all airspace over the
Laboratory is protected against unauthorized drone or UAS flights…We
can detect and track a UAS, and if it poses a threat, we have the ability to
disrupt control of the system, seize or exercise control, confiscate, or use
reasonable force to disable, damage or destroy the UAS.” 81
By invoking a “drone flying public,” the press release sets the public against the best
interests of the nation, making anyone a potential security threat. Colonial anxieties about
aerial counter-surveillance are made evident in this policing of hobby drones, treating any
unmanned aerial vehicle as a potential threat to the nation-state and every drone pilot as a
possible insurgent. This tension about who can use the aerial perspective is repeated in
many sites and at many scales, including at Standing Rock (discussed in chapter five) and
in Palestine (discussed in chapter 4). By using the aerial perspective and technologies
built around the aerial perspective, Indigenous artists, activists, creators, and
cartographers are identified as insurgent operators and threats to the state. In the
following chapters, I examine how Indigenous artists and cartographers take up the aerial
perspective on their own terms or subvert it with oblique, cross-sectional, threedimensional, and ephemeral, time-based perspectives.
Volumetric
This understanding of the aerial is in conversation with the volumetric. In a 2013
paper published in Political Geography titled “Secure the Volume: Vertical Geopolitics
81
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and the Depth of Power,” Stuart Elden plays on the military and police phrase “secure the
area” to argue that our understandings of state control and geopolitics are often limited to
a two-dimensional understanding of territory. 82 Elden asks how our understanding of
geopolitics might shift if we understood territory as volumetric. Drawing on the work of
Paul Virilio and photographs of the West Bank and the Israel/Lebanon border, Elden
takes cues from the verticality of Israeli infrastructure and architecture to argue that “geometrics” must be taken into account in the study of geopolitics. 83 Elden’s argument builds
on the work of Israeli architect and theorist Eyal Weizman who argues that a
consideration of the vertical is essential to understand territorial governance in
Palestine/Israel. Weizman calls this the “politics of verticality,” which he says “requires
an Escher-like representation of space, a territorial hologram in which political acts of
manipulation and multiplication of the territory transform a two-dimensional surface in a
three-dimensional volume.” 84 For both Elden and Weizman, considering the vertical
necessitates a volumetric understanding of territory. Colonial, imperial, and
counterinsurgent violence is enacted volumetrically, through aerial drone strikes,
bombings (both at the surface and dropped from the air), and even below the surface,
through investment in bunkers, submarines, and other technologies that hide the tools of
war.
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In the chapters that follow, I ask how our understanding of Indigenous
sovereignty shifts if we understand territory as having volume. I argue that Indigenous
peoples already understand territory as volumetric, and that this conceptualization of
volumetric territory allows Indigenous nations to assert sovereignty and selfdetermination that is not limited by the spatial and legal bounds of the states that occupy
them.
Atmospheric
To be atmospheric is to be constant and to be enveloped. Eric Stanley theorizes
“atmospheres of violence” as state processes of inclusion that, rather than making safe
what was unsafe, enable the violent expansion of the state at the expense of those it
forcibly includes. 85 This violent expansion of the state is multisensorial, such that the use
of tear gas and sound deployment, for example, become practices of what Anna
Feigenbaum and Anja Kanngieser term “atmospheric policing.” 86 These violent
atmospheres become known affectively when we are enveloped in them. Derek
McCormack expands on scholarship on the aerial and the volumetric to emphasis the
voluminous qualities of the volumetric, or what McCormack calls the “intensive
spaciousness of atmosphere.” 87 McCormack considers the envelopment of atmospheres
in the figure of the balloon, arguing that the condition of being enveloped enables
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humans and others, including living being and non-living entities and agencies, to sense
the atmospheric conditions in which they are enveloped. 88 McCormack writes:
Envelopment is a process for sensing a condition; it is a process through
which atmospheric things emerge whose form, shape, and duration
depends upon their capacity to sense and respond to the atmospheres in
which they are immersed. It is the process by which entities emerge within
a milieu from which they differ without becoming discontinuous, in the
same way that a cloud is a process of differentiation within an atmosphere
without necessarily being discontinuous with it.89
In the context of this dissertation, I am interested in McCormack’s formulation of
atmospheric things as conditions and states of being that can be sensed through
envelopment. Colonial surveillance is simultaneously atmospheric, in that it surrounds
and provides context for everything within its viewfinder, and is also moving and
flowing, in that it only need shift perspective to change the atmospheric conditions of
those who are enveloped by it.
Overview of the Dissertation
Fanon asks: “But how do we pass from the atmospheres of violence to violence in
action?” 90 This dissertation is about the relationship between counterinsurgent violence in
action and atmospheres of violence through colonial surveillance. The dissertation
contains three sections. Each section focuses on a different aspect of the volume of
Indigenous territory: air, surface, and subterranean. Each section is made up of two
chapters; the first chapter of the section focuses on digital cartographic projects; the
second chapter focuses on analog cartographic projects.
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In section one titled “Air,” I examine the politics of Indigeneity in India, arguing
that surveillance and territorial abstractions of Indigenous land as a “disturbed area”
shapes Indigenous experiences of and relationships to colonialism. In chapter one, “Birds
Eye View: Aerial Surveillance and Producing the Indigenous Subject in India,” I consider
the legal categories designed to surveil Indigenous identity and claims to land. I examine
two maps produced by the Nagaland State GIS and Remote Sensing Centre that situate
Nagaland within an Asia-Pacific and Global South context and challenge the Indian
central government-administered boundaries within Naga territories. I place these spatial
contestations in the context of the politics of Indigeneity in India, as India both disavows
Indigeneity and surveils it through legal frameworks of recognition. I examine how
Indigeneity is taken up in Indian political discourse, including categories of Indigenous,
aboriginal, and Adivasi. While dominant discourse engages with Indigeneity in India
primarily through the development and uplift of so-called backwards peoples, Nagas and
other Indigenous peoples in the Himalayan border region of India articulate an
Indigeneity that looks beyond the borders of India to international forums and solidarities
with other Indigenous peoples.
In chapter two, “What Nagas Eat: Sovereignty and Kinship Under Lockdown,” I
consider the surveillance and policing of Naga eating in India and how what Nagas eat
informs Naga theorizations of sovereignty and territory. I focus on geospatial data
collection for environmental surveillance as a site of political contestation which works to
further the colonial project in Nagaland, even when the data is not originally intended to
do so. I place the territorial imaginary of the Armed Forces Special Power Act in
conversation with a graphic short story to illustrate how the categorization of the
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“disturbed area” is challenged by Indigenous peoples “on the ground.” I engage with
emerging theorizations of Naga sovereignty that deemphasize Westphalian, recognitionbased sovereignty and move away from dominant rights-based frameworks towards a
historical and embodied framework of Indigenous Naga sovereignty.
In section two, I consider the earth's surface. Chapter three, “Ground Truth in
Palestine: Open Maps in Occupied Territories,” examines the use of geospatial
technologies such as GPS, GIS, and public map resources such as Google Maps and
OpenStreetMap in Palestine, as well as political dialogue around these technologies by
groups like 7amleh, the Arab Center for Social Media Advancement. Routes determined
by Google Maps, 7amleh argues, are safe for Israeli citizens, but put Palestinian travelers
at risk, as they pass through Israeli military zones, checkpoints, and settlements. 7amleh
also draws attention to the inconsistencies in labelling on Google Maps, where Israeli
settlements are marked, but Palestinian villages are not recognized. In this chapter on the
surface, I consider how the aerial perspective flattens and simplifies the political
topography of territory and in so doing creates conditions of danger and fear in some
populations, while protecting others.
Even the satellite imagery obscures. Where most of publicly available satellite
imagery of the Arab world has an average resolution of 0.5 meters, aerial imagery of
Palestine has a resolution of 2 meters. It is 16 times less detailed. While major land cover
can be observed at this resolution, the encroachment of small-scale developments is
obscured. In chapter four, “Palestine Pixelated: Imagined Geographic Futures in the
Landscapes of Jordan Nassar,” I consider these questions of resolution, transparency, and
opaqueness in relation to speculative representations of Palestinian landscapes. I analyze
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the work of Jordan Nassar, a Palestinian-American artist who integrates traditional
embroidery processes with digital design to imagine Palestinian landscape futures. Nassar
plays with pixilation in digital design and traditional embroidery patterns, then overlays
embroidered maps of Palestinian landscapes as he imagines them, as they could be. In
Nassar’s zines, photocopies blur both traditional Palestinian embroidery designs as well
as pixelated images of Arab landscapes.
In section three, titled “Subterranean,” I analyze visual culture associated with
Indigenous movements for environmental justice in the U.S. I consider how cultural
production pushes back against the colonial idea that the subterranean can be claimed
independently from the earth's surface and examine activism against pipelines and mining
through cultural production that addresses both two- and three-dimensional conceptions
of Indigenous territory. In chapter five, “Sensing Remotely: Indigenous Landscapes in
360˚,” I analyze digital territorial representations that offer alternatives to the aerial
perspective to make what is underground visible and re-orient viewers to the relationships
between areas above, below, and on the surface of the earth. I analyze the video game
Thunderbird Strike, which uses a cross-sectional view to trace the connections between
what is above, below, and on the surface of the earth, and virtual reality piece
“Poise/end,” which invites the viewer to experience the effects of uranium mining in
multi-dimensional space-time.
In chapter six, “Putting Indian Country on the Map: Indigenous Practices of
Spatial Justice,” I examine the Zuni Map Art Project, which encodes cultural information
in images so that only those initiated can interpret what is visible to all, and performance
cartography of the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition, which uses Zuni spatial practices to
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represent Zuni territorial sovereignty. These representations of Indigenous space and
place challenge colonial understandings of territory as bordered, two-dimensional, timebound, and divisible into discrete units.
In the conclusion, I reflect on the spaces of Indigenous insurgence that contribute
to Indigenous community strength while marking Indigenous peoples as targets of the
state. Indigenous peoples navigate the hurdles the state places upon them, such as
assimilation, genocide, bureaucratic entanglements. While the state leads us to believe
that some paths will lift the target off the backs of Indigenous peoples, there is no way to
avoid being seen as insurgent. Even those most cooperative with the state are always seen
as at risk of becoming instruments of insurgency. Drawing on stories of my family’s
participation in the Naga sovereignty movement, I consider sites of Indigenous spatial
knowledge production where the colonial state’s territoriality is questioned and revealed
to be tenuous and instable. I close with a reflection on the role of theory building in
Indigenous movements as a process of making real the dreams we enact in everyday life.
American studies includes a growing undercurrent of scholarship that examines
empire and colony transnationally, looking at everyday practices of militarism that shape
the globe, within and beyond the Americas. I draw on this genealogy to examine how
everyday militarism, enacted transnationally, shapes global colonial relations. My
research agenda intervenes in this transnational turn through an examination of how
Indigeneity is defined and taken up within geopolitics, linking seemingly disparate
nation-states in a shared rubric for domination of Indigenous territory while
simultaneously creating the conditions of possibility for transnational Indigenous
solidarity.
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This project examines representations of Indigenous territory volumetrically to
consider how Indigenous territory is claimed and represented aerially, on the surface, and
below ground. Through a multi-site approach to comparative colonialisms, I seek to
demonstrate how local struggles over Indigenous territory are struggles of global,
geopolitical import. I expect this research to contribute to debates around surveillance
and contemporary experiences of colonialism within cultural studies, political geography,
and Indigenous studies. Using visual culture methods, I locate technologies of
territoriality through which counterinsurgent and colonial forces establish, represent, and
reify their power, contrasting with the methods Indigenous nations use to challenge those
colonial claims. While the map remains the most well-documented technology of
territoriality, this project decenters the map as the primary interlocutor of territorial
power, instead examining how the aerial view, applied more broadly, is taken up as
extension of imperial and colonial culture. Counterinsurgency practices today span from
drone to social media surveillance, from map-less geospatial data collection to boots-onthe-ground militarized traffic checkpoints. I argue that these forms of counterinsurgent
data collection ground a colonial spatial imaginary that claims to see and record all.
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Chapter One
Birds Eye View: Aerial Surveillance and Producing the Indigenous Subject in India
On January 19, 2017, images of a small drone went viral on social media in
Kohima, Nagaland. The drone was seen flying over the city of Kohima during a bandh, a
public strike and shutdown of roads, and the drone was shot down using a slingshot.
After photos of the drone and images taken by the drone were shared on social media, it
was said that officers from the Indian paramilitary force the Assam Rifles came to collect
it. While the origin of the drone was never confirmed, the incident alludes to fears around
surveillance and the aerial in Naga territories. Technological aerial surveillance is
assumed to be the realm of the state, while Indigenous interception of the aerial
perspective threatens the state’s power.
This chapter examines two key formations of colonial control of Naga territory
through modes of spatial surveillance and the policing of recognition and identity. Here, I
consider how normative cartographic practices compound with racialized assumptions
about Indigenous peoples, leading to assumptions of Naga territory as an inherently
violent space. First, I examine how Indigenous peoples contest state modes of spatial
surveillance by problematizing and making tenuous the state’s claims to spatial fact.
Second, I consider the politics of Indigeneity in India more broadly and in India’s
northeastern Himalayan borderlands. I demonstrate how Indigeneity functions as a
shifting category that is continually redefined to suit the political goals of both the
colonized and the colonizer. I argue that both Naga claims to and rejections of
Indigeneity are used strategically to further Naga self-determination and sovereignty.
Simultaneously, India’s category of the “Scheduled Tribe” is used to legitimize the
Indian state’s control of territory in areas that never sought inclusion into the Indian
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nation-state. In so doing, India attempts to limit the applicability of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples within India’s borders. Both
cartographic and recognition-based practices of surveillance enable the state of India to
police Indigenous populations and their territories without requiring direct
counterinsurgent boots-on-the-ground. In the process, surveillance of space, place, and
identity become a primary site at which Indigenous peoples confront the colonial state.
The Naga territory of collective experience cannot be seen from the air. As you
zoom into my family’s village from outer space via aerial imagery on Google Earth,
Naga territory emerges as part of a dark green fringe of folded mountains across northern
and eastern India, contrasting with the tans and light green of the plains on either side of
the Himalayas. A solid white line denotes the national boundary between India and
Myanmar and, as you zoom in further, dotted white lines indicate first the state
boundaries within northeast India and then the state boundaries within Myanmar. The
jungle leaf cover is dense, so that small villages look like they are on the verge of
encroachment by the jungle; villages are visible at the tops of ridges and terraced rice
paddy fields can be seen built into the natural slope of the mountains. Zooming in to the
maximum resolution of the aerial image, I can make out the contours of the roof of my
family’s house and the tight u-curve of their driveway which requires a five-point turn in
order to extricate a car from the car port. But whole aspects of life are invisible from
above. From here, we cannot see the garden where the neighbor grows vegetables, the
network of tubing that transfers water from an uphill stream to each house’s cistern, or
the paths walked to harvest wild jungle vegetables. The whole village appears like this,
red or tin roofs barely visible through the surrounding jungle except for the occasional
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brown clearing for the high school’s football field or the painted lines of a concrete
basketball court visible from space. The largest clearing in the village belongs to the
Assam Rifles, an Indian paramilitary force with bases throughout Naga territory.
Aerial surveillance and the state bureaucratic creation of territorial boundaries are
reinforced and informed by boots-on-the-ground counterinsurgent forces. Nagas and
frequent visitors to Nagaland are accustomed to the everyday presence of multiple
military and paramilitary forces throughout the state, as well as the bureaucratic and
quotidian disruptions that entails, from registering travel plans with the police upon
arrival to unannounced checkpoints along the highway. Despite the 1997 ceasefire
between the government of India and a Naga national political group, India’s
counterinsurgent forces and the associated displays of potential violence are an everyday
expression of India’s power in Nagaland.
The Indigenous Question
Over a cup of green tea, I tell my grandfather’s cousin about my dissertation
research. Atsa 91 Adino Phizo is the president of the Naga National Council (NNC), a
Naga political group that emerged before Indian independence and became the political
arm of the Federal Government of Nagaland. 92 Since then, several groups have splintered
off from the NNC, but many of these groups share NNC’s long commitment to working
towards a sovereignty recognized by the United Nations as a nation-state that includes all
of Naga territory. 93 As I tell her what I study, Phizo stops me, “Ah,” she says. Nagas are
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not Indigenous. We are a nation.” She begins recounting Naga twentieth century political
history and I settle in, appreciating the familiarity of the story, with twists and turns I
know and have heard recounted many times since I was a small child. She recounts that
Nagas had our own way of living, our own cultures and languages, our own systems of
political governance, our own relationships between clans, villages, and tribes. Then the
British invaded. When Britain left the subcontinent in the late 1940s, Nagas declared
independence, but then India claimed Naga territory as its own. The Indo-Naga political
events of the twentieth century led to the formation of the state of Nagaland, an ongoing
war between India and the Naga people, and our current moment of negotiation for
“shared sovereignty.” 94 “Urra Uvie,” she concludes, a common slogan of the Naga
National Council and Naga national movement more generally: “Our land is ours.” “But
Atsa,” I ask, “if our identity is tied to our land, our cultures, languages, and political
systems, and if India has a colonial relationship with Nagas, then what?” “We are a
nation,” Phizo responds.
Phizo’s assertion that to be Indigenous is incommensurable with nationhood
spotlights the tension around how Indigeneity is taken up in the Indian national context
and globally. While many Nagas and other “tribals” in northeast India identify as
Indigenous, participate in transnational organizations focused on protecting Indigenous
rights, such as the Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact or the United Nations Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues, the politics of Indigeneity in India constrain the legal consequence
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of such assertions. Because India does not recognize Indigeneity of any people within its
borders, the fight for recognition by the Indian government of Naga nationhood has
necessarily avoided the language of Indigeneity and focused instead on nationhood and
sovereignty in a Westphalian sense. However, whether or not Indigeneity and rights as
Indigenous peoples are invoked, Naga claims to sovereignty and nationhood get
collapsed into a single phrase: “The Naga question.” This tenuous position of Indigeneity
within India means that Indigeneity as a political strategy is easily coopted by the state as
a category of backwardness or dependency and therefore Indigenous peoples are
prescribed an inevitable assimilation into the state. To be legible to the occupying state,
Indigeneity must conform to the state’s rubrics and definitions of Indigeneity, resulting in
an understanding of Indigeneity that likely does not match an Indigenous nation’s own
sense of identity and belonging. Furthermore, adhering to the state’s definitions of
Indigeneity means navigating Indigenous territorial sovereignty within the colonial
state’s frameworks and on colonial grounds. This perceived contrast between Naga
nationhood and Indigeneity manifests in territorial claims both against the state and
within state-sponsored mapping projects.
Making Official Maps
Tensions around Indigeneity in India are spatialized, evident in the politics of
mapping in India’s borderlands, even within the official cartography of the Indian state.
Agrawal and Kumar attribute cartographic conflicts and discrepancies between maps of
Naga territory to unstable notions of Naga identity in terms of both nation and territory. 95
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Conflicts about the border between the states of Nagaland and Assam are compounded by
differing views of what Naga lands should be counted as Naga land. Advocates for full
integration of all Naga territories refer to this integrated territory as “Greater Nagaland,”
which Agarwal and Kumar argue “is itself an object of spatial-statistical dispute as it
represents a spatial unit of measurement different from that adopted by the
government.” 96 One cannot definitively map Nagaland, they say, without settling the
multiple territorial disputes between the states of Nagaland and Assam, the governments
of India and Myanmar, or determining the territorial bounds of the Naga political
imaginary. 97
The foyer of the Nagaland State GIS and Remote Sensing Centre is quiet, the only
sound soft footsteps on marble floor and natural light from a recessed window shining on
a wall featuring two large maps of the state of Nagaland. One, a map of the physical
topography of Nagaland, indicates topographic relief via color, corresponding to an aerial
photograph. High, forested areas are indicated by a deep green, plains by a tan, and areas
with exposed ground are a rust red. The state districts are labelled with text. The
boundary between Nagaland and neighboring Indian states of Assam, Manipur, and
Arunachal is marked by a thin gray line that is so understated relative to the colors of the
map as to be almost imperceptible. A hard rust red line following the topography marks
the India-Myanmar boundary. At the bottom of the map, next to the list of data sources
and key, is an inset that appears to be aerial imagery such as that you might see scrolling
through Google Earth. The inset includes almost the entirety of Asia as well as vast
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sections of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Just above the center of the map is a bright red
polygon, the state of Nagaland.
In the second map, titled “Nagaland Political,” the state stands in greater contrast
to the surrounding states and countries. Here, each state district is shaded a transparent
color to differentiate it from the surrounding states. Like the physical map, the IndiaMyanmar boundary is indicated by a thicker line, more prominent than Indian state
boundaries. The inset of this political map takes up almost the entire bottom of the map
poster. Again, Nagaland state is indicated by a bright red polygon slightly off center on
the map. However, this time the context provided by the inset map extends as far west as
Southwest Asia and North Africa, and as far east as Japan.
The insets of both the physical and political maps break the mold of classic
cartography. Nagaland State GIS And Remote Sensing Centre is the GIS department for
the state of Nagaland and is therefore connected to the central government. Norms of
cartography would lead us to expect the inset to simply mark the state of Nagaland
relative to the rest of India, perhaps a small map of India, with Nagaland highlighted.
Instead, the physical map inset locates Nagaland within a greater Asia-Pacific region in
which half of the space in the inset is ocean and islands. The political map of the state
expands Nagaland’s political context even further than the inset of the physical map. Via
this inset, Nagaland’s political context includes the entirety of Asia and North Africa, as
well the Indian and Pacific oceans.
Both maps feature two sentences that are included on all Nagaland state maps
created by this center: “This map is without prejudice to the claims of Nagaland for redrawing the Assam-Nagaland boundary on the basis of historical and traditional factor”
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and “The boundaries of Nagaland as shown on this map are subject to revision as
provided in the 1960 Delhi Agreement.” The first sentence holds both a disavowal and an
affirmation. First, the map gestures to Naga claims to territory that is currently part of the
Indian state of Assam. Being “without prejudice” asserts that the map is not
representative of contested territorial claims but is delimited by the official boundaries of
the states as recognized by the government of India. Simultaneously, the first sentence
nods to the legitimacy of the territorial claims from which it disassociates by nodding to
the “historical and traditional” nature of those claims. The second sentence builds on this
tension, stating that the boundaries formalized in these maps are not necessarily the
permanent boundaries of the state. This statement backs up this assertion with a reference
to the 1960 Delhi agreement, commonly referred to as the 16-point agreement, which led
to the formation of the state of Nagaland. 98 Points 13 and 14 of the 1960 agreement focus
on consolidation of forest areas and “contiguous Naga areas,” stating a desire on the part
of the Nagas to include forest reserves and in the new state of Nagaland and enable the
boundaries of the state to expand to include other Naga-inhabited areas not included in
the formal state boundaries. The state boundaries did not then – and do not now – reflect
this stated desire. However, the inclusion of this caveat in the state GIS maps emphasizes
that the state boundaries are recent, impermanent, instable, and with a legal right to shift.
Furthermore, the inclusion of these two sentences challenges the primacy of the state of
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Nagaland, alluding to historical and traditional formations of territory, polity, and relation
that predate the state of Nagaland and the boundaries represented on these maps.
“Post” Colonial Policies
The notion of Indigeneity is highly contested in Indian law and scholarship. India
has claimed both that there are no Indigenous peoples in India and that all inhabitants of
the country are Indigenous. 99 This section engages with the politics of Indigeneity
through examinations of Indigenous struggle in India. Conducting a legal analysis of
transcripts from the United Nations and drawing on recent Indian scholarship, I argue that
“post” colonial Indian law disappears Indigeneity. Indigenous identity is transformed into
a marker of the past, left behind in a process towards development and assimilation.
Simultaneously, India’s disavowal of Indigenous identity conflates historical and ongoing
territorial dispossession with class difference, rendering Indigenous peoples poor, not
dispossessed, and as temporarily backwards Indian citizens, not colonized peoples. I seek
to make a case for an engagement of Indigeneity within Indian scholarship, calling into
question India’s identity as postcolonial and decolonized. I argue that transnational
discourses of Indigeneity must be taken into account to understand Indian Indigenous
politics. Considering Indigeneity is crucial to understanding what is obscured in the
archive of contemporary Indian politics and engagement with international law. In
addition, I argue that subalternity is an incomplete and inadequate framework for
understanding Indian Indigeneity. Finally, I assert that an engagement of critical
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Indigenous studies within a site such as India marks the relations of imperialism that
entangle continents, colonialisms, and perhaps, solidarities for decolonization.
In this section, I seek to address three questions: How does South Asian
postcolonial scholarship take up the notion of Indigeneity? How are ideas of Indigeneity
operationalized in South Asian politics and scholarship? How do South Asian scholars
theorize the connection between Indigeneity and subalternity?
Subalternity has been championed by South Asian postcolonial scholars who took
up Gramsci’s notion of the subaltern as those who have been disenfranchised due to
“uneven national development”. 100 In the 2012 essay “After Subaltern Studies,” Partha
Chatterjee reflects on the development of subaltern studies and proposes a shift to new
scholarly formations. Chatterjee argues that the insurgent peasant championed by
subaltern studies is no longer relevant: “This figure of the mass-political subject in India
needs to be redrawn.” 101 While subaltern studies has been widely heralded in Indian
postcolonial scholarship, in recent years, some scholars have begun to consider
Indigeneity, not as a category of subalternity, but as a political identity that challenges
dominant narratives of India’s identity as postcolonial. Speaking of Indigenous peoples in
India, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Mahasweta Devi asserted that “The tribals, then
paid the price for decolonization[.] They have not been part of the decolonization of
India[.]” 102 The texts discussed here are perhaps a partial answer to the question posed in
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the afterword to Spivak’s translation of Imaginary Maps: Three Stories by Mahasweta
Devi: “A conflation of Eurocentric migrancy with post-coloniality lets drop the
vicissitudes of decolonization and ignores the question: Who decolonizes?” 103
Indian contestation of Indigenous presence is highlighted by overlapping and
contradictory terms used to describe Indigenous peoples within India’s borders. During
the British colonial period, Indigenous peoples in India were frequently referred to as
“aboriginals” and the original draft constitution of India included this term. In the final
constitution of India, “aboriginals” was changed to “Scheduled Tribes,” referring to a
schedule, or list, of legally recognized tribes. Indigenous peoples identified as Scheduled
Tribes were considered to be “backward” and in need of development and assimilation
into mainstream Indian society. 104 Recognition of Scheduled Tribes and identification of
individuals as members of a Scheduled Tribe is decided upon by the Indian government.
In addition, the economic, educational, and development projects for “uplift” of
Scheduled Tribes are chosen and funded by the Indian government with little to no input
from the Indigenous peoples these projects are meant to assist. 105 Members of recognized
Scheduled Tribes make up 8.2% of the Indian population and they are considered to be
some of the “most marginalized and vulnerable communities” in India. 106 However,
members of many Scheduled Tribes do not necessarily associate with the term beyond its
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legal utility, preferring the term Adivasi or terms that denote belonging to specific
community.
At the drafting of the Indian constitution, the sole Indigenous representative on
the committee advocated for the use of the word “Adivasi” instead of the newly crafted
term “Scheduled Tribe” as he felt that “Adivasi” was more precise and historically
accurate. However, his proposal was rejected and, to this day, the term Adivasi holds no
legal standing in Indian law. 107 Adivasi is frequently translated into English as “original
inhabitants.” 108 While not legally recognized, this term is used widely across India.
Adivasi denotes historical and political relations marked by dispossession of land and
resources, distinguishing Adivasis from other disenfranchised groups in India such as
Dalits, the “untouchable” lowest caste in the Hindu caste system. Adivasis live
throughout India with the highest concentration of Adivasis in east India. Many Adivasis
from east India were displaced during British colonial rule when they were sent to work
as coolies in the northeast tea plantations of Darjeeling and Assam. 109 Descendants of
Adivasi coolies still live and work on tea plantations in northeast India, but unlike other
Adivasis in mainland India, these dispossessed peoples have not been recognized by the
Indian government as Scheduled Tribes, in part due to their forced detribalization during
British colonial rule. 110 Colloquially in northeast India, Adivasi refers specifically to
these dispossessed or “landless” groups who remain in the tea-growing areas of northeast
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India, distinguishing them from the Scheduled Tribes who lands are included in northeast
India, whereas in other parts of India, Adivasi and Scheduled Tribe may be used
synonymously. The use of the term Indigenous, while not as common as Adivasi, is
increasingly used to make claims to Indigenous rights, territory, and resources. 111
India and UNDRIP
India’s public position on the rights of Indigenous peoples and interpretation of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) reveals a
discomfort in its relationships to Indigenous peoples within its borders. At the signing of
UNDRIP, Ajai Malhotra, Deputy Permanent Representative of India to the United
Nations, described India’s agreement with the principles of UNDRIP. However,
Malhotra’s elaboration highlighted India’s attempt to separate itself from any
responsibility of upholding UNDRIP. Malhotra stated that he understood that “the right
to self-determination applied only to peoples under foreign domination and that the
concept did not apply to sovereign independent States or to a section of people or a
nation.” 112 In other words, India did not consider the right to self-determination to apply
to Indigenous peoples within its borders. Furthermore, Malhotra underlined that UNDRIP
only afforded Indigenous peoples self-determination with regards to “internal and local
affairs,” suggesting that Indigenous claims to sovereignty were not covered by UNDRIP
on an international scale. 113 Malhotra’s assertions on behalf of India directly
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contradicted the framework provided by UNDRIP which asserts Indigenous peoples’
rights to self-determination.
Three years later, India reiterated its position on the rights of Indigenous peoples
to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations at the 9th Session of the
Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues. At this meeting, Randhir Jaiswal expressed
concern that two reports submitted to the Economic and Social Council by groups from
within India used the term “Indigenous” interchangeably with the term “tribals.” Jaiswal
argued that these terms were not synonymous, saying that “’so called’ Indigenous
groups” were making claims through rights laid out in UNDRIP when instead these are
actually “various other minority groups.” 114 Jaiswal argued that not only were these
claims to Indigeneity unfounded, but that they diverted “the attention of the Forum from
its core concerns of indigenous issues.” Jaiswal asserted that it was inappropriate for any
of these “various other minority groups” to make claims to Indigenous rights as the
position of the state of India is that “we regard the entire population of India at the time
of our independence, and their successors, to be indigenous.” 115 In fact, India’s nativist
legal imaginary of the indigenizing power of national independence reveals the necessity
and urgency of scholarship that engages Indigeneity in India and South Asia more
broadly.
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Adivasi Indigeneity in India’s Tribal Belt
Indigeneity in India is monitored and limited through bureaucratic and processes,
legal recognition, and assimilationist development practices. In We Were Adivasis:
Aspiration in an Indian Scheduled Tribe, anthropologist Megan Moodie explores the
politics of Adivasi assimilation in Western India, focusing on the gendered effects of
urbanism among urban Dhanka, a Scheduled Tribe. Moodie argues that Dhanka upward
mobility is predicated on embracing an identity as “ST”, or Scheduled Tribe, and
participating in associated affirmative action policies meant to help assimilate Adivasis to
mainstream Indian society. However, this embracing of “ST” status requires urban
Dhankas to relegate their Indigenous, or Adivasi, identity to the past - “We were
Adivasis” - in order to achieve upward mobility. 116 In this sense, to be Adivasi is a pasttense identity, representing the impossibility of Indigenous presence in the so-called
postcolonial Indian context. While Moodie engages with scholarship about global
Indigenous politics, she argues that not all Indigenous peoples in India “take oppositional
stances to the state and not all seek indigenous identities.” 117
One tactic of assimilation of Indigenous peoples in India is the creation of new
states in areas populated by Indigenous peoples, granting Indigenous peoples legal rights
as a state and recasting Indigenous claims as legal and bureaucratic domestic politics,
rather than assertions of sovereignty. Anthropologist Alpa Shah explores Adivasi land
claims, migrancy, and politics in an Adivasi region in eastern India. Shah’s extensive
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ethnography in Jharkhand, India, explores the politics that led up to and followed official
recognition of Jharkhand as a state of India in 2000, separating Jharkhand from its
previous designation as part of the state of Bihar. Shah argues that while the formation of
an independent Jharkhand was initiated by Adivasis and was brought about through
transnational activism for the rights of Indigenous peoples in Jharkhand, the political
process to achieve an independent state only served to further disenfranchise Indigenous
peoples of Jharkhand. Those who stood to gain access to resources and greater control
over markets were actually non-Adivasi settlers of Jharkhand. Shah asserts that what
started as an Adivasi movement quickly became subsumed by a movement of
environmentalists and urban, middle class Indigenous rights activists, flattening out
Adivasi claims to make the political movement legible to the Indian state while
simultaneously erasing the specificities of Jharkhand Adivasi struggle. For Shah, the
activists’ engagement with global discourses of Indigeneity may have led to recognition
of Adivasi territory by the nation-state of India, but it also opened the gates to further
marginalization and exploitation of Adivasi inhabitants of Jharkhand. 118
Indigenous rights, epistemologies, and ontologies are not legible to the law in
India, but the complexity of many contemporary territorial conflicts in India cannot be
understood unless Indigenous rights, epistemologies, and ontologies are taken seriously
by the law. 119 Legal scholar Pooja Parmar combines ethnographic and archival work to
decipher the multiplicity of claims surrounding a controversial case of a Coca-Cola
bottling facility in the state of Kerala in south India. The legal case and political activism
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revolved around land and water claims related to water pollution and depletion by the
bottling facility. Parmar’s analysis reveals the violence of Indian law against Adivasi
peoples. In this case, Adivasi voices were absent from both legal and media narratives
about the conflict. Environmentalist and Indigenous rights activists’ narratives eclipsed
those of the Adivasis they claimed to represent, erasing Adivasi presence and leadership.
Parmar argues that the concept of Indigeneity is critical to understanding Indian politics.
Indian law makes Indigeneity illegible, present yet invisible, acting as an
obfuscating tension within the law. Indigeneity is obscured as a colonial legacy, rather
than a present lived experience of Indigenous dispossession and disenfranchisement. For
Parmar, the absence of Adivasis in legal and media accounts of the Coco-Cola dispute
reveals India’s rejection of claims to Indigenous rights. Focus on colonialism as a legacy,
as opposed to a presence, relegates Indigeneity to the past and makes Indigenous politics
purely focused on “uplift” and “development” of Scheduled Tribes, precluding any
possibility of self-determination and sovereignty for Indigenous peoples.
Since Indigeneity is rendered impossible under Indian law, Indigenous resistance
is therefore misconstrued in legal and media accounts of Indigenous politics. In an
account of the formation of the Indian state of Jharkhand, Shah shows how Indigenous
identity and resistance are not only denied by the Indian government but are also re-cast
by those who claim to speak and advocate for Indigenous peoples. These activists use
Indigenous resistance as a backdrop to achieve their own ends. In turn, the Indian
government represents Indigenous peoples as insurgents or terrorists in order to justify
violence against Adivasis. Shah uses the example of Maoist insurgency in many
Indigenous territories in India to exemplify this appropriation of Indigenous struggle.
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While media accounts conflate Maoist insurgency with Adivasi social movements and
claim that Maoists guerilla groups are primarily made up of India’s Indigenous peoples,
the relationship between these movements is more complex than it first seems. In
Jharkhand, Maoist guerillas protest bourgeois state oppression and claim to advocate on
behalf of the Indigenous poor. They offer “protection” to Adivasis, a commodity which
Adivasis are expected to pay for, and do, at the threat of violence through extortion by the
guerillas. Despite promises of protection on both sides, Adivasis remain the target of both
the guerillas and the government. The conflation of Adivasi with terrorist allows the
Indian government to legitimize violence against Indigenous peoples. Meanwhile,
Adivasi resistance to the state is lost in the conflict between government and
insurgency. 120
Not all self-proclaimed representatives of Indigenous peoples enact direct
violence towards Adivasis. However, non-Adivasi settlers and environmentalists who
claim to advocate for Indigenous rights silence Adivasi voices and re-represent Adivasis
as backward, primitive, and close to nature. In doing so, they relegate Adivasis to a
mythical past and render Adivasi political presence impossible. Shah argues that
Indigenous rights activists in Jharkhand represented Adivasis as “eco-savages” with a
deep ecological knowledge of their territory. 121 These activists also advocated an
essentialized image of Jharkhand Adivasi religion as nature worshipping. 122 These
representations of Adivasis as close to nature and natural environmentalists paved the
way for the creation of nature preserves within Jharkhand to confine wild elephants. This
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kept wild elephants within Jharkhand, and therefore out of neighboring states, but placed
the elephants directly on Adivasi territory, as the forest which the elephants were
supposed to inhabit was occupied by Adivasi villages and farmland. When wild elephants
in Jharkhand attacked Adivasi villages, destroying crops and homes and even killing
Adivasi villagers, Adivasi protests fell on deaf ears. Environmental activists’
representation of Adivasis communing with nature not only threatened Adivasi lives by
relegating elephants to the “forest” of inhabited Adivasi villages, but it required Adivasis
to conform to the activists’ representation of Indigenous peoples in order to be
recognized by the state. 123
Adivasi identity only becomes legible through its disavowal. Moodie argues that
the claiming of Adivasi identity is only legible to the state through individuals’
participation in government programs for Scheduled Tribes which are designed
specifically for Adivasi assimilation. Moodie identifies a distinction in Adivasi identity
claims in which Adivasi identity is spoken about in the past tense while identification as
ST, or Scheduled Tribe, is spoken in the present tense. She illustrates how some urban
Adivasis engage in government programs for Scheduled Tribes and achieve the intended
results of these programs: new identities as urban, educated, and upwardly mobile. As a
result of this government incentive for assimilation, Indigenous peoples in urban areas
only identify as Adivasis in the past tense. Here, Adivasi is a temporary identification
which is merely a steppingstone to assimilation.124
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The past temporality of Adivasi identity is amplified by the impossibility of being
an authentic Adivasi. Adivasis must be “traditional”, “tribal”, and “with the correct
origin, relationship to land, and cultural uniqueness” expected by the category of
Scheduled Tribe. 125 Becoming urban and upwardly mobile means shedding Indigenous
identity. Meeting expectations of Adivasi authenticity also poses problems for activists
who seek to represent Adivasis. Adivasi migrancy disrupts Indian nationalist discourse
about an essentialized Adivasi connection to place. This essentialized rhetoric is common
not just in India, but in international struggles for Indigenous territorial rights. Shah
argues that the reality of Adivasi migrancy and urban Adivasi presence is “inconvenient
for the activists” who rely on dominant international discourses of Indigeneity and expect
Adivasis to conform to these essentialized notions of Indigeneity. 126 This tension looms
large for non-Adivasi settlers in conflict with Adivasis. Parmar illustrates how nonAdivasis call into question Adivasi claims to Indigeneity when they ask: “Are these
Adivasis real Adivasis?” 127 Yet, in the face of silencing of Adivasi resistance, recognition
of Indigenous peoples is not a panacea. Recognition of Adivasis does not necessarily lead
to justice or granting of rights. Instead, formal recognition by India – on the state’s terms
– leads to exploitation.
In her explication of the disenfranchisement of Adivasis by Indigenous rights
activists, Shah nods to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, drawing on Spivak’s assertion that
even those postcolonial intellectuals who seek to reclaim subaltern voices are complicit in
imperialism. Shah links Spivak’s claims about subalternity to her own claims about
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Indigeneity: “In the case of those speaking for indigenous populations, the danger is that
the political project of this identity politics, this ‘culture-making,’ flattens a vast diversity
of agendas and interests that are in fact affected by the complex inter-relations of, for
example, gender, class, and caste, which undercut people’s identity.” 128 In contrast,
Moodie juxtaposes Indigenous Dhanka narratives with subaltern narratives through a
distinction between Indigenous aspiration and subaltern resistance, suggesting a political
distinction between Indigeneity and subalternity. While Parmar cites numerous scholars
who engage with subalternity, the notion of the subaltern is tellingly absent from
Parmar’s narrative. Here, Adivasis are represented as Indigenous peoples – nothing else.
Whereas Indigeneity is sometimes defined as emerging from experience of settler
colonialism, a consideration of Indigeneity in India challenges this conflation. Parmar
suggests that she seeks to intervene in Indigenous studies and colonial studies work on
Indigeneity: “These stories also help us understand Indigeneity in a broader context than
the one offered by scholarship on states identified as settler-colonial and point to the
urgent need for an interdisciplinary engagement with issues of access to justice raised by
indigenous mobilization against ongoing appropriation of lands and resources.” 129
Though this sentence seems to distance Parmar’s work in Kerala from settler colonial
studies while maintaining an association with postcolonial studies, perhaps the key word
in this sentence is “identified.” As Parmar describes, the majority of non-Adivasis in
Kerala are called “settlers,” suggesting a stark contrast between Indigenous and nonIndigenous inhabitants. 130 Similarly, Parmar narrates the history of Adivasi dispossession

128

Shah, 2010, 25.
Parmar, 2010, 3-4.
130
Parmar, 2010, 43
129

69

as a “systematic invasion of tribal lands. 131 Parmar does not directly dispute the notion of
India as postcolonial or decolonized, but her narrative suggests a tension with regards to
the level to which India embodies these labels.
As illustrated in the Indian proclamation to the United Nations, Indian law
disappears Indigeneity and confines it to the past, remaking Indigeneity in the
glorification of “postcolonial” India to signify all descendants of inhabitants of India in
1947 as Indigenous. In doing so, Adivasi identity is transformed into a marker of the past,
left behind in a process towards “uplift,” development, and assimilation. India’s rejection
of Indigeneity recasts territorial dispossession as class difference in which economic
disparity and “backwardness” justifies India’s expansion into Indigenous territories.
Indigeneity in India’s Himalayan Borderlands
Within the northeast region of India which includes the eight states Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, the
language of Adivasi and Dalit movements is not embraced unilaterally. While there are
solidarities and similarities between tribal peoples in the northeast and in the tribal belt of
mainland India, Indigenous peoples in the northeast boundary of India do not generally
identify with the Sanskrit-derived term Adivasi and also resist collectivist categories such
as Dalit-Bahujan-Adivasi (DBA) which they feel erase their particular histories,
collapsing diverse Indigenous experiences in India into a dominant framing that locates
Indigenous peoples within a caste system, a relatively recent incursion into northeast
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India. 132 Popular culture highlights this tension through social media accounts such as
Decolonial Indigenous Memes, which challenge DBA categories as an attempt to
“Indianize” communities in northeast India. 133 While settler colonial discourse is
peripheral at best within scholarly literature on Indigeneity in northeast India, popular
culture takes up these terms directly, interpreting India’s northeastern boundary as a
settler incursion into sovereign Indigenous nations: “Mainstream DBA discourse often
misses a lot of issues that are at the heart of Indigenous politics in the [North East
Region] centering around our relationship with land (which is intimately tied to our
Indigeneity), the issue of “sovereignty” & “nationality,” militarization, settler
colonialism, extractive colonialism, and institutional racism, etc.” 134 These cultural
producers advocate for solidarity between those marginalized by caste and Indigeneity
without subsuming distinct identities, histories, and politics.
Indigeneity is policed in India not only at the scale of the community via the
formal legal recognition of Scheduled Tribes, but India also manages individuals via a
series of bureaucratic policies that categorize people and territories. Through government
entities like the Ministry for Tribal Affairs, members of a constitutionally recognized
tribe can apply for a Scheduled Tribe certificate, which secures eligibility for programs,
school placements, and government jobs reserved for members of Scheduled Castes and
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Scheduled Tribes. 135 This close monitoring of Indigenous peoples extends to Indigenous
territories as well. Nagaland and other states in northeast India are subject to a territorial
“protected area” claim such that Indians and foreign nationals visiting these Indigenous
territories are required to apply for an Inner Line Permit (ILP), administered by the
central government of India. Originally instated in 1873 under British India to protect
British interests in tea, oil, and elephant trade in northeast India, the ILP remained written
into law after Indian independence and was revised in 1950, ostensibly to “protect tribal
cultures in northeastern India.” 136 To distinguish permanent residents from other Indian
citizens and foreign nationals, the state of Nagaland created an additional identification
process. Within Nagaland, residents can apply for an Indigenous Inhabitant certificate.
While intended to mark members of the eighteen tribes in Nagaland, fourteen Naga tribes
and four non-Naga Scheduled Tribes, in practice, this certificate identifies as Indigenous
any residents of Nagaland who personally, or whose immediate family, lived in Nagaland
prior to November 1979. 137 This complicates claims to Indigeneity in Nagaland, as many
people who are not members of the eighteen recognized Scheduled Tribes of Nagaland
are able to obtain Indigenous Inhabitant certificates. In 2019, a commission consulted
with tribal organizations, communities, and NGOs and submitted a report to the Nagaland
state government, recommending revision of the eligibility criteria for the Indigenous
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Inhabitant certificate. They recommended shifting the date of family residence to
December 1, 1963, the formation of the state of Nagaland and to engage traditional tribal
governance structures into the process of identifying who is Indigenous, asking family,
clan, khel, and village council to certify the application document before submission to
the state government. 138 In addition, the commission recommended the creation of a
Register of Indigenous Inhabitants of Nagaland (RIIN). These changes would mean that
people who currently hold Indigenous Inhabitant certificates would not be included on
the RIIN; the commission recommends that those who settled in Naga territory prior to
the formation of the state of Nagaland could be considered permanent residents, allowing
them to move freely in Nagaland without an Inner Line Permit, but preventing them from
obtaining benefits intended for members of Scheduled Tribes. 139
While India is commonly understood to be postcolonial, emerging scholarship
theorizes the Indian state as an imperial and colonizing entity in tribal and borderland
territories, particularly in Indian’s northeastern boundary. Communities and individuals
may identify as Indigenous, but this self-identification is not always recognized by the
nation-state, not only in India as described here, but in neighboring countries and
elsewhere in Asia, including Myanmar, China, Thailand, and Nepal. In a special issue of
Verge: Studies in Global Asias on Asian Indigeneity, Charlotte Eubanks and Pasang
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Yangjee Sherpa assert that dominant global notions of Indigeneity are grounded in issues
of recognition, whether for securing of rights within a nation-state or at the scale of
international law. Eubanks and Sherpa attribute this orientation around recognition to the
strong influence of Indigenous movements from settler colonial states such as the United
States and Canada: “Deeply influenced by the legal apologetics of settler colonial states
toward displaced Native, First Nations, and Aboriginal peoples, however, this notion of
Indigeneity – at once largely modern, Western, and neoliberal, meshes imperfectly with
autochthonous conceptions of Indigeneity as articulated in a variety of Asian
contexts.” 140 Recognition oriented Indigenous claims fall short in Asian nation-states
such as India where governments claim that there are no Indigenous peoples, that all
people within the state are Indigenous, or label Indigenous nations as ethno-nationalists
or minority nationalists, such as in China. 141 Further complicating the utility of
recognition based frameworks for Indigeneity in Asia is Asian governments’ articulation
of Indigeneity as being confined to states settled by people of white, European ancestry.
Eubanks and Sherpa state that “while any number of Asian governments may accept the
rights-based concept of Indigeneity as comprehensible and even defensible for groups
displaced by European settler colonialism, few political leaders in Asia consider it
applicable to their own countries – one important exception being Taiwan, which does
recognize various Aboriginal peoples and their rights to land restoration.” 142 Since the
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publication of this special issue, in February 2019, the government of Japan passed a bill
recognizing the Ainu as Indigenous people and banning discrimination by race. 143 An
understanding of Indigeneity as being limited to peoples and territories occupied by
commonly recognized settler states (such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand) not only excludes many Indigenous nations and millions of selfidentifying Indigenous peoples in the Global South, but it simultaneously ties Indigeneity
to whiteness, such that whiteness is a contrasting prerequisite to Indigeneity. For nationstates in Asia, defining Indigeneity as contingent on domination of an aboriginal people
by a white, European-origin, settler state enables Asian nation-states to participate in
modern, western, and neoliberal politics of recognition elsewhere, outside of their own
territorial claims. Thus, the politics of recognition serves to promote Asian nation-states
as sympathetic to the rights of Indigenous peoples while simultaneously rejecting claims
by Indigenous peoples within Asia.
Rather than siloing Asian and Anglo settler states’ engagement of Indigeneity,
centering global critiques of recognition-based frameworks in theorizations of
Indigeneity enables scholars of Indigeneity to better theorize beyond the politics of
recognition. Scholars of Indigenous studies within the commonly recognized settler states
of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand critique the politics of
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recognition as a dead-end that results in inclusion into a colonial state, rather than
decolonization or liberation from the nation-state. 144 A politics of recognition reifies the
settler state via Indigenous appeals to the state, further entrenching colonial power and
shifting understandings of Indigenous sovereignty from being inherent, legitimate,
historical fact to be seen instead as a gift from the colonial state. 145 Critiquing the politics
of recognition creates new possibilities for transnational Indigenous political organizing,
refusing to be contained to the scales generated by nation-state governments as domestic
dependents, ethno- or minority-nationalists, or insurgents.
Emerging research engages theorizations of Indigeneity and racialization within
the “Mongolian fringe” through which solidarities and mutual recognition occur between
tribal peoples in northeast India and Kashmir. Drawing on Goldberg’s understanding of
racialization as key to the organization of the modern nation-state and on Byrd’s
theorization of how Indigeneity is the medium through which colonizing projects transit,
Gergan and Smith argue that “tribals” as racialized minorities “are central to the
construction of Indian nation-identity.” 146 While emphasizing that they make this
association between U.S. and India colonizing projects cautiously, Gergan and Smith
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effectively center an understanding of Indigeneity and Indigenous relationship to
colonialism that is not predicated on whiteness, but is rather a political formation in
relation to colonizing state power.
Comparative or relational analysis of Indigenous politics eschews the politics of
recognition in favor of articulation of a future-oriented politics. Through a comparative
analysis of environmental activism by Indigenous youth in India and the United States,
Gergan and Curly argue that Indigenous youth in both sites express “youthful decolonial
futurity” that pushes back against both colonial and tribal government approaches to
articulate a global Indigenous decolonial politics. 147 This youthful decolonial futurity
rejects the politics of recognition that makes possible recognition of tribal governments
such as the Navajo Nation in the United States and the formation of assimilationist states
such as Sikkim, India. Importantly, contrary to previous approaches to Indigenous
territorial sovereignty via recognition by the settler nation-state, Indigenous youth
activism asserts that territorial autonomy cannot occur via state subsidies. This rejection
of recognition as a path forward is present in contemporary Naga political and public
discourse, as Nagas reimagine Naga sovereignty and territorial autonomy beyond a
politics of recognition.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the politics of Indigeneity in India and how those
politics are mapped onto a landscape for both direct and indirect surveillance of
Indigenous peoples. As I have shown, working within the state’s logics of recognition has
territorial consequences. Indigenous territorial claims against the occupying state must be
navigated within the frameworks designed by the state. In this context, I have argued that
India’s policing of Indigeneity as a political category requires that Indigenous landscapes
be continually marked as insurgent, violent, disturbed, and under conflict. These
representations of Indigenous space and place are used to justify colonial
counterinsurgent measures on those territories thereby maintaining the colonial project.
The aerial, in the form of spatial data collection or the mapping of laws onto
bordered territories, is upheld as the realm of the state, a prime vantage point from which
the state can monitor and police Indigenous insurgents. By policing Indigeneity through
legal categories and ascribing physical and political landscapes as inherently violent or
disturbed, the state can control who can access the rights afforded to Indigenous peoples
through international law. These practices of surveillance and control are dependent on
the aerial perspective in that they require the quantification and assignation of status to
Indigenous territories to reinforce the state’s representations of Indigenous space and
place and attempt to destabilize Indigenous territorial sovereignty. Thus, the surveillance
of space, place and identity are a primary site at which Indigenous peoples confront the
colonial state.
This surveillance of Naga territory extends from the cartographic, through the
mapping and unmapping of Naga territory, to the legal, through categories of identity that
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police who may or may not be in a specific landscape and dictate what rights can be
accessed by people within those landscapes. In the next chapter, I turn to a physical mode
of surveillance of Naga territory: satellite tracking for environmental data collection and
the policing of what Nagas eat.
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Chapter Two
What Nagas Eat: Sovereignty and Kinship Under Lockdown
This chapter considers surveillance of what Nagas eat in relation to Naga
experiences of war, militarization, and counterinsurgency. I begin with a close read of
media discourse that attempted to link Naga eating habits to the origin of the 2020
coronavirus pandemic, racializing Nagas as primitive, violent, and virulent through
criticism of hunting and eating practices. I then analyze a graphic short story that narrates
Naga eating habits as practices that articulate relations between Nagas and more-thanhuman beings. 148 I argue that Naga eating habits are closely linked to Naga experiences
of colonial and counterinsurgent violence. Furthermore, I assert that the surveillance of
eating habits contributes to counterinsurgent domination of quotidian life in Nagaland, an
intimate manifestation of India’s legal and territorial power in Naga territory. Finally, I
close by considering how Naga relationality with more-than-humans, land, and water
inform contemporary Naga visions of sovereignty.
In February 2020, I packed my bags and was getting ready to return to the United
States after spending the winter in Nagaland. Reports of the new coronavirus had been at
the top of international news for several weeks, but I had not been worried about my
travel plans till a few days before my flights, when I heard that Hong Kong, where I was
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supposed to layover before a flight across the Pacific, had sold out completely of hand
sanitizer and soap. That did not bode well. I had already been cautious of my travel plans,
as only a few weeks before, President Trump added Myanmar to the list of banned
countries. Concerned that I might get blocked from reentry to the United States, or be
quarantined at customs, I decided to cancel my flights and find a new direct flight from
India to the US. The evening before my flight, The Hindu published a breaking news
story declaring that the new coronavirus might have originated in Nagaland. The headline
read: “Coronavirus: Wuhan Institute’s study on bats and bat hunters in Nagaland to be
probed.” 149 “Don’t tell anyone that you are coming from Nagaland,” my grandfather told
me. “Let them think you are travelling from mainland India.”
The Hindu article reported that a collaboration between researchers from Wuhan,
China, India, and the U.S. Department of Defense had travelled to a remote area in
Nagaland to collect specimens from bats and blood samples from human bat hunters.
Nagas in neighboring villages, the article stated, hunt and eat bats. While the article never
explicitly blamed Nagas and Naga eating habits for the epidemic—soon to be
pandemic—it was easy to connect the dots between their logic. Public outcry was swift.
The U.S. Department of Defense denied involvement in bat research in Nagaland. 150
Later that week, India’s National Centre for Biological Sciences with the Tata Institute
for Fundamental Research published a press statement “in reference to media reports that
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grossly misrepresent the facts concerning a study of bats in Nagaland.” 151 The press
statement clarified that no biological samples were ever removed from India, that two
researchers from Wuhan, China, were listed as co-authors only because they supplied a
reagent for the lab tests, and that the work was a collaboration between researchers at the
National Centre for Biological Sciences in India and the Duke-National University of
Singapore Medical School. The U.S. Department of Defense provided research funds to
Duke-NUS, the extent of its involvement in this study. The study the article claimed to be
based on had, in fact, nothing to do with coronavirus, and the results of the study had
been published in October 2019, prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan, China. 152
Upon this outcry, The Hindu removed the word “coronavirus” from the article’s headline
and removed a section of the article that focused on researchers from Wuhan. The revised
article retained its focus on Naga bat hunting, the age and gender of the bat hunters, and
how many times each individual participated in the bat harvest in a single year. The
article concluded: “The study says the potential virus present in the bats may not be an
exact copy of the virus responsible for various outbreaks.”
Tracking the Amur Falcon
This is not the first time that what Nagas eat has made national and international
headlines. In the winter of 2012, Nagaland made international headlines, as journalists
reported the “slaughter” and “massacre” of amur falcon, a small raptor that migrates
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across India en route from Siberia and China to South Africa. 153 The amur falcon is
famous among birders for making the longest over-ocean flight of any raptor, flying day
and night on its migration across the Indian Ocean. It is a relatively small raptor that
migrates in large groups, so thousands of birds will arrive in a small area all at once.
International papers described this “massacre” of birds by Naga people. Scientific
publications took on the same language as media reports. For example GABAR: The
Journal of Birds of Prey reported that the amur falcon in Nagaland were “flying the
gauntlet back to South Africa.” 154 The birds’ brief stopover in Pangti village in the
remote Wokha district of Nagaland was a welcome economic opportunity to villagers, as
birds could be caught and sold as a food source, bringing income to a village
geographically distant from the two cities of Nagaland. Capturing and selling these birds
was a means to adapt to and survive within capitalist systems. While early articles about
the amur falcon showed images of conservationists and scientists tagging birds, later
coverage narrated that it was in fact a Naga journalist who first sought to address the
issue of the amur falcon to protect the bird while also identifying new sources of income
with the villagers. 155 Without outside intervention, Nagas created a rapid response, which
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included incentives, education programs for school-age children, and economic
development initiatives to decrease hunting of amur falcon. This response enacted
processes of self-determination that affect not only Nagas, but all areas within the amur
falcon’s migration.
Radio tagging of amur falcon in Nagaland began in 2013 when three amur falcon
were fitted with 5 gram solar-powered satellite transmitters during their winter migration
in Nagaland. 156 They were named Naga, after the people and region, Pangti, after the
nearest village, and Wokha, after the district. The signals sent from the satellite
transmitter backpacks were then not only sent to researchers, but were also uploaded to
maps online, allowing anyone with an internet connection to track the falcon during their
migration, summer stop in southern Africa, and winter stop in Naga territory. While the
falcon Wokha’s last signal transmission was only four months after Wokha was first
tagged, Pangti and Naga both continued to send signals for three years. A satellite
tracking website still makes accessible a tracking map where a viewer can select which of
the three original birds they would like to trace, and then can watch as the bird’s historic
locations are marked by a red dot moving across the map against a timeline from the
bird’s first day tagged to the day when its last signal was sent. 157 In the years since, many
other amur falcon have been fitted with satellite trackers, each named after Naga tribes,
towns, and districts. Bird watchers can post their own data on ebird.org to indicate
sightings of amur falcon in their area and the Nagaland state forestry division Facebook
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page posts occasional updated map screenshots to show where specific tagged falcons are
currently located. These maps mirror the migration paths of the three original birds.
When a bird’s tracking signal stops moving, it is assumed that the bird has died and the
nature of its death is pondered in public forums. 158 While ostensibly a conservation
project, scholarly and media coverage of these tracking efforts retain an anti-Naga stance,
indirectly surveilling Naga hunting and eating habits as much as they track bird
migrations. Nagas are seen as a threat to bird conservation and Naga hunting practices are
seen as threatening not only ecosystems within Naga territory, but along global migration
routes. Surveillance of the amur falcon stands in for the surveillance of Nagas, allowing
governments, NGOs, and the public to monitor Nagas, attempt to control Naga hunting
and eating, and policing Naga relationships to the other-than-human.
What is striking is that, in the ten years since amur falcons first made international
headlines, focus on the falcons has centered around their presence in Nagaland. Nearly all
conservation, tracking, or surveillance efforts related to the amur falcon take place in
Nagaland, despite the remoteness of the location. To get to the only airport in Nagaland,
there are four flights per week. In addition to a visa to travel to India, visitors and
researchers must also apply for an Inner Line Permit, which is required to enter areas
enforced by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. From the airport, it is an eight hour
drive on dirt roads to the village closest to the falcon’s roosting area, and that is assuming
there is no military checkpoint, road shutdown, or bad weather that could slow down or
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prevent travel to the village. So why make so much effort to monitor a bird species that
can be monitored from many other locations across two continents?
When an other-than-human species such as the Amur Falcon is seen as a common
good belonging to a global public, the rights of Nagas within their own lands are seen as
potential threats to global environmental good, and surveillance of Nagas or other
Indigenous peoples, is seen as a necessity for conservation efforts. I consider events like
the environmental monitoring of the amur falcon as part of the ongoing surveillance of
Naga people in India-occupied Nagaland. Environmental monitoring meant to work
towards conservation of a non-human species becomes a means through which to
simultaneously surveil and control Indigenous peoples. In this way, armchair
birdwatchers who track the amur falcon migration via GPS-tagged birds, participate in
the surveillance of Naga territory.
In fact, Naga difference from mainland India is marked by what we eat, how we
eat it, and what that might mean about our relationship to territory and nation. Through
dominant critique of what Nagas eat, Naga Indigeneity is cast as barbarian, primitive, and
ultimately, destructive. Identified as one of ten key biodiversity hotspots in the world,
Nagaland’s more-than-human life garners attention from conservationists and climate
change activists. 159 While some of these organizations claim to prioritize or consider
Indigenous ways of knowing and being, there is often a disconnect between
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conservationists and Naga political contexts. What Nagas eat, I think, comes down to
how we survive a lockdown.
What Nagas Eat
The national lockdown in India due to the pandemic brought renewed attention to
what Nagas eat. After a June 2020 tweet storm, not to mention years of activism, by
Indian animal rights activists against the sale and eating of dog meat in Nagaland, the
chief secretary of the state of Nagaland, Temjen Toy announced that Nagaland would ban
the importing, trade, and sale of dogs and dog meat. 160 This announcement was
celebrated by animal rights activists, and the conversation centered around the morality
of what we eat, with the ban celebrated outside of Nagaland as a moment of progress for
this “underdeveloped” state. Nagas responded critically, with consideration of how dogs
feature in Naga cosmologies, the intersection of animal rights and far right Hindu
nationalism, and the anti-Indigenous racism embedded in animal rights activism. 161 This
ban occurred during the pandemic lockdown, when access to all food, including meat,
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was limited, and many looked for sources of meats and vegetables that they might not
usually obtain.
Why the preoccupation with what Nagas eat? In a country where religious
difference gets conflated with political difference, we might be led to infer that what a
person eats suggests something about their religious background and, therefore, their
political affiliations. Legislation against cattle slaughter exists in many states across
India, so we might be tempted to affiliate the policing of Naga eating with beef bans
elsewhere in the country. But these forms of public outcry and shaming hit differently.
While we can trace religious arguments for bans on cattle slaughter, the objection to the
eating of fragrant fermented foods or even wild animals is not of the same cloth. “Unlike
the cow debate,” writes Naga anthropologist Dolly Kikon, “the one on dog meat does not
centre around religion but on a civilizational logic.” 162 The dog meat debate, like
international coverage of the amur falcon “massacre” or Naga bat research, marks Nagas
as uncivilized and backwards, incapable of complex understandings of the
interrelationships between people, ecosystems, polities, and economies.
We might ask: where do contemporary Naga eating habits come from? Where do
these public conflicts about what Nagas eat touch down on other contemporary Naga
issues? What might that tell us about the political conditions of everyday life in
Nagaland?
Breakfast
The pandemic lockdown, and its associated food insecurity, joined another type of
territorial lockdown in Nagaland. Only three days before the dog meat ban, the
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government of India renewed the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). 163 This
act has been in effect in Nagaland and renewed by the government of India every six
months since 1958. AFSPA marks regions as “disturbed areas” and permits Indian armed
forces special powers in those areas, such that they may detain or even kill anyone based
on suspicion. Furthermore, AFSPA protects members of the armed forces and exonerates
them from any wrongdoing if the suspects harmed are later found to be innocent. This
act, first instituted in Nagaland, has been applied to other states in northeastern India, in
Punjab and Chandigarh from 1983-1997, and Jammu and Kashmir since 1990. 164 The act
has been condemned by the United Nations as a violation of international law. 165
Activism and government actions that cast Nagas as uncivilized fall into racist and antiIndigenous assumptions about Nagas and perpetuate the belief that Nagaland is disturbed
and, therefore, AFSPA is necessary. Kikon writes:
The insidious logic of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) and
the Disturbed Areas Act (1955) is the reproduction of the “disturbed area”
as a geographical location (Northeast India) and a social category
(northeastern people). Circular logic predicts that places inhabited by
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suspicious people will eventually become a disturbed area, and those
inhabiting the disturbed area will naturally become suspicious people. 166
When AFSPA is renewed, WhatsApp conversations between Nagas remind loved ones to
stay home and be careful, lest an accidental interaction with a member of the armed
forces leads to a display of AFSPA’s power. AFSPA itself may be construed as a form of
lockdown, in which people may not freely move through their days without threat and
unease.
If amur falcon migration data or harvesting of bats is used to mark Indigenous
peoples as violent, primitive and barbarian, then this data supports the idea of Naga
territory as a Disturbed Area. Activism, such as the interest by conservationists in the
amur falcon or that of animal rights activists in dogs, cast Nagas as uncivilized. It falls
into racist and anti-Indigenous assumptions about Nagas, and perpetuate the belief that
Nagaland is disturbed and, therefore, AFSPA is necessary.
In a place where the “small problem” of Naga sovereignty is the punchline to
formal jokes, debates over what Nagas eat often overlook a critical Naga perspective that
situates what Nagas eat in relation to other aspects of our cultural and political life. 167 In
other words, conversations about what Nagas eat often ignore questions of militarization,
dispossession, or disenfranchisement. To consider these complex entanglements, I will
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examine the work of a Naga artist who centers Naga political struggles in the
conversation around what Nagas eat. These questions play out in a graphic short story
released shortly after the dog meat ban.
Less than a month after the dog meat ban, Naga artist Moa Lemtur, also known as
Shinobi, published a graphic short story on his Instagram feed. 168 Titled “Breakfast,” the
caption said that the “short fiction is based on true events” and the only hashtag on the
post was #AFSPA. This thirteen-panel story is drawn in pen and ink, exclusively black
and white, except the title panel, which bears the name of the story and the disembodied
head of a snarling dog. Red blood splatters out behind the head as it appears to be in an
arc of flight. In the second and third panels, the text sets the scene as “circa 1960
Nagaland,” begins with a description of the legal parameters of AFSPA, and directs the
reader to imagine the consequences of such a law:
The tragedy in the presence of such draconian acts is that unimaginable
terrors have been wrought on the public in the pursuance of this so called
‘order.’ Mass killings, torture, and rape of the most blood curdling
heinousness have been visited upon the innocent who were simply guilty
of being caught in the crossfires. Needless to say, the perpetrators were
protected by an ironclad act that placed ‘order’ above human dignity and
lives.
This opening blends comic book tropes with legal footnote. Whether set in Gotham City
or 1960s Nagaland, the protagonist exists within a draconian setting, evading violence
and trying to survive. The third panel continues:
Toshi, a young Naga lad looks down with horror from the cliff
overlooking the burning remains of what used to be his village. He grits
his teeth in helpless rage as he watches the soldiers languidly strolling
about after their killings and rape. Bodies everywhere…bloodied, torn,
mangled and violated. The sound of their laughter reaches him like a faint
168
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echo and he wonders if they are truly human or demons come for
vengeance.
The author continues, describing how no other people in the village escaped. The young
man Toshi and his hunting dog Nok are two of three survivors, as they had been in the
jungle when the soldiers arrived in the village. Toshi saw the third survivor, his own
brother, taken away by the soldiers. From the clifftop, Toshi and Nok survey the
devastation below, ashes, rubble, and flesh. In the midst of this horror, Toshi is drawn
back to immediate needs:
Despite the overwhelming sense of loss and rage Toshi can no longer
ignore the painful rumblings his stomach was making. The soldiers had
brunt [sic] all the granaries and either killed and eaten or taken whatever
food there was. The vengeance would come in its own time but right now
the rumblings demanded satisfaction.
In panel four, the first image-based panel, a hornbill sits on top of a woven handle
of a machete. Behind it, billowing clouds fill the background and vertical crosshatching
suggests the air is hazy, perhaps with smoke from the burned village. A speech bubble
indicates that the main character, Toshi, warns his hunting dog away from the bird: “Not
the bird Nok.” In panel five, he continues: “I know you’re starving too…but not the
bird.” Here, Toshi and Nok stand on top of a rock outcrop with grasses growing between
fractures in the rock. Toshi is wearing traditional clothing, a loin cloth, woven greaves to
protect his shins, an arm band, and two feathers on his head. We can see the chest tattoos
indicating his success as a warrior. To one side is a tree stump with a machete casually
stuck into it, the hornbill from the previous panel seated on the handle of the machete. On
the other side are a shield and two spears stuck in the ground. One spear skewers four
human skulls. From the high point of their rock outcrop, Toshi and Nok survey their
village’s fields below them.
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We jump perspective in the sixth panel. Now, we can see the cliff on which they
stand, with Toshi and Nok and the stump and spears small shadows. Below them in the
fields is a traditional Naga rest house, with its iconic crossing rooflines, where people
working in the field take breaks for lunch and tea. This house has open air walls and
inside the house is a Christian cross. There are three men with guns in the image. One
pins down to the ground a figure who appears to be unclothed, one stands guard with his
arms folded on his chest, the third man, this one mustachioed, crouches next to a wide
shallow grave in which there are many unclothed bodies. Up on the cliff above, Toshi
refers to the hornbill when he says to Nok: “Let at least one thing of beauty remain.
Maybe it’s come to send us off on our warpath. What do you think Nok?”
The seventh panel zooms out further. Toshi and Nok are still on a cliff above the
village field, the rest house with the cross inside now much smaller in our view. In the
foreground is a stream with dark water swirling around two bodies. While the soldiers’
faces were cross hatched and hard to decipher in the last panel, here, the faces of the dead
are detailed; you can see the traditional haircut of a Naga boy. Around the stream you can
see the furrows in the fields, but no evidence of crops still growing. Toshi speaks to Nok
again: “Say old friend, you remember the spiteful dog that used to steal mother’s
chicken? I think I saw it slinking among the burnt ruins earlier. Maybe it was fated.”
He continues in panel eight. “First I eat and then we find a nice hare for you.
Won’t do to become a cannibal, eh Nok?” Here we see Toshi in more detail, bowl cut,
hornbill feathers on his head, pierced and gauged ears, tattooed chest. A dark colored dog
slinks up behind him through tall grasses. Toshi continues: “Then nightfall and with the
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darkness we scream our battle cry. May the forefathers witness the destruction of our
enemies!”
In panel nine, Toshi and Nok turn to face the intruding dog. They stand crouched,
ready for attack. Now Toshi holds the machete that had been stuck in the tree stump. An
almost-transparent image of the hornbill in flight is emblazoned onto the machete. When
Toshi speaks this time, he addresses his brother that the soldiers took away, and promises
to rescue him. The dog Nok speaks for the first time in panel ten, growling as he and
Toshi lunge toward the intruding dog. Next, we see the image from the title panel, the
intruding dog’s head arcing through the air, blood trailing behind, though this time, the
image is black and white. A dark line connects this panel to the next one, where we see
the now headless dog’s body in the air as though pouncing. Nok gnaws a foot in his
mouth. The dark line connects to the final panel, where we see Toshi lunging, machete in
hand, mid stroke. There is no hornbill in sight, other than the hornbill feathers Toshi has
worn on his head throughout the panels.
Grounding the story in the context of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and
setting the story in 1960s occupied Nagaland recenters the conversation from what Nagas
eat, to the condition in which Nagas live. The story illustrates that Nagaland is not a
political stage that displays a battle between modern, secular liberalism, and primitive
barbarian practices, as it is so often represented outside of Nagaland. Rather, we see,
everything that happens in Nagaland or to Nagaland or about Nagaland is foregrounded
by AFSPA. We live, eat, and die in the context of AFSPA, which continues to be
renewed by a vote of Indian parliament every six months, as it has been since it was first
instituted in 1958.
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This story complicates the current news coverage of the dog-eating ban instituted
in Nagaland in 2020. The artist Shinobi shows that Nagas’ relationship to domesticated
animals such as dogs and to wild animals such as hornbills is more complex than the
current political conversation around dog meat eating might presume. In this story, dogs
are friends who work with humans, as well as occasionally enemies or breakfast. Even
when Toshi decides to eat the invading dog, he makes sure to find other sustenance for
his dog Nok, so that Nok will not cannibalize his own kind. Through his conversation
with Nok, Toshi reveals that there are some species that have special relationships with
Nagas and are therefore not to be eaten. Here, Toshi tries to decipher the meaning of the
hornbill’s visit, guessing what action the visit is meant to prompt. While he will
eventually hunt a small bird for Nok to eat, he makes it clear that that will not be the fate
of the hornbill. Perhaps, this story suggests, what Nagas eat is not a sign of a barbarian
past or violent present. Perhaps what Nagas eat, and our relationship to the wild and
domestic animals around us, is rooted in our political context. Perhaps war, militarization,
and AFSPA affect what we eat.
Special Status in a More Self-Confident India
Increased surveillance of what Nagas eat occurred concurrently with shifts in
India’s understanding of its territoriality and a more volatile sense of who constitutes a
threat to the state. In May 2020, nine months after India had reneged on Jammu and
Kashmir’s special constitutional status, reinforced its military presence in Kashmir, and
barred broadband and mobile phone service, a pigeon was captured and detained by the
Indian Border Security Force after the pigeon crossed the India-Pakistan border in Indiaadministered Kashmir. The pink ring tag attached to its ankle was suspected to contain
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codes intended to convey information to insurgent groups in India-administered Kashmir.
After keeping the pigeon in custody for several days, it was confirmed that the code on
the tag was the phone number of the owner of the bird, who races pigeons, and lost a
pigeon when the bird crossed the border during a training session. The pigeon was not
released, however, until the owner appealed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 169 Similar
cases occurred in 2015 and 2016 when pigeons who crossed the India-Pakistan border
were taken into custody on suspicion of spying on India for Pakistan. This national
security approach conscripts all non-human agents as potential threats, regardless of
human control or interaction. In order to reinforce nation-state territoriality, any
presumed ability to see from above by those in surveilled territories is seen as insurgent.
Aerial counterinsurgent strategies blur the distinction between the technological and the
natural within the realm of surveillance, widening the possibility of threat to the colonial
nation-state.
The relationship between Kashmir and Northeast India, particularly Nagaland, is
fraught and not immediately obvious. At first glance, they seem to be entirely unrelated,
as they are located on opposite sides of the Indian subcontinent, inhabited by different
religious and ethnic groups, and have distinct histories in relation to the Indian state.
However, the incompleteness of Indian state sovereignty renders these territories close
cousins. What brings Kashmir and Nagaland together is India's interest in defending its
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claim to territory that borders China. In practice, these regions, and the people who
inhabit them, are seen as potential insurgents, foreigners in India despite being enclosed
by India’s borders. Indian military presence in these regions is based on presumed
suspicion and potential threat. Article 370 of the Indian constitution describes India’s
relationship to Jammu and Kashmir, citing Jammu and Kashmir’s special status within
the new India, granting it provisions for its own constitution, flag, and autonomous
internal administration. From 1954-2019, Jammu and Kashmir was subject to some
aspects of the Indian constitution in addition to its own constitution, such that Indian
citizens could not legally purchase land in Jammu and Kashmir. However, in August
2019, the government of India announced that the entirety of the Indian constitution
applied to Jammu and Kashmir, effectively abrogating the Kashmir constitution. Shortly
after, the government of India amended the Indian constitution, adding article 370(3)
which denounced not only the special status indicated in article 370, but suggested that
any other former treaties or agreements with or about Kashmir were inoperable. In this
announcement, land in Kashmir became available for sale to non-Kashmiri Indian
citizens. Kashmir was placed under a central government-appointed internet blackout for
over seven months, continuing in during the pandemic lockdown. 170 NYC-based Muslim
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Kashmiri cartoonist Mir Suhail illustrated the events in Kashmir before and during the
pandemic. In one cartoon, military boots march into mountainous Kashmir, each boot a
house with a roof, door, and windows with a warm yellow light. The landscape is a dark
blood red, the mountains in the background shrouded by a dark sky, and ghostly figures
at the edge of the plains and mountains. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Suhail said:
“They will start building settlements there soon … they will colonise us just like
Palestine.” 171 Kashmiri Anthropologist Ather Zia argues that affective suffering in the
face of occupation, torture, and surveillance serves as a pivot for solidarities between
Palestine and Kashmir. 172
Nagas and other Indigenous peoples in northeast India followed the events in
Kashmir closely, noting the bureaucratic linkages between Kashmir to Nagaland. Just as
article 370 granted a special status to Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian union, article
371 grants special status to states with large Indigenous populations, mostly within
northeast India. Article 371A applies to Nagaland and asserts that Indian parliament
cannot pass laws that interfere with Naga religious or social practices, customary law and
procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice, or ownership and transfer of land
and resources. If Kashmir could be stripped of its special status, could Nagaland?
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The governor's "At Home" function on the 71st Republic Day, 26, January 2020,
in Kohima, Nagaland celebrated the formation of the state of Nagaland and honored the
individuals who had participated in that process. The governor addressed a group of
families of the honorees, Indian military and government personnel, and a few others,
including myself. Just two weeks earlier, the Indian government had intercepted the wife
of a Naga militant as she attempted to leave the country with a large sum of cash. This
attempted flight was seen as a breaking of trust between the Indian government and the
Naga group NSCN-IM, which were in negotiations for "shared sovereignty." The "At
Home" event, then, seemed to be primed to rewrite history and create an unspoken threat.
The governor began his speech with a reminder of India's celebration: "Friends, this is an
occasion when we remember and pay homage to the father of Nation, Mahatma Gandhi
and other leaders who through peaceful means led a political process to the
decolonisation of India. We also today, remember and pay homage to the founding
fathers of Nagaland State, the leaders of the Naga People's Convention." In that
introduction, Governor R.N. Ravi effectively tied the formation of the Indian state of
Nagaland to India's independence from Britain, suggesting that the state of Nagaland is
itself decolonized. Governor Ravi presented a story of Nagaland that left India blameless
and suggested that Naga people suffered due to infighting between insurgent groups:
"When all around the guns were booming and the people were caught in
the crossfire, these people got together displaying an extraordinary sense
of unity because even though the region was not like what we have the
State today; administratively not under one. All the 16 tribes' leaders got
together and deliberated and pursued a path in the best interest of
Nagaland. I salute their extra ordinary courage because today when we
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talk about the fear of the gun, it sounds trivial when we compare it with
the situation when they took the lead." 173
Ravi here ignored that Naga people and land are divided between three Indian states and
Myanmar, asserting that Naga territory and people are administratively a single unit.
Furthermore, Ravi suggested that representatives of all Naga tribes participated in the
formation of the state and that the benefits of this formation were felt equally between
tribes and people.
Between this revisionist history of Nagaland and awards congratulating
community organizations on awards for excellence in conservation and public health,
Governor Ravi added a veiled threat towards the current political situation, linking
Nagaland to Kashmir, and India's expansionist dreams:
"Because as the time passed, a more self-confident India would perhaps
not agree what was agreed at that point of time. I really wonder if anyone
can imagine getting today anything like Article 371A. They got not only a
Nagaland State, which could have been otherwise partly a district of
Assam and partly of NEFA. They got the state, a united state, and much
more than that. It is a special state where the sovereign parliament of India
chose to limit its own power in the core areas concerning the Naga people
and gave it to Naga people's legislature to take a call on them. Land,
resources, tradition, customs, religion, system, justice all that which were
crucially concerned with people of Nagaland, Indian Parliament chose to
withdraw and gave it to the people of Nagaland to decide their destiny
according to their genius. And it was all done through peaceful dialogue. It
was done pursuing the path with Mahatma Gandhi had shown." 174
The papers summarized the speech without the direct text, but the synopsis was
enough to inspire early morning phone calls and heated conversations. "Is India
threatening to do to Nagaland what it is doing to Kashmir?" A more self-confident India,
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the governor was saying, would never have acknowledged the rights of the Naga people
to customary practices and traditional land ownership. Just months before, when India
threw out the special status held by Jammu and Kashmir, Governor Ravi told the Morung
Express, a daily paper in Nagaland: “I would like to categorically assure you all that you
do not have to worry at all. Article 371(A) is a solemn commitment to the People of
Nagaland. It is a sacred commitment." But this Republic Day speech seemed to alter the
public approach to this "sacred commitment." 175
Theorizing Indigenous Naga Sovereignty
In the wake of the stalled 2021 negotiations between the government of India and
Naga national political groups, the conversation around Naga sovereignty is shifting to
consider what Naga sovereignty looks like outside of or beyond the structures of
recognition by the nation-state of India or the United Nations. For Nagas, the “Naga
problem” is not the Naga insurgent insistence of sovereignty, but rather is the tension
between the nationhood Nagas have articulated since the early twentieth century and the
militarized opposition to that nationhood by the nation-states of India and Myanmar.
How to address this tension? Literary scholar Dr. Paul Pimomo and public
intellectual Niketu Iralu theorize Naga nationhood outside of western, Westphalian
understandings of sovereignty. In a speech to the Naga Peoples Movement for Human
Rights (NPMHR) in November 2020, Niketu Iralu proposed a reexamination of “the
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concept of sovereignty that Nagas have inherited from the colonial era.” 176 Iralu argues
that Nagas have done everything possible to articulate Naga sovereignty within the
structures first introduced in South Asia during the British colonial period, but these
actions have not resulted in recognition of Naga sovereignty. Thus, Iralu asserts, even the
form of sovereignty through which Nagas seek legibility is a colonial legacy. Iralu
theorizes an “Indigenous Naga sovereignty,” not constrained by a politics of recognition
as a nation-state but based on a “unwritten but lived sovereignty of our ancestors.” 177 For
Iralu, Naga sovereignty is not a discrete moment of recognition of a nation-state. Instead,
it is ongoing state of being and process of self-determination and self-rule marked by
internal, mutual relations. Sovereignty is not merely a legal status, but a is a practice of
working towards fulfillment of the aspirations, concerns, and desires of a people.
Sovereignty, Iralu says, is “proper growth of a people in all areas of life.” As interlocutor,
Paul Pimomo engaged with Iralu’s proposal in his keynote lecture at the 2020 conference
of the Naga Scholars Association. Pimomo argues that Iralu’s framing of an Indigenous
Naga sovereignty splits “the regimented narrative of Western sovereignty into two
modes: the concept of a world divided into sacrosanct juridical nation-states and an
Indigenous practice of transforming a people into a contingent nationhood.” 178
Furthermore, Pimomo asserts, this opens a path forward for Naga nation-building that is
not dependent on negotiations of the framework agreement, or any other recognition from
the Indian nation-state: “For Nagas, then, Western style conferred sovereignty has only
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been an idea, a costly idea, and an unfulfilled dream, which we are not about to dismiss –
not just yet…The way forward for us lies in implementing Indigenous Naga sovereignty
with what we have, where we are, and what we may together be capable of as a
people.” 179 Sovereignty, then, is not simply an aspiration or demand for the near future
but is a current lived practice and way of relating to each other.
Naga demands for recognition as a nation-state had sidelined Naga participation
in the Indigenous activism that led to the formation of the United Nations Working Group
on Indigenous Populations in the 1980s. 180 Today, articulations of Naga sovereignty,
territory, and Indigeneity have renewed Naga representation in international forums. On
July 13, 2021, Paul Pimomo spoke on behalf of the Global Naga Forum at the 14th
Session of the Expert Mechanism for Rights of Indigenous Peoples Right to SelfDetermination. In his speech, Pimomo described Nagas as “an Indigenous transnational
people living in India and Myanmar” who were “arbitrarily divided and placed under
different administrative units” when India and Burma became independent in the
1940s. 181 Pimomo’s articulation of Naga space and place rejects colonial notions of
territoriality, framing Naga Indigeneity as an inherently transnational category not
dependent on recognition by India or Myanmar.
While previous decades of Naga political organizing emphasize narrations of the
political history described above, supported by an archive of correspondence, public
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statements, and other writings according to normative western practices of providing
proof via physical documentation, Pimomo and Iralu draw on Naga cultural practices,
emphasizing relationality between community and territory to articulate a Naga
sovereignty that does not seek recognition from occupying nation-states. This emphasis
enables a shift away from the legal, citational, and documentary practices of previous
years and moves towards a centering of Naga lived experiences as a site of Naga
sovereignty. In the presentation to the UN Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, Pimomo articulated five related appeals from the Global Naga Forum.
Primary to these appeals were three items: a deep concern at the thousands of lives lost
and suffering due to the ongoing “Indo-Naga political conflict,” a desire for peaceful
resolution of this conflict, the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA),
and, as a material outcome of a peaceful resolution and repeal of AFSPA, the territorial
and political unification of Naga territory across four Indian states and Myanmar. The
statement expresses a desire for a change in political relationship: “We want a new
relationship that ensures human rights, justice, and peaceful co-existence for all the
stakeholders: India, Myanmar, and the Nagas.” 182 With the phrase “the Nagas,” Pimomo
exacts a slight shift in language, emphasizing relationality of people and territory over
recognized statehood. Throughout the statement, Pimomo offers a subtle critique of the
formations of state power that have enabled colonial power to continue in Naga territory.
Pimomo refers to “India’s politically engineered state of Nagaland,” rejecting the
argument that the formation of the state within India was anything other than a political
move and creation of the Indian government. Pimomo describes Nagas’ experience of
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British retreat from South Asia as a time when Nagas “were arbitrarily divided and
placed under different administrative units (we still are)...The imposed separations have
prevented us from maintaining links as an Indigenous nation.” Rather than demanding
recognition as a nation-state and membership in the United Nations, as Naga political
groups have articulated in the past, this speech from the Global Naga Forum presents a
vision of Naga sovereignty and territorial autonomy that is not delimited by the strictures
of contemporary notions of Westphalian sovereignty via a nation-state. Naga sovereignty
exists whether or not it is recognized.
Shared Sovereignty
For several years now, Nagas have watched in anticipation as the government of
India negotiates with a Naga political group to find a settlement that satisfies the Naga
demand for recognition of its sovereignty while not affecting India’s territorial control
and cartographic boundaries within the region. While the details of that settlement are yet
to be made public, we have heard that “shared sovereignty” between India and Nagaland
is under discussion, though we do not know the exact terms of this framework. 183 Nagas
want our own flag and constitution; India rejects that possibility. During an ordinary
family dinner with grandparents and cousins, we discuss: Can Westphalian sovereignty
be shared? What is this new working definition of sovereignty? What futures might
shared sovereignty activate?
Perhaps shared sovereignty is not something to be achieved via political
negotiations, but rather a practice of sovereignty through kinship. Zubaan books, an
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independent feminist publishing house based in New Delhi, hosted a forum in Nagaland’s
capital city Kohima on December 15-16, 2019, called “Cultures of Peace.” 184 There,
Seno Tsuhah, Nagaland program director for the women’s rights organization North East
Network, articulated a vision of “shared sovereignty” as a means to address ecological
destruction in northeast India. 185 Tsuhah’s vision differs from the visions of shared
sovereignty deliberated in op-eds and legal news, which emphasize legal agreements, the
geometries of national boundaries, specifications of symbology to represent the nature of
a potential government-to-government relationship. As Tsuhah envisions, sovereignty
starts with Indigenous peoples’ control over their own lands, resources, the ability to
make decisions about how to manage those lands and resources, based on Indigenous
peoples’ priorities. Shared sovereignty, Tsuhah said, “transcends borders.” We enact
shared sovereignty as Indigenous peoples when we practice food sovereignty, sharing
seeds, sharing knowledge, helping each other adapt to the challenges of managing our
own land and resources. But sovereignty, and therefore shared sovereignty, is not just
about the present and articulating our control and agency now. Sovereignty is also about
a vision for the future, and shared sovereignty means creating a shared vision for how we
imagine our future together. In Tsuhah’s vision, shared sovereignty means envisioning a
future not just for humans, not just for Indigenous peoples, but envisioning how that
political vision will make possible a future for land, soil, rivers, forests, aquatic life, and
wildlife in relationship with Indigenous nations.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have identified environmental data collection and the policing of
what Nagas eat as practices of surveillance that further India counterinsurgent efforts in
Nagaland. This informal surveillance functions in two key ways: First, it enhances a
culture of surveillance that occurs directly, in the form of active military occupation of
Naga territory, and indirectly, through criticism of Naga eating habits. This surveillance
affects even the most intimate aspects of daily life in Nagaland. Second, digital
approaches to this surveillance enable the participation of a national and international
public, implicating that public in the surveillance of Nagas through monitoring of amur
falcon satellite tracking data. This data collection and analysis contributes to stereotypes
that racialize Nagas as violent and barbarian and Naga territory as dangerous and
disturbed. In contrast to this colonial logic, Naga cultural production and political
discourse traces the connection between our daily lives and the conditions of
militarization and counterinsurgency that have remained in effect for over sixty years. In
responses to environmental surveillance, Nagas center Naga relations with the more-thanhuman as a key framework for articulating Indigenous Naga sovereignty.
In closing, I return to Toshi and Nok’s search for breakfast as an act of political
agency. Confronted with the reality of devastating violence and destruction of their
village, the characters Toshi and Nok could not address their pangs of hunger without
establishing their relationship to each other and to people, wild animals, domesticated
animals, and land around them. AFSPA initiated not just brute force and violence, but a
destruction of ways of life and ways of relating to space and place. Under the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act, breakfast is not a given, but rather, a negotiation, a political
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declaration, and a mark of relationship between humans and more-than-humans. In
“Breakfast,” I see glimmers of Tsuhah’s vision of shared sovereignty, where a boy, a
domesticated dog, and a wild hornbill negotiate their kinship and belonging within an
occupied landscape.
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Chapter Three
Ground Truth in Palestine: Open Maps in Occupied Territories
In 2016, Google Maps came under fire for an allegation that it had removed the
label “Palestine” from its ubiquitous user interface. This controversy came to the surface
again in 2020. In both cases, it was found that, rather than removing the name of
Palestine from Google Maps, the name had never been in Google Maps in the first
place. 186 If you type “Palestine” into the search function of the Google Maps web
browser, the map slides to a view where the only country name label is “Israel.” Google
Maps marks the borders of Israel with solid black lines. Smaller gray print labels “Gaza
Strip” and “West Bank” and these areas are marked by a dashed gray line. While there
are roads marked inside these borders, there are no labels for towns or cities. In the
“Quick Facts” box on the left-hand side of the screen, it reads: “Palestine, officially the
State of Palestine, is a de jure sovereign state in Western Asia. It is officially governed by
the Palestine Liberation Organization and claims the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” In
both 2016 and 2020, activists documented that other internet-based mapping programs,
such as Apple Maps and Bing maps, also lacked labels for Palestine. Google Maps,
Apple Maps, and Bing Maps are all based in the United States which, in contrast to the
News Outlets reported on the outcry on social media, both reporting that the claims of
removing Palestine from the map were false and suggesting that corporate mapping
programs are not neutral sources of spatial information. For example, the Washington
Post stated: “Still, even if the current outrage is misplaced — and people are outraged,
check out #palestineishere — it does raise some interesting questions about the power of
mapping technologies like Google’s. In their attempts to dispassionately document the
physical world online, tech companies often end up shaping our understanding of it, too.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/09/google-maps-didnot-delete-palestine-but-it-does-impact-how-you-see-it/
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United Nations, does not recognize the State of Palestine. Yandex Maps, a Russian-based
company, outlines Palestine’s borders and labels it “Palestine.”
While traditional printed maps function as a fixed representation of space,
freezing space in the time of the map’s publication date, web-based digital maps can
engage more complex and iterative representations of space. For example, one has only
to zoom in to a place on Google Maps to see the landscape change. As you zoom in, new
labels, symbols, and colors appear marking cities, roads, landmarks, boundaries, and land
cover. Google Maps previously was critiqued for marking disputed territories as
belonging to one country or another; today, Google Maps addresses disputed territories
by having multiple iterations of the same digital map such that Google Maps displays
look different depending on the location of the viewer opening the application. 187 For
example, a viewer at maps.google.in, will see the northeast Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh. A viewer at maps.google.cn will see the same territory occurring within the
border of China. Google Maps views highlight a similar conflict in northwestern India.
Viewed from India, Kashmir is within India’s borders; from Pakistan, Kashmir falls
within Pakistan’s borders. Google Maps and other mapping applications shift the
perspective of the viewer based on geopolitical claims and conflicts, demonstrating that
mapmaking is always a political project. These liminal spaces highlight the instability not
only of geopolitical claims of nation-states but also the mutability of spatial
representations.

David Gellner (ed.), Borderland Lives in Northern South Asia (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2013).
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Throughout the chapters of this dissertation, I am concerned with critiques of
normative technological representations of space, place, and territory, particularly those
that are based on the aerial perspective as a colonial technology of territoriality. This
chapter takes on the politics of the literal by considering the constraints of verifying
accuracy through ground truthing. I argue that prioritizing “ground truth” necessarily
means reifying the boundaries and structures of the settler state, even when attempting to
map against the state. Furthermore, ground truth is a politics of the surficial, limiting
cartographic representations not only to what is visible on the surface in the current
moment but to what is able to be translated into symbols and geometric shapes on a map.
Here, I examine digital participatory cartographic projects that juxtapose maps of historic
Palestine against the physical landscape of the present Israeli settler state, focusing on
projects built using software from Google Maps, Google Earth, and OpenStreetMap.
While many of these projects are celebrated and held up as examples that challenge the
settler state, I suggest that the impulse to document in detail for evidentiary truth claims
works within colonial terms on colonial grounds. Finally, I engage critical scholarship
from Indigenous science and technology studies and Indigenous approaches to
Geographic Information Systems to consider how cartographic representations of
Palestine might account for the Palestinian right to refuse quantification.
Mapping Palestine
International interest in the geopolitical dispute over occupied Palestine and
Israeli settlements results in frequent representations of Palestine/Israel as well as
objection to representations of Palestine/Israel. In 2018, 7amleh, The Arab Center for
Social Media Advancement, published a report on the impact of Google Maps’
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representations of Palestinian territory. 188 7amleh argued that Google Maps’
representation of Palestine contributes to the “planned erasure” of Palestinian spaces and
places and that Google Maps route planning services are designed for settlers and place
Palestinians in unsafe situations. A non-profit organization based in Haifa, 7amleh uses
digital advocacy tools to build capacity, defend digital rights, and build digital media
campaigns. 7amleh’s publication “Mapping Segregation: Google Maps and the Human
Rights of Palestinians” documents how Google Maps’ representations of Palestine
reinforce the narratives and colonial spatial claims of the state of Israel. It advocates for a
series of recommendations, including making the level of detail uniform across
Palestinian villages and Israeli settlements, marking illegal Israeli settlements according
to Article 49 IV Geneva Convention and Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, naming
Palestine on the map, and providing more detailed information in route planning with
regards to marking restrictions on movement for West Bank Palestinians and identifying
routes which are only available to Israeli ID holders. 189
While many nation-states base their territorial sovereignty around specific,
internationally recognized national borders, only Israel’s national borders with Egypt and
Jordan are formally recognized. Israel has no formal national borders with the Palestinian
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territories, Syria, or Lebanon, making Israel’s vision of its territorial sovereignty open for
ongoing expansion. 190 Contemporary territorial divisions in Israel and Palestine originate
in the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, known
commonly as the Oslo Accords or Oslo “peace process.” Mediated by the United States,
the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization, also known as the
Palestinian Authority, and the state of Israel were meant to initiate a process in which
Israel would give up control of the West Bank and Gaza while the Palestinian Authority
would form an independent state in these territories. 191 The underlying purpose of these
negotiations was to preserve the state of Israel as majority Jewish, which meant that the
Palestinian Authority would be limited to Gaza and the West Bank. The right of return of
Palestinian refugees – who make up two thirds of all Palestinians – would also be limited
to these areas. The Oslo accords erased the spatial and territorial history of the conflict,
from the 1948 formation of the state of Israel and the Nakba, the destruction,
dispossession, and displacement of Palestinian society, to 1967, when Israel first
occupied the West Bank during the Six-Day War, instead creating a new territorial base
and reference point for both Palestine and Israel. 192 The Oslo Accords effectively reset
the boundaries of Palestinian territory as if the historical territorial dispossession were
uncontested.
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Today, Palestine is recognized by international law to be made up of two separate
territories, Gaza and the West Bank, while Israel exists inside what is known as the Green
Line. The 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, informally
called Oslo II, resulted in the creation of three distinct areas A, B, and C within the West
Bank. The Palestinian Authority has limited powers that vary within each area. The
Palestinian Authority controls Area A and has civil control in Area B. The Israeli military
has control of Area C and has security control in Area B. Area C is the site of ongoing
Israeli settlement in Palestinian territories. Areas A and B are not contiguous land bases,
but are composed of tracts of land surrounded by Area C. Thus, Palestinians cannot travel
between locations in Area A without crossing Area C or passing through a checkpoint.
While Area C is under Israeli control, there are unrecognized Palestinian villages in Area
C that continue to be under threat of dispossession and settlement. Israel’s color-coded ID
system determines the level of freedom or restriction of movement of the ID holder.
Israelis and Palestinians living within Israel have blue IDs and may move freely through
Israel and Area C. Palestinians in Gaza or Areas A or B have green IDs and can only
move within the territory in which they reside. Holders of blue IDs are subject to Israeli
civil law while holders of green IDs are subject to Israeli military legislation. 193
In addition to Gaza and the West Bank, there are 36 unrecognized Palestinian
villages in the Naqab, or Negev, desert in southern Israel. The majority of Bedouin
Palestinian villages in the Naqab existed before the 1948 creation of the state of Israel,
but these villages are unrecognized by the state of Israel and the state classifies
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inhabitants of these villages as “trespassers on State land.” 194 Being classified as
unrecognized means that these villages are denied access to infrastructure provided by the
state to other cities and settlements, such as electricity, water and sewage systems,
accessible roads, social services, hospitals, and education. Shourideh Molavi explains that
Bedouins and other Palestinians “are placed in a paradoxical situation where, as Arab
citizens of a Jewish state, they are both inside and outside, host and guest, citizen and
stateless.” 195
7amleh’s critique of Google Maps hinges on two key aspects of the digital
mapping service. First, Google Maps’ choices of how and what to label follow narratives
of the state of Israel. The amount of detail at each zoom level of the map differs based on
whether the details represented are Israeli or Palestinian. 196 For example, there are
Palestinian villages in the Naqab desert in southern Israel and in West Bank Area C that
are unrecognized by the state of Israel and therefore are under threat of demolition. Many
of these villages are not visible on Google Maps or are only visible at a high zoom level,
in contrast to Israeli settlements which are labelled and visible at lower zoom levels.
Even at a high zoom level, Palestinian Bedouin villages are labelled with tribe and clan
names, rather than village names. Second, Google Maps route planning is designed for
people with Israeli ID cards and does not account for the restrictions of movement placed
on Palestinians. Routes on Google Maps direct users along roads that are inaccessible to
West Bank ID holders or that take them through check points and roads they avoid, as the
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consequences for Palestinian access of “Israeli-only roads include arrest, delays,
detainment, confiscation of cars, and even death.” 197
These two factors critiqued by 7amleh inform and affect each other. Google Maps
directions prioritize routes that travel through Israel rather than through the West Bank,
sometimes adding hours onto travel time in order to avoid the West Bank. For routes that
do pass through the West Bank, Google Maps neglects to include checkpoints or Israeli
settlements along those routes. Google Maps will not provide directions between rural
Palestinian communities, or between Gaza and a rural community, as these communities
are not marked on the map and therefore are “missing places.” These absences from the
map reinforce the state of Israel’s narrative of this land as uninhabited and open for
settlement by Israelis. Google Maps, despite being open access and having systems
through which users can submit edits, bolsters the Israeli state’s spatial claims.
Drawing on the recent history of dispossession of Palestinian villages and lands,
many scholarly and activist projects seek to remap Palestinian villages that were
destroyed and depopulated in 1948, often using visual and cartographic technologies for
mapping and immersive storytelling such as open access mapping programs, virtual
reality, and the Metaverse. 198 Projects such as “Palestine, Today” created by Visualizing
Palestine, use immersive storytelling to zoom in to historical maps of Palestine and
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narrate the stories of specific cities and villages in contemporary Palestine and Israel. 199
These maps draw on historical data from Salman Abu Sitta’s Atlas of Palestine, the
Palestine Remembered Statistics Project, Zochrot Nakba Map, the Palestinian Central
Bureau of Statistics, and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. They illustrate
Palestinian histories of dispossession and occupation by overlaying contemporary aerial
imagery with historical maps that have been annotated with colored dots to mark
communities that were destroyed and built over, depopulated and appropriated,
depopulated and currently uninhabited, or remaining since 1948. 200 This spatial
storytelling of “Palestine, Today” is based on Palestine Open Maps, an open source
platform that makes historic maps of Palestine searchable and compiles vast amounts of
data about historic villages and cities. 201 These projects demonstrate how the state of
Israel has remapped Palestine and manipulated the landscape and infrastructure to
maintain Israel’s claims to territory.
Digital spaces such as Google Maps and Google Earth have become sites of
territorial conflict themselves. In 2006, just one year after the launch of Google Earth,
Thameen Darby announced on the Google Earth Community Forum that he had created a
Google Earth layer that marked all the Palestinian villages destroyed or depopulated in
1948. In addition to his post on the Google Earth Community Forum, Darby shared his
Google Earth layer via email with his friends and family, inviting them to share it
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broadly. 202 Palestinians in diaspora could find their original villages and towns on the
Google Earth layer which would then link to PalestineRemembered.com where they
could read further about each town. 203 The Nakba layer, as it came to be known, was
downloaded so many times that it earned a top spot in the “Best of Google Earth
Community” which was followed by complaints from users, including formal complaints
against Google filed with Israeli police and the creation of a “counter-counter-map”
expressing “the Israeli side.” 204 Quiquivix describes how the Nakba map led to the
creation of an even more detailed map of dispossessed Palestinian territories. Made by
Salah Mansour, site administrator of PalestineRemembered.com, using data from Salman
Abu Sitta’s 2007 The Return Journey, this spatial data layer explicitly marked Palestinian
territories as occupied by Israel and referred to all Israeli areas as “Exclusive Jewish
Colonies.” While Quiquivix acknowledges the role of geospatial technologies like
Google Earth in war, surveillance, and assumptions of neutrality of satellite imagery,
Quiquivix sees in Google Earth and associated technologies the potential for countercartographic projects that appropriate technologies of warfare in order to protest injustice,
work towards the goals of collective movements, and destabilize dominant discourse that
erases Palestinian dispossession. 205 Quiquivix writes: “Because these are cooperative
endeavors that also leave the invitation open for Israelis to join in, they can also be
understood as practices that reterritorialize Palestine beyond a political geometry that
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assumes oppositional division between people.” 206 Rather than see engagement of Israeli
and Palestinian history on Google Earth as a digital manifestation of conflict on the
ground, Quiquivix sees an opening in this digital modality for solidarity building.
Critique of web-based mapping of Palestine focuses in large part on Google Maps
and Google Earth, as Google’s near ubiquity means that it dominates global
representations of space, place, and territory in Palestine and elsewhere. The usability of
programs like Google Earth means that Google products can be easily used by
individuals to map data, creating counter maps and “counter-counter-maps.” Many of
these critiques emphasize Google Maps’ positionality as a U.S. based company, subject
to U.S. regulations regarding spatial data, and likely to represent international territorial
borders that are influenced by U.S. imperial understandings of the world. While 7amleh’s
exposé focused on Google Maps, 7amleh compared Google Maps route planning
directions to those of two other mapping services: Waze and Maps.me. 207 Waze is now
owned by Google but was originally made by Israeli developers. Waze’s default in Israel
and Palestine is to “avoid high-risk areas,” which means in practice that routes will
conclude at Israeli checkpoints even if the final destination is a Palestinian town. This
default option must be turned off to navigate to Palestinian locations and, when the user
turns the default off, a warning is displayed with a number to call in case of emergencies.
There is no route planning available in rural Palestinian areas nor will the software
compute routes that begin or end in Gaza. 208 Originally developed in Zurich, Maps.me
uses data from OpenStreetMap (OSM) to create offline maps to use for navigation.
206
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Unlike Google Maps and Waze, Maps.me marks and names checkpoints. It rarely
provides routes that pass through Israeli settlements, which only permit movement by
blue ID holders (residents of Israel), and rarely creates routes that circumvent Palestinian
controlled Area A. Some routes even include dirt roads used primarily by Palestinian
residents. Both Waze and Maps.me allow users to add data to their respective maps, but
users can make edits to Maps.me by contributing to OpenStreetMap, which is open
source and open data, meaning that its base maps and spatial data are both editable and
free to use for any purpose. Maps.me uses this open source and open data software as
base maps for its own application, so changes made in OSM are reflected in Maps.me.
Collaborative forms of online mapping promise the possibility of challenging
power relations and democratizing the collection, maintenance, storage, and sharing of
spatial data. These forms of mapping are part of Web 2.0, a movement since the early
2000s towards web development that emphasizes participation through social
networking, cloud computing, and user-generated content. 209 While not open source,
Google Maps draws on developments of Web 2.0 by enabling users to edit or contribute
data to its maps. Google Maps also uses conglomerated user location data to predict route
time and traffic jams, so that features like route planning can change in the moment based
on present conditions of roads. OpenStreetMap (OSM) takes these elements of Web 2.0
further than Google Maps and other online mapping programs. Founded in the U.K. in
2004, just one year before Google Earth was launched, OpenStreetMap promises greater
transparency and democratization of spatial data through its status as open source and
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open data. For cartographers and activists such as those mapping the dispossession of
historic Palestine, programs like OSM seem to offer an opportunity to right cartographic
wrongs and provide just visual representation of Palestine and other occupied territories
by putting cartographic tools and platforms in the hands of Palestinians.
In the OpenStreetMap Wiki page “How We Map,” OpenStreetMap emphasizes
that it is a “social activity” with a “tradition of making as few rules as possible.” 210
Instead, it provides guidelines for contributions to OSM:
Contributions to OpenStreetMap should be:
Truthful – means that you cannot contribute something you have
invented
• Legal – means that you don’t copy copyrighted data without
permission
• Verifiable – means that others can go there and see for themselves
if your data is correct.
• Relevant – means that you have to use tags that make clear to
others how to re-use the data.
When in doubt, also consider the “facts on the ground rule”: map the
world as it can be observed by someone physically there. 211
•

OpenStreetMap privileges two key elements: metadata and verification by ground
truthing. It emphasizes metadata through its stipulation that data must be traceable and
not invented and through its requirement that tags must indicate how to re-use data. The
importance of ground truthing, or the ability to ground truth if necessary, is enshrined in
its guideline about verifiability and the “on the ground rule.” According to this rule, if
someone were in the exact physical location one was mapping, they should be able to
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point to literal facts on the ground that correspond to and confirm the points, lines, and
polygons on a digital map. 212
While 7amleh found that Maps.me use of OSM resulted in better route planning
and greater level of detail for Palestinians, OSM’s reliance on “facts on the ground”
results in maps that represent physical aspects of Israel’s occupation of the landscape as
uncontested, ahistorical fact. OSM’s approach makes it possible to map dirt roads used
only by green ID card holders and to include those roads in route planning, but simply
mapping those roads and routes does not challenge the relationship of domination that
necessitates different routes depending on the ID card color. A checkpoint is represented
in OSM as a checkpoint; the fact of the checkpoint’s existence is not questioned on
contextualized. In an analysis of OSM map data, forum discussions, and interviews with
OSM users, Christian Bittner examined whether Web 2.0 participatory cartography like
OSM replicates previous cartographic conflicts in Palestine and Israel. Bittner’s analysis
found that while the aggregation of data within OSM did not replicate the same processes
and points of tension as documented in other mapping efforts in Israel and Palestine,
OSM data was predominantly created by Israeli users. Bittner hypothesizes that the lack
of Palestinian participation is likely due to an ontological rejection of OSM’s “facts on
the ground rule.” Bittner asserts: “Insisting upon an objective ‘ground truth’ can also be
interpreted as a strategy to depoliticize a conservative form of cartography that
reproduces current socio-spatial order and thus the power imbalances behind it.” 213 OSM
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provides greater support for Palestinians for the purpose of daily navigation, safety, and
survival, but OSM’s “facts on the ground rule” means that these maps will always
replicate the current conditions of colonial occupation. A change to OSM can only follow
significant shifts in the conditions of life as manifested in physical space, for example,
road infrastructure, buildings, and other features which can be mapped spatially as points,
lines, and polygons.
Digital cartographic projects documenting historic Palestine abound. Often
synthesizing video, photography, digital mapping, audio recordings, and interactive
media like blogs, chat forums, and user-uploaded photographs, these projects attempt to
make historical spatial data accessible, humanize it through story, and bring quantitative
data to life for viewers. Dale Hudson examines three interactive documentary projects
that emphasize the responsibility to remember by using cartographic technologies:
Gaza/Sderot, iNakba, and Jerusalem, We Are Here. Hudson argues that these projects
engage participants in cartographic representations of historic Palestine while limiting the
risk of surveillance by avoiding location-aware GPS tracking technologies. 214 These
projects all rely on quantitative cartographic data to represent Palestinians within the
occupied landscape. While Hudson focuses on how these projects engage memory and
generate an affective response by making viewers responsible for remembering and
memorializing Palestine before the Nakba, I am interested in how these projects are
drawn from the same overlapping sets of spatial data on historic Palestine. ARTE
France’s Gaza/Sderot: Life in Spite of Everything, a documentary film made up of two
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minutes videos following six people from Gaza, Palestine, and six people from Sderot,
Israel, was broadcast online every day for two months. The daily two-minute videos in
the two sites were juxtaposed against each other and embedded into a map so that
viewers could zoom out to see the places in relation to each other spatially. 215 In 2014,
Israeli NGO Zochrot, which promotes awareness of the Palestinian Nakba, launched the
trilingual mobile app iNakba. The app is based on GPS navigation technology, though it
can be used on- or off-site from the locations depicted. Like the Google Earth Nakba
layer, provides coordinates of Palestinian places that were destroyed and depopulated
during and as a result of the 1948 Nakba. The app provides historical information, video
clips, and photographs for these sites and allows users to add their own photographs and
text comments to data within the app. 216 Viewers enter Dorit Naaman’s video
documentary project Jerusalem, We Are Here by finding themselves, via a web browser,
sitting in the historic Regent Theater in Jerusalem and watching black and white video
clips filmed by a narrator’s ancestor. Viewers can then accompany three hosts on a
walking tour of Katamon, a neighborhood of West Jerusalem, to learn about its
Palestinian history. Rather than a traditional video format, viewers can click and drag a
mouse to navigate through the neighborhood. There are three virtual tours to choose from
and each one has symbols over objects in the street view scene to indicate video, audio,
and text that the viewer can pause to take in. A street map embedded in the page lights up
to indicate the path each virtual tour will take. Viewers can also click a link titled
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“Remapping Jerusalem” that jumps to an interactive map made with data from Mapa
GISrael and Google Street View and allows the viewer to toggle between aerial views of
the neighborhood in 2014, 1946, 1938, and 1934. 217 What these and other digital
cartographic projects that visually represent historic Palestine have in common is a
documentary impulse to synthesize spatial data in order to make evidentiary truth claims
to Palestinian life and presence. They attempt to map in as much detail as possible
Palestine before the Nakba. When overlaid on a map of the present, the digital projects
invite the viewer to deal with the incommensurability and try to comprehend what steps
happened in the intervening years for the ground truth of the present to exist. Despite the
intimacy and detail of these maps, the digital, web-based format in which they are shared
means that there is global access to these projects. Who then is responsible to remember?
What spatial details does a non-Palestinian viewer need to know?
Other digital mapping projects are designed around participatory processes of data
collection, analysis, and representation, rather than simply interacting with data after it
has been collated, and these participatory approaches are heralded as acts towards
“cartographic justice.” 218 For example, events called “mapathons” offer cartography
training to interested people via a workshop who are then invited to participate in a largescale collaborative mapping project. In 2020, a project of Visualizing Palestine called
Palestine Open Maps offered mapathons to teach participants to digitize historic spatial
data of 1940s Palestine. Participants vectorized the content of 155 original paper maps
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made by the British Mandate of Palestine and this data was added to Palestine Open
Maps. 219 In this way, Palestine Open Maps not only introduces people to its platform but
also engages users in producing the spatial data and maps that make up the platform.
Digital Infrastructures and Data Transit
Who are these projects for? Advocates of digital cartographic projects such as
those described above argue that these projects illustrate history that has been
systematically erased, facilitate accountability, work towards cartographic justice, and
initiate a rethinking of space and place beyond territoriality. 220 Some, like the Google
Earth Nakba layer, are ostensibly made for the Palestinian diaspora to identify their own
landscapes of origin and inhabit that space, if only virtually. Others, like Gaza/Sderot, are
designed to speak to a global audience and inspire an affective relationship to and
understanding of contemporary lived experiences in Palestine/Israel.
However, these projects circulate widely far beyond their intended audiences. To
return to the example of the Google Earth Nakba layer, Thameen Darby made the layer to
circulate among friends and family and encouraged them to share the layer with others in
the Palestinian diaspora so that many people could return virtually to their families’
homes and see what they look like today. Its immediate success placed the layer in a
For a description of the Palestine Open Maps mapathon process, see:
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prominent Google Earth list, making the layer known and accessible to any users of
Google Earth, regardless of their interests, politics, communities, or context. While Darby
made the Nakba layer for the Palestinian diaspora as a form of claiming, knowledge
producing, and memorializing, some responses understood the layer as a direct attack on
Israeli territoriality and accounts of history. These viewers perceived the Nakba layer as a
counter-map, made in opposition to state narratives of Israel. The Nakba layer generated
Israeli cartographic responses within Google Earth that attempted to challenge the Nakba
layer. These responses, in turn, were seen as counter-counter-maps, when in fact they
simply reiterated the narratives and geographies that already dominate the “facts on the
ground” maps derived from contemporary aerial imagery. I engage further in the concept
of counter-mapping in chapter six. While it has been an effective tool for Indigenous
claims making for land use, land tenure, and territorial boundaries, I maintain that it is not
a panacea for Indigenous projects nor does it stand in as an umbrella term for all
Indigenous cartography. In some cases, the term “counter-mapping” comes to mean a
map made with a particular political point of view in contrast to maps where the political
intent is not made explicit. While understanding counter-maps as political is not
inaccurate, this alone does not challenge the central claims of objectivity of state
cartography. It also centers the map as a response to state powers. While the Nakba layer
did present a representation of Palestine that differs from the maps promoted by the state
of Israel, its intended purpose exceeded that function. It was meant as a tool for
reconnection of Palestinian diaspora to their ancestral places, not just as a response to the
colonial state. The understanding of Israeli responses to the Nakba layer as “countercounter-mapping” exemplifies this understanding of counter-mapping as defined by
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response, as though these maps could not exist without another map to respond to. Of
course, maps are never neutral, but the way that countermapping is taken up can reinforce
assumptions that maps are political in varying degrees and are not inherently political.
We might consider what these spatial memorializing projects do when they
circulate beyond their intended audience. Do they effectively challenge colonial
cartographies? Do they add fuel to the colonial state’s cartographic project? Does the
impact of these projects shift for the Palestinians in Palestine and in the diaspora when
the projects are the target for attack and contradiction from people outside the
community?
Digital and spatial archival projects that document the occupation of Palestine
draw on a long tradition of producing documentary evidence and reminders of the Nakba
and its aftereffects for both Palestinians in historic Palestine and in the diaspora. From
memoirs like Salman Abu Sitta’s Mapping My Return and Walid Khalidi’s All that
Remains or visual projects like Edward Said and Jean Mohr’s After the Last Sky:
Palestinian Lives, these projects illustrate the everyday nature of settler colonialism in
Palestine. More recent digital mapping projects are celebrated for exposing the physical
fact of settler colonialism, and scholars engage notions of settler colonialism, Indigeneity,
and apartheid in analyses of these digital projects. Bevilacqua understands these digital
maps as Indigenous mapping: “Several Palestinian projects ranging from collaborative
mapping software to open-source graphic layers have sought to expose Israeli settler
colonial violence through the deployment of indigenous knowledges.” 221 Other scholars
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see these projects as generating an independent archive of Palestinian history. Ann Stoler
describes an “archival surge” by, for, and about Palestine in which artist-activistacademics engage in practices of archiving that stand in contrast to working in or on
traditional archives. 222 These archiving projects, Stoler argues, are fundamentally anticolonial and seek to narrate and document without having to simply respond to the formal
archives of the state. Digitization of these projects, such as the Nakba layer, allow them
to be shared and proliferate quickly, despite the increasing digital surveillance of
Palestinians.
Critiques from Palestine studies and surveillance studies of spatial data collection
for public projects focus on the infrastructural constraints and risks of producing and
sharing digital images and spatial data. While activists may embrace the use of
technologies such as drones, GIS, and GPS for counter-surveillance and sousveillance,
the collection, storage, and sharing of this data is always tied to governmental and
corporate digital infrastructure which are in turn closely linked. 223 Sophia Goodfriend
argues that Google Maps and Israeli surveillance are deeply imbricated, not only because
they rely on the same technologies of satellites, high speed internet, and Israeli physical
infrastructure, but they have a symbiotic relationship in which what is visible or absent in
Google Maps Street View is shaped by Israeli surveillance infrastructure and protocol. 224
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Any user can create and share photos and labels with Google Maps or spatial data layers
within Google Earth, but ultimately the creation, sharing, and storage of that data always
falls within Google systems and procedures. Featuring the Nakba layer within the “Best
of Google Earth Community” list was not a specific choice made by Darby but occurred
algorithmically due to the high download volume of the layer. This development feature
of Google Earth meant that the layer was automatically available to millions of users; the
list is not generated by distinct choices of an individual or committee to publicize specific
layers nor does sharing the layer require consent of the mapmaker. Google Earth layers
can be private or public, but there are not built-in options that would allow both private
and public data within a single Google Earth layer. Furthermore, participation in and
interaction with these documentary projects is also influenced by individuals’ comfort
with sharing information in public forums. 225 Even projects meant to democratize
cartography through inclusion of underrepresented communities may find greater
participation from users whose interests align with dominant cartographic
representations, as Bittner extrapolated in his analysis of Israeli and Palestinian
participation in OpenStreetMap, or from those with access to internet infrastructure and
speeds that enable them to engage meaningfully in these open source projects. 226
Sharing of digital data is also dependent on access to internet infrastructure to
upload, download, and view spatial data and cartographic representations of territory.
Prior to 1993, internet access in Palestine was illegal. Today, internet access in Palestine
remains dependent on Israeli internet infrastructure that is unreliable, low speed, and low
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bandwidth. 227 In addition to limiting participation in these Web 2.0 cartographic
representations of Palestine, dependence on Israeli internet infrastructure also makes
Palestinian internet activity subject to surveillance, which might limit the ability or desire
of Palestinians to participate in interactive digital cartographic projects. If an occupied
territory experiences frequent internet and cellular network blackouts, as occurs in Gaza
and as India frequently applies in Kashmir and northeastern territories, then access to
spatial data and the ability to participate in its creation is limited for people in those
regions.
Increased technologization and expansion of technological networks necessarily
means greater surveillance of users of those networks. Internet access detached from state
networks has been proposed as a way of increasing internet access globally, though
corporate ownership of internet infrastructure does not reduce the risk of surveillance of
users of those networks. 228 For example, Google Balloon Internet proposed to build giant
hot air balloons which could aerially transit large areas and transmit internet access to
rural areas without fiber-optic internet connection. 229 As another example, Starlink, a
“constellation” of low Earth orbit satellites owned by SpaceX, plans to use these satellites
to provide satellite internet access globally. Google Balloon Internet never came to
fruition and the newly launched Starlink remains cost prohibitive for most of the world’s
population, one of many cascading issues with such a large satellite endeavor by a private
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corporation. 230 Rather than increasing internet access, these commercial satellite
communications systems create new forms of technological exclusion.
Can technological inclusion occur free of state and corporate surveillance?
Palestinian-American scholar Helga Tawil-Souri documents the technological modes of
control Israel exerts over Palestinian territories. All internet and telephone access in the
Gaza Strip is entirely dependent on Israel, such that Israel can sever network connection
at will, control bandwidth and speed, and maintain constant network surveillance. 231
Given the impossibility of avoiding colonial surveillance via Israeli internet
infrastructure, Tawil-Souri proposes an Internet Pigeon Network (IPN) based out of
Gaza, with pigeons flying between multiple nodes to transfer data via USB drives. Data
could be transferred to local servers, Tawil-Souri asserts, and then accessed within Gaza
without a need to rely on Israeli networks. Furthermore, the IPN would result in faster
internet speeds than any currently available in Gaza. 232 Israel could use hawks or drones
to attempt to intercept the Internet Pigeon Network, but the sheer volume of birds and the
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commonness of pigeons would make it challenging to determine which birds are part of
the IPN and which, as it were, are civilians.
The use of pigeons as infrastructure is essential to the development of
contemporary forms of the aerial perspective, especially in relations to visual
technologies of war. Tawil-Souri’s vision of an Internet Pigeon Network takes up
traditional Palestinian use of pigeons for communication and early twentieth century
experiments in combining pigeons with technological advancements to create an internet
infrastructure that requires a relationship between digital systems and living beings. A
century before the proliferation of drones as household object or military strategy or
conspiracy theories about birds as aerial surveillants, German apothecary Julius
Neubronner experimented to create the first photograph-taking unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV): a pigeon. Neubronner created a leather harness to attach to homing pigeons and
designed a lightweight camera that could be strapped to the harness, complete with a
pneumatic timing mechanism that would activate the shutter at set intervals. This would
allow the camera to take photos entirely based on the pigeon’s perspective and choice of
angle and direction. 233 Neubronner built a horse-drawn darkroom so that he could capture
and develop photographs on the move for public exhibitions, providing printed aerial
surveillance imagery in real time. Germany and France attempted using similar camera
pigeons for aerial surveillance in World War II, but camera pigeons were outpaced by
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manned aircraft for aerial surveillance. The impetus behind both modes, however,
remained the same: to surveil the earth’s surface from above.
Spatial Data Sovereignty
In the years since the Nakba layer was first made available on Google Earth, the
state of Israel has only bolstered its technological aerial surveillance of Palestinian
territory. Israel maintains specific geopolitical relations based on the development and
trade of surveillance technologies and the sharing of data collected by those technologies,
as I describe in the introduction. Thus, the risks of state-sponsored internet infrastructure
and the limitations of frameworks of geospatial corporations are heightened in relation to
publicly accessible spatial data about Palestine.
Historic maps and aerial imagery allow Palestinians in Palestine and in the
diaspora to visualize and digitally inhabit their ancestral homes and experience an
affective relationship to the land. 234 Physical landscape features are imbued with meaning
and symbolize specific historical moments and an ongoing sense of Palestinian
peoplehood. Nassar Abufarha considers the cactus, the orange, the olive tree, and the
poppy as symbols that represent Palestinian identity, history, and relation to land and
engender an affective relationship to Palestinian territory for displaced Palestinians.
Abufarha argues: “Palestinians rely on the reconstruction of Palestine in the Palestinian
cultural imaginary through cultural representations and performances to maintain the
relationship to the land and a sense of hominess in the face of the Israeli physical
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isolation of Palestinians.” 235 For Palestinians, then, knowledge of the location and
number of trees in a historic olive grove can have great meaning and foster a sense of
identity and connection to the land and diasporic community. But who else should have
access to that information?
Scholars of Indigenous methodologies, Indigenous science and technology
studies, and Indigenous geographies caution against uncritically embracing technologies
like Google Earth in political organizing and communication, as data created, stored, and
made accessible in these platforms is always at risk of being coopted by the state and
used against colonized peoples. Applying a critical Indigenous lens to data sovereignty
urges activists, artists, and scholars alike to consider how data made open access might be
used to further the colonial project that data was meant to document and expose. 236
Indigenous data sovereignty is the right of Indigenous peoples to govern how data
is collected, who owns and maintains data, and how data is used and applied. It
recognizes data as a cultural and economic asset to Indigenous peoples and understands
data as something collected and maintained for and by Indigenous peoples, not just about
Indigenous peoples. 237 Furthermore, within the rubric of Indigenous methodologies,
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Indigenous data sovereignty explicitly understands Indigenous data as part of a larger
project of Indigenous knowledge production that occurs both within and outside of the
academy. 238 Indigenous data sovereignty is also a response to normative academic and
state-led data collection, storage, and analysis in which data belongs to private or
government researchers, is stored within systems maintained by those structures, and is
analyzed according to the methodologies and theoretical backgrounds of the researchers.
Open Data, propagated through the strategies of Web 2.0, is another response to
the privatization of data collection, storage, and analysis. As within OpenStreetMap, the
turn to Open Data critiques the idea that data should be maintained by a select few and
instead asserts that data can and should be available publicly, crowdsourced, verified by
an interested public, and able to be continually revised and updated in response to new
crowdsourced evidence. Open Data assumes transparency of data as a common good and
as a more ethical approach to quantitative data. The International Open Data Charter
(ODC) was developed in 2015 by government and non-governmental entities to create
norms for how data is managed and published. The six principles of the ODC call for
data collected by governments to be open by default (and justified if kept private),
available in a timely fashion, accessible and usable free of charge, identified within
rubrics so as to be comparable and interoperable, make governance transparent, and be
usable for “inclusive development.” 239 The techno-imperial relationship between the
U.S., India, and Israel described in the introduction is a modified, governmental approach
238
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to open data, based on maintaining comparable and interoperable data though that data
would be maintained by the three states and is not available publicly.
Despite sharing a critical approach to normative modes of data collection and
analysis, Open Data and Indigenous Data Sovereignty stand in contrast to one another.
While Open Data prioritizes transparency and public access to data, Indigenous data
sovereignty requires a consideration of who “owns” data, who needs access to data, and
what risks might be incurred by open access to data. Open Data processes are still shaped
by normative colonial ways of understanding data and Indigenous peoples and therefore
replicate state forms of oppression through data collection, storage, and analysis. 240 Both
state-led data processes and Open Data processes, argue Walter et al., emphasize
comparison of Indigenous peoples against non-Indigenous peoples, aggregate data at
national and state levels at the expense of Indigenous communities and nations, and
decontextualize data outside of social and cultural contexts. These tensions surface in the
context of the present discussion of interactive mapping programs in Palestine. Within
the conflict over the Google Earth Nakba layer, spatial data layers created in response to
the Nakba layer focused on holding the Nakba layer in contrast to other visions of the
same land. Instead of understanding the Nakba layer as additional information about
historic Palestine, it was perceived by some non-Palestinians as a contradiction of Israeli
narratives and therefore, as incorrect. The Nakba layer was used as evidence for which
people in support of the state of Israel could blame Palestinians for territorial conflict.
Despite being open data, the Nakba layer was interpreted within normative colonial data
logics. Israeli responses to the Nakba layer decontextualized the project so that it was

240

Maggie Walter et al, 2021.

138

examined without attention to its purpose as a spatial representation for and by the
Palestinian diaspora to view and connect spatially to the ancestral places of which they
were dispossessed.
Even when users of open access software contextualize open data or provide
detailed metadata, digital data is at risk of being reproduced incompletely, misused, or
remixed, divorcing the data from its context. Guiliano and Heitmen describe the risks of
digital circulation of Indigenous data saying, “Open access allows for objects to be
divorced from their conditions of production and contexts of interpretation for all forms
of reuse.” 241 Common understandings of cartographic layers also devalue this
documentary cartographic projects. As Musih and Fisher suggest, the use of layers in
cartographic projects like the iNakba app or the Nakba layer play into assumptions of
layers as being mere additions to a solidified base map, rather than being seen as maps in
and of themselves. 242 On the contrary, Musih and Fisher argue that all map elements are
added to a map in layers and each new layer must be considered a continuation of the
cartographic process, not as an addition that can be turned on and off. Despite depicting
the literal dispossession of Palestinian towns, the ease with which the Nakba layer can be
divorced from its context as it circulates on the internet as well as the ability to turn the
layer on and off on Google Earth make it an easy target for opponents to call the layer
into question.
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As the examples of participatory digital mapping projects described earlier
demonstrate, users of an open access program like Google Earth must fit their
cartographic projects within the data management parameters of that program. Web 2.0
software like Google Earth may not enable users to, for example, conceal some data
while sharing others to limit the concealed data to a select group of viewers. The reliance
of Google Earth, OpenStreetMap, and other cartographic mapping programs on facts-onthe-ground also limits the ways that spatial data can be represented within these
programs. If data accessibility and representation of Indigenous and land-based peoples is
enacted primarily within these kinds of open data initiatives that are not designed around
protection of Indigenous self-determination and sovereignty, then spatial representation
of Indigenous peoples will always be on colonial grounds, both literally and
figuratively. 243
Spatial data sovereignty requires particular attention to the protection of spatial
data in order to prioritize Indigenous land tenure, land use, and relation to land, which
may mean making data accessible to a limited audience. As I describe further in chapter
six, Indigenous scholars advocate for forms of digital mapping that preserve Indigenous
spatial data and knowledge for the communities to which the data belongs while also
limiting who has access to that data or the level of detail in the data shared. Colonial
states do not need to know the exact contents of sacred sites or the specific locations or
routes used to harvest foods and materials in order to uphold Indigenous rights and
protect those areas from development. Indigenous approaches to Geographic Information
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Systems (GIS) call for forms of spatial representation that make spatial data available to
Indigenous communities, or even specific people within those communities such as elders
and spiritual leaders, while protecting that information from those outside of those
communities. 244
Indigenous approaches to data sovereignty and Geographic Information Systems
enact a quantitative and cartographic form of what Audra Simpson terms “ethnographic
refusal.” 245 Simpson writes that ethnographic refusal “involves an ethnographic calculus
of what you need to know and what I refuse to write. This is not because of the centrality
of esoteric and sacred knowledge. Rather, the deep context of dispossession, of
containment, of a skewed authoritative axis and the ongoing structure of both settler
colonialism and its disavowal make writing and analysis a careful, complex instantiation
of jurisdiction and authority.” 246 For Simpson, refusal is an enactment of sovereign
authority over ethnographic data, used to protect community concerns, which in the
process highlights unequal power relations within ethnographic research. Indigenous
quantitative data sovereignty functions through a similar act of refusal. By making data
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accessible to a limited group of people, or by generalizing for the purpose of claims
making without revealing unnecessary spatial data, Indigenous peoples engage in a
cartographic refusal to work within the terms of state cartography or Open Data software.
Open Data software like OpenStreetMap assumes that having the power to edit and
contribute to maps places all people on equal footing within its cartographic project.
Indigenous data sovereignty refuses this assumption of neutrality, refuses “ground truth”
as objective, and refuses the notion of spatial documentation as inherently good or
necessary.
Conclusion
Ground truthing strips away context and history in favor of literal physical
evidence in the current moment. When evidence of Palestinian life has been demolished
and built over, and assessment of fact depends on ground truthing in the current moment,
then the aerial perspective cannot resuscitate what is no longer visible on the surface.
This chapter examines participatory and documentary cartographic projects that seek to
provide evidentiary truth claims of Palestinian dispossession and displacement. These
projects map historic Palestine before and during the 1948 Nakba against aerial imagery
of Israel and Palestine in the present. As I have shown, an emphasis on “facts on the
ground” in a settler colonial state will always replicate the settler territorial vision that the
state has already constructed on the landscape. Furthermore, attempts to map previous
presence of the dispossessed through normative colonial cartographic measures and
technologies will always be constrained by the colonial rubrics and colonial assumptions
built into those technologies.
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In this context, I have argued that while these historic mapping projects can
engender affective relationships to land, feed a sense of belonging, and recount a
multiplicity of Palestinian experiences of colonialism, digital cartesian mapping projects
are always influenced by normative assumptions of colonial mapping. I also contend that
Open Data maps are structured without regard for asymmetrical power dynamics and
cannot account for differences in knowledge needed based on those power dynamics. In
this vein, my efforts in this chapter have been aimed less at problematizing participatory
cartographic projects then at raising Indigenous critiques of these modes of community
participation. Mapping the literal will always mean working within colonial spatial
norms. Thus, I assert that consideration of the intended audience and protection of data
for that audience be prioritized in participatory cartographic projects, regardless of the
digital platform used, in order to reimagine spatial data storage and communication. But,
as the next chapter explores at length, speculative and creative representations of
landscapes also struggle to transcend the politics of the literal.
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Chapter Four
Palestine Pixelated:
Imagined Geographic Futures in the Landscapes of Jordan Nassar
How might colonized peoples represent an over-represented space? How do
transparency and opacity function to hide or reveal spatial relations of power? Must maps
be ground truthed to be true? Can we map the future? In this chapter, I consider these
questions of resolution, transparency, and opaqueness in relation to Palestinian diasporic
speculative art. I extend my analytic of the aerial to consider how image resolution, and
pixelation in particular, befuddles, compounds, and makes inaccessible the ability to
sense remotely. Satellite-enabled surveillance monitors everything happening on the
ground and via cloud networks while simultaneously obscuring the data, the process of
data collection, and the identity of the data collectors. Engaging with scholars of
surveillance and visual culture, I respond to Ronak Kapadia’s urge to examine Palestine
not only as ground zero for contemporary colonial surveillance, development of violent
technologies for policing and killing, and as a template for contemporary settler states,
but also as an “experimental site of decolonial fantasy and freedom. 247
I begin with this provocation: If Israel-occupied Palestine is the development
engine for colonial surveillance technologies in the present, then maps and other
landscape representations that communicate other futures are essential for navigating that
which technological surveillance obscures. I advance this provocation through a
Ronak K. Kapadia, Insurgent Aesthetics: Security and the Queer Life of the Forever
War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019): 152.
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discussion of resolution, pixelation, and opacity in territorial images, and examine how
these technological tools are taken up by New York City-based, Palestinian-American
visual artist Jordan Nassar. Working primarily with textiles, Nassar is best known for his
embroidered paintings based on traditional Palestinian embroidery patterns. Nassar also
works with glass and wire, creates zines, and, most recently, transformed an art gallery
into an imagined apartment. Here, I will discuss several of the embroidered paintings, a
zine, and the imagined apartment to explore the relationship between pixelation and how
aerial images shape what we think we know about a territory. In the process, I will
consider how U.S. imperial acts govern not only U.S. ways of seeing and knowing
colonized territories but take shape elsewhere. Image qualities such as resolution or
opacity enable ongoing colonization in the present. These imperial acts are in turn
reinforced through indirect governance by corporations like Google which are the
primary purveyors of spatial data to the global public and provide visual access to remote
geographies. I bring together observations of the geospatial, legal, and visual dimensions
of U.S.-Israel geospatial technological dominance and Palestinian assertions of life, land,
and self-determination, through scholarship from transnational American studies, critical
surveillance studies, and visual culture. This chapter asks how anti-colonial resistance
and representation turn aerial colonial surveillance on its head to enact imagined futures
for the territories of dispossessed peoples and recast colonial spatial surveillance as an
impossible, continually failing project.
Jordan Nasser’s work is only one instance of a breadth of Palestinian speculative
expressive culture. Palestinian writers and visual artists envision Palestinian futures that
build on historical fact without necessarily adhering to a vision of reproducing historical
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Palestine discussed in chapter three. For example, in the 2018 short story collection
Palestine +100: Stories from a Century After the Nakba, edited by Basma Ghalayini,
writers draw on genres of science fiction and dystopia to imagine Palestine in the near
future of 2048, a future much closer to the present that the 1948 Nakba. 248 These
dystopian futures are contextualized within Israel’s present culture of techno-imperial
surveillance and control and locate Palestinian agency amid the colonial technological
array. 249 In Palestinian speculative visual art, these imaginaries are architectural and
spatial as much as they are time-oriented, imagining future Palestinian space and place.
For example, Larissa Sansour’s 2012 short film Nation Estate imagines a Palestine in the
near future in which Palestine has no territorial surface area on which to expand, so all of
Palestine is housed within a single skyscraper. Palestinian cities are each assigned a floor
and Palestinians can travel between cities via elevator, without having to navigate Israeli
military checkpoints. Sansour describes this imagined future as a “vertical solution to
Palestinian statehood.” 250 To imagine the future is not to erase the past. Instead, it moves
beyond recounting of the factual in order to imagine how liberation could look, sound,
and feel.
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In the preface to Becoming Palestine, Gil Hochberg despairs of any promise of
the traditional archive for Palestinian futurity. Hochberg suggests that “little remains that
is redemptive or promising about the archives as a source of historical knowledge. There
is nothing left to find or prove. Secrets have been exposed and more will still be unveiled,
but these archival efforts, important as they are, result in little political change and bring
about minimal if any new configurations of future potentiality.” 251 Hochberg goes on to
argue that whatever documentary evidence is needed to “prove” Palestinian dispossession
and disenfranchisement is already known and well documented. Instead, Hochberg
asserts, Palestinian futures require valuing the imaginative as much as the factual, leaving
room for multiple, open-ended futures, rather than a prescribed reinstitution of pre-1948
Palestine. The work I examine in this chapter attempts to take on this charge. Chapter
three examined cartographic projects that imprint historic Palestine onto contemporary
aerial imagery to illustrate how Palestinian presence has been erased from the surface. It
examined digital approaches to Palestinian landscape representation with the penchant of
the digital for precision, definition, and exactitude. This chapter considers an analog and
aesthetic attempt to represent future Palestinian landscapes. In this chapter, I consider
Jordan Nassar’s speculative embroidered landscape paintings as expressive culture that
attempts to imagine a Palestine that is not limited to the recounting and reconstitution of
Palestine as it was before 1948. I discuss Nassar’s work here not because it is
representative of all Palestinian speculative art (it is not) nor because Nassar’s politics are
exemplary among contemporary Palestinian artists (they are not). Instead, I discuss
Gil Z. Hochberg, Becoming Palestine: Toward an Archival Imagination of the Future,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2021): vii.
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Nassar’s work as an example of how Palestinian speculative art attempts, and sometimes
fails, to appropriate the technological tools of Israel’s colonial surveillance of
Palestinians and recast those tools to imagine Palestinian life and landscape in the future.
Nassar’s work, I argue, plays with pixelation to challenge the erasure of Palestinians from
Israeli narratives about the region but in so doing, ultimately re-enacts the very process of
obscuring Israeli violence which it attempts to critique.
Resolution/Pixelation
Open access satellite imagery has become an essential tool to identify and track
key socio-political events, used by the media, government agencies, and the general
public. In recent years, satellite imagery has been applied to document and expose
colonial and imperial violences and human rights abuses. Satellite imagery was used to
spot the destruction of Rohingya villages by the Myanmar military in 2017, 252 to
construction prison camps in North Korea in 2015, 253 the creation of “re-education”
centers forced upon Uyghers in the Xinjiang region of China in 2018, 254 and mass
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prisoner killings in Syria in 2017. 255 Drawing on remote sensing data collected by
satellites, governments, non-governmental organizations, and the media monitor for new
buildings, particularly near known prisons, and draw on remote sensing data that
identifies fires, such as NASA VIIRS (Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite) and
Synthetic Aperture Radar. 256 Thus, the examples above are characterized by land cover
change and fire, as in the case of Myanmar, or new buildings, as in North Korea, China,
and Syria. Perhaps most famously, the collection of satellite imagery and examination of
images of a single site over time led to the U.S. killing of Osama Bin Laden. 257 Spatial
analysts with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, a little-known wing of U.S.
intelligence operations, used intelligence about the house in which Bin Laden was living
and analyzed past aerial imagery to view the stages of building the compound. From
these images, they knew the exact dimensions and layout of the house, which enabled the
military to build a to-scale model of the compound where troops rehearsed their mission
before being deployed. 258 Both objects and actions can be seen from space in real time.
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Yet the coverage and resolution of this imagery is not uniform globally. Despite
the proliferation of satellites and the accessibility to the public of remotely sensed
images, the quality and use of such aerial images is limited by U.S. imperial power. In
1996, the United States House of Representatives signed into law Public Law 104-201,
known as the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment, which effectively prohibited the collection and
release of detailed satellite imagery of Israel and Palestine. 259 The law stated that nonfederal entities could collect and distribute images of Israel “only if such imagery is no
more detailed or precise than satellite imagery of Israel that is available from commercial
sources” operating outside of the U.S. 260 Effectively, U.S. retailers of satellite imagery
could not collect or distribute satellite imagery of Israel and Palestine at a higher
resolution than satellite images sold by non-U.S. retailers of satellite imagery. While this
law was only applicable to the United States and agencies and corporations operating
within the U.S., the law nevertheless became institutionalized within the satellite imagery
industry, due to U.S. domination of the market for satellite imagery. In addition to
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limiting future collection and dispersal of high-resolution imagery of Israel and Palestine,
the law enacted restrictions on archival satellite imagery dating as far back as the
1960s. 261 The final amendment included a provision that this law could also be applied to
“other countries or geographical areas designated by the President.” 262
As a practice of U.S. imperialism and counterinsurgent policy, policing the
resolution of aerial imagery determines who has access to information, who can monitor
the spatial consequences of ongoing colonization, and who is subject to U.S. imperialism.
The resolution of satellite imagery determines what is visible and what is obscured on the
surface. Where most publicly available satellite imagery of the Arab world has an
average resolution of 0.5 meters, aerial imagery of Palestine has a resolution of 2 meters.
It is 16 times less detailed. Spatial resolution is a number that indicates the equivalent
size of a pixel in the imagery to measurements on the ground; the higher resolution an
image, the smaller an area on the ground is represented by a single pixel. In other words,
the more pixels an image has, the higher the resolution of the image. 263 At a resolution of
0.5 meters, an object with a horizontal surface of 0.5 meters or greater will be visible in
the imagery. A change in landcover of an area 0.5 meters wide will be visible. At a
resolution of 2 meters, one pixel will be equivalent to a 2-meter square area on the
ground. Objects with a horizontal surface less than 2 meters will be blurry and
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indecipherable. While major land cover can be observed at this resolution, the
encroachment of small-scale developments is obscured. At two meters, a car or a building
will be visible, but many trees would not. Landscape change, such as the deforestation of
an area or small additions to buildings might not be visible at two meters but would be
visible at 0.5 meters. At the time that the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment was passed,
commercial satellite imagery of Israel and Palestine was not yet available to the public.
Imagery become commercially available in 2001 and had a resolution of 10-20 meters,
which obscured vast amounts of landscape change. 264
The operation of satellites that orbit the earth, owned by both corporations,
governments, and non-governmental organizations, requires attention to the spatiality of
the airspace through which satellites orbit. Even this airspace is understood
volumetrically. Geostationary Orbit (GEO), the furthest removed from the earth’s
surface, is the realm of telecommunication and broadcasting. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)
is used for global positioning systems. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is used for remote sensing,
the process of collecting data about the earth’s surface using electromagnetic radiation. 265
The creation of these zones emerged from the generation of an understanding of what
makes “outer space” separate from earth’s surface. Treaties such as the 1967 United
Nations’ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies” established “outer
space” as non-sovereign public space and created a structure for regulation of that
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space. 266 But while airspace is regulated volumetrically, once a satellite is in orbit, the
purpose of the satellite is comprehensive data collection about the surface and thus
regulation of data collected via satellite occurs post-collection. For resolution of images
of Palestine, higher resolution imagery exists, but is limited to a specific resolution for
data distribution. 267
Nassar’s Imagined Landscapes
From afar, Jordan Nassar’s embroidered paintings look like pointillist, colorblocked landscapes. Developed in layers, Nassar’s creative process to generate the
imagined Palestinian landscapes of his embroidered paintings is reminiscent of digital,
technoscientific processes of mapping and analyzing landscapes. Nassar begins by
adapting the symbols of traditional Palestinian hand embroidery called tatreez and he
recreates and riffs on these traditional designs to create digital patterns. These geometric
symbols and designs are printed, then embroidered in meticulously repeating and
intersecting patterns. An embroidered painting may be composed of a single repeating
symbol or may be a complex arrangement of multiple repeating symbols. When the
image is embroidered in a single color, the eye is drawn to the complexity and intricacy
of the patterns; there are geometric forms as well as imagery we might identify, such as
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flowers. When embroidered with multiple colors, the composition of the landscapes
emerges through color-blocking.
Nassar works with Palestinian women who are skilled at traditional embroidery
practices to create these landscapes. After digitally designing the patterns, Nassar
generates a PDF that captures visual instructions to create the geometric patterning. The
Palestinian embroiderers follow the pattern, selecting colors and color-blocking patterns
of their own design or in of-the-moment embroidery practices. Nassar sees this as a way
of “capturing this living cultural practice” rather than replicating or reinforcing a
historical embroidery practice. 268 Empty spaces are built into the patterns. After the
Palestinian women have completed the first layer of embroidered patterns, Nassar uses
the same repeating and interlocking embroidery patterns and color-blocking technique to
create his imagined Palestinian landscapes in the spaces that were left empty in the
original pattern. Rather than using colors in repeating patterns to mirror the repeating
forms of the embroidery, Nassar uses a color blocking technique such that the
embroidered patterns become the background from which the color-blocked landscape
features emerge. If the background repeating pattern is an image of a rose with blooms,
bud, leaves, and stem, the colors used do not necessarily distinguish between the forms.
Instead, the embroidered pattern might be monochromatic so that the details of the
pattern are only visible upon close inspection.
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Nassar’s repeating embroidered units operate as irreducible, opaque pixels that
make up the pixelated image of Palestinian landscapes of the diasporic imagination.
While viewers might be tempted to focus on the historical practices of Palestinian
embroidery or might wish to decipher and interpret and draw links between Nassar’s
digitized Islamic embroidered patterns, Nassar insists that he sees the methods of
traditional craft which he employs “more as medium than as topic.” 269 The hybrid digital
and analog process through which Nassar creates these landscapes is not just a
modernization of traditional craft practices, but in fact affixes new meaning to the
completed patterns. For the viewer, the intricate embroidered patterns are secondary to
the color-blocked landscapes. To view the patterns, the viewer must zoom in, if using a
screen, or, if viewing in a gallery, stand very close to the embroidered paintings to make
out the individual stitches that form each repeating embroidered pattern. The viewers eye
can locate specific repeating patterns but cannot break down each pattern into its
individual stitched components.
Nassar distinguishes between the imagined aspect of his embroidered landscapes
and those of the colonial, orientalist imagination. “Palestine is not a place for me that is
imaginary.” 270 Nassar asserts. Instead, the embroidered landscapes “are all potential
Palestines, as imagined by people in the diaspora.” 271 Rather than fixing Palestinian
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embroidery practices or Palestinian landscapes into a past moment or a singular future,
Nassar’s embroidered landscapes blend the historic and traditional with a contemporary
digital practice to create multiple iterations of Palestinian landscape futures. The
paintings are not created in situ, but are completed transnationally, involving Palestinians
in Palestine and in the diaspora.
Traditional creative forms like tatreez are always on the verge of cooptation, of
being frozen in time as a remnant of the past. 272 In an open letter to Sylvia Wynter,
responding to Wynter’s “1492: A New World View,” Ariella Aïsha Azoulay begins with
a 1905 postcard captioned “School of Embroidery, Algiers” and considers her family’s
experience of Jewish Arabness and its reframing and reconstitution with the creation of
the nation-state of Israel. 273 The image shows twelve girls in a courtyard, with engraved
pillars and tiled walls. Five of the girls sit on the ground, their legs tucked under wooden
frames stretched with fabric upon which the girls embroider. Azoulay relates how
traditional embroidery practices became embedded into European colonial curriculum,
becoming standardized and orientalized to appeal to European markets. While traditional
embroidery was shared intergenerationally, with colonization, embroidery became
associated with mechanization, capitalism, the French language, and European markets.
Azoulay writes:
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Look at the synchronized movement of their right hands. No doubt, they
were asked by the photographer (or their teacher-patron) to act as if they
were in the midst of embroidering. This semi-mechanized gesture is not
how their ancestors used the needle, outside of the market logic of French
educational institutions. Note how everything is standardized: were there
no left-handed girls among them? Was this “flaw” also eradicated, along
with previous modes of embroidering? Does the standardization of their
work connect to the disappearance of my great-great grandmother? 274
It is this sort of mechanization and standardization which Nassar seeks to avoid. While
the process of digital pattern design might seem to further regiment the traditional
practice, Nassar attempts to infuse unpredictability into the process and finished product,
such that each finished piece is a representation not only of traditional processes, or
diasporic futurism, but is also attentive to trends of the moment in color, pattern, and
aesthetic.
The zines that accompany Nassar’s exhibits are compilations of black and white
images and text. They feature cut and pasted photographs, photocopies of objects,
graphic embroidery patterns, photocopied embroidery, and borrowed text in English and
Arabic such as Etel Adnan’s 1989 poem “The Arab Apocalypse.” The photocopy as
medium echoes the pixelation present in Nassar’s embroidery and glass work. Blurred
and imperfectly aligned on the page, the images, whether photocopies of objects, photos,
or embroidery, recreate a feeling of distance from the page. The possibility of a clear
view is obscured through the uneven and indiscrete pixelation on the page. A photocopy
of a piece of an embroidered pattern includes a reproduction of the woven cotton on
which the pattern is embroidered. In some places on the page, the woven cotton appears
as a grid of dots of differing saturation. In others, the woven nature of the strands of
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cotton is clearer. Individual stitches can be made out as small “x”s on the page, but when
stitched close together, the x’s take the form of a wavering line. Likewise, landscape
photographs in the zines are grainy, photos of sand dunes that are not provided context or
geographic location. Graphic images of barbed wire, flames, or roses look like off kilter
clip art when juxtaposed against embroidered patterns. Unlike the embroidered landscape
paintings, the snippets of embroidery look like practice pieces for the designs; readers can
look closely at individual embroidery patterns and see the complexity of these individual
units that form the color-blocked embroidered paintings. Here, each embroidered unit can
more easily be seen as made up of pixels itself, each embroidered black x against the
woven grayscale background.
In his solo exhibition, “The Sea Beneath Our Eyes,” at the Center for
Contemporary Art in Tel Aviv, Israel, in September 2019, Nassar transformed the exhibit
hall into a projected studio apartment. 275 The gallery-as-apartment was furnished with
150 household objects that Nassar produced in collaboration with local artisans in Israel
and Palestine, highlighting the craftsmanship and cultural forms of the numerous peoples
who inhabit these territories. As with his embroidery, Nassar asked artisans to make
objects according to their own design choices and practices, but with a few specifications,
such as a particular color. While Israeli newspaper Haaretz called the apartment
“quintessentially Israeli,” Nassar emphasized that the familiar objects that made up the
apartment are made by people of many different ethnic, cultural, and religious
backgrounds who make up the population of cities in the region:
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“I wanted to think about returning to this land now, in 2019. It’s not the
Palestine of my dad’s imagination, and it’s also not the Ashkenazi
dreamland that the Israeli government wants to project. So, I thought the
best way to address the question of what I’d be returning to now is to look
at the demographics of the country based on what crafts are here.” 276
For Nassar, this apartment exhibition was an imagining of what real apartment he and his
Israeli husband might live in if they were to move to Tel Aviv. The exhibit plays
simultaneously with memory and fantasy, of traditional forms of craft, and new riffs on
those forms, to create a “home” in the present. The curator, Center for Contemporary Art
director, Nicola Trezzi, emphasized that the apartment was not a facsimile of real life, but
rather a window into how exhibit interiors contribute to understandings of history.
This show is about memory and fantasy. It takes the personal history of
the artist, his connection to this land, and links it to what period rooms —
such as those you can find at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New
York or in several encyclopedic museums in the world — can do to our
understanding and misunderstanding of history. 277
Household objects that were called “quintessentially Israeli” are made by and come from
the craft traditions of people of Bedouin, Ethiopian, or Armenian descent in what Nassar
refers to as “the land between the river and the sea.” 278 Nassar’s apartment denaturalizes
the Israeli identity imagined and constructed by the nation-state of Israel while his
cartographic formation of river, sea, and land ignores the formalized boundaries of
nation-states and occupied territories. His work insists instead on an understanding of
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place and identity that is attuned to diaspora and transnationalism, memory and the
present.
Critiques of Nassar’s work focus on the political positioning and economic
practices that have helped his work gain attention globally. 279 While Nassar describes his
process as a collaborative co-production with Palestinian women in the West Bank, the
economics of this collaboration are uneven, as he pays the embroiderers the standard
price they charge for their labor and then, after adding his embroidery, he sells the
finished works for thousands of dollars. This uneven power dynamic recurs in several
other projects with which Nassar is involved, including the brand ADISH which Nassar
co-founded with two Israelis. This project follows the model of non-governmental
humanitarian and economic development initiatives that reframe traditional practices like
tatreez as women’s empowerment projects, directing international attention to Palestine
as a depoliticized site for charity initiatives. Despite stating on the ADISH website that its
“mission is to counter the systematic erasure of Palestinian cultural heritage that is
commonplace in Israel,” ADISH takes up Palestinian “cultural heritage” of tatreez while
erasing the individual Palestinian embroiderers who create the garments ADISH
markets. 280
Furthermore, Nassar has broken the call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions
(BDS) of Israeli institutions by exhibiting in Israeli institutions where it would be illegal
for many Palestinians to visit, such as the apartment exhibit in Tel Aviv. Launched in
2005 by 170 Palestinian organizations, BDS is a movement to put non-violent pressure
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on the state of Israel through (1) boycotts of Israeli institutions, corporations, and
international companies that participate in the violation of the human rights of
Palestinians, (2) withdrawal of investments in the state of Israeli and Israeli and
international companies that uphold Israeli apartheid, and (3) pressuring governments to
place sanctions on Israel by banning business with Israeli settlements, ending military
trade with Israel, and pressuring international forums like the United Nations to suspend
Israel’s membership in those international bodies. 281 Nassar’s choices to exhibit in Israeli
institutions in Tel Aviv and collaborate with Israel-based companies directly go against
the BDS movement. In addition, participating in projects like ADISH situates
Palestinians as laborers working under Israeli leadership rather than working to end
Israel’s economic oppression of Palestine. Omar Joseph Nasser-Khoury, a Palestinian
“anti-fashion designer” who works with historic Palestinian textiles, argues that Nassar’s
approach to his work contributes to the normalization of Israel and Israel’s settler
colonial violence against Palestine by commodifying and decontextualizing the anticolonial form tatreez has taken on during and since the Nakba. 282 As defined by the
Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI),
normalization in a Palestinian and Arab context is:
the participation in any project, initiative or activity, in Palestine or
internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to bring together
Palestinian (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or institutions) without
placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and
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all forms of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian
people. 283
Thus, any project that involves collaboration between Israelis and Palestinians without
resistance to the Israeli state as its base contributes to the normalization of the Israeli state
and the colonial occupation of Palestine. These kinds of apolitical collaborations, PACBI
asserts, prop up Israel’s vision of itself. They allow Israel to benefit from the
appropriation of Palestinian creative and scholarly production while drawing attention
away from Israel’s militarized occupation of Palestine. Artist and cultural critic Reem
Farah argues that Nassar’s work contributes to this normalization in that it commodifies
his identity as Palestinian, furthers cultural appropriation of Palestinian art forms, and
replicates uneven economic power dynamics that disenfranchise Palestinians as laborers.
Nassar’s willingness to exhibit in Israeli institutions and his reducing of Israeli settler
colonialism to “the conflict,” Farah argues, serves to further Nassar’s career as an artist
without challenging Israel’s colonial domination of Palestine and Palestinians. Farah
writes: “He is perceived by other liberals as a bridge – but in an apartheid state there are
no bridges, only bypass roads for Israelis to access illegal settlements.” 284 These critiques
assert that, without centering the literal dispossession and disenfranchisement of
Palestinians, the representational will always fail to do the political work it claims to
enact.
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Indigeneity and Palestine
Nassar’s multicultural vision of the region reflects the multiculturalism celebrated
in the United States in the 1980s and 90s of Nassar’s childhood. Nassar even goes so far
as to apply colloquial language for this U.S. multiculturalism to Palestine/Israel,
describing the ethnic communities whose work made up his apartment exhibit as a
“multi-ethnic melting pot.” 285 Rather than simply reinforcing Israeli cultural
appropriation of cultural practices of distinct ethnic communities in Palestine/Israel,
Nassar’s description of Palestine as a melting pot demonstrates the cultural and artistic
modes through which U.S. imperialism transits, upholding settler colonial states as
diverse collectives, rather than sites of explicit, violent dispossession and
disenfranchisement that maintain racist and anti-Indigenous hierarchies. In his
engagement of the Palestine/Israel “conflict” and descriptions of the region as a “melting
pot,” Nassar evades any discussion of Indigeneity in Palestine or the illegality of Israel’s
occupation of Palestine. Representation and memory feature within his descriptions of his
work, but he does not challenge the existence of the state of Israel or distinguish between
the uneven experiences of the settler state by differently racialized groups.
The BDS movement was inspired by the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa
and as such is framed around an understanding of Israel’s occupation of Palestine as both
apartheid and settler colonialism. Scholars and activists frequently draw parallels
between settler colonialism in North America and Palestine, but theorizations of
Indigeneity are not uniformly taken up in analyses of Israel’s colonial relationship to
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Palestine. 286 Mark Rifkin engages discussions of apartheid and Indigeneity as “prisms”
through which to view the occupation of Palestine by the state of Israel. Rifkin argues
that considering Palestine through the prism apartheid, inviting comparisons to South
Africa, centers inclusion of Palestinians into the nation-state as the goal of Palestinians.
In contrast, viewing Palestine through the prism of Indigeneity rejects the legitimacy of
the occupying nation-state and focuses scholarship and movement building on selfdetermination and sovereignty of Palestinians. Indigeneity, Rifkin argues, “foregrounds
the presence of a political collectivity (or collectivities) whose existence, inhabitance, and
governance cannot be conceptualized as an internal matter for domestic polity and whose
modes of political organization and expression need not take the form of a nationstate.” 287 In other words, Indigeneity as a theoretical framing for Palestine takes seriously
the rights of Palestinian people to self-determination outside of and beyond the occupying
state, while apartheid as a theoretical framing limits discussion of the rights of
Palestinians to inclusion within the occupying state. In Palestine, South Africa, and
elsewhere, a focus on inclusion into the polity of the occupying state recreates Indigenous
nations as ethnic minorities rather than communities with their own prior and ongoing
political systems and goals.
Palestinian identification with Indigeneity emerges as a political strategy to make
Palestinian claims to nationhood legible within rubrics formally recognized by both
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global movements for liberation and international governing bodies like the United
Nations. The Zionist project used the concept of Indigeneity, based on biblical historical
claims to firstness, to justify the formation of the state of Israel as a Jewish homeland. 288
In the 1960s and 1970s, beginning before and continuing after the 1967 occupation,
Palestinian scholars described Israel as a settler state and compared Israel’s occupation of
Palestine to apartheid South Africa. 289 Despite the emergence of settler colonialism as an
analytic to understand the occupation of Palestine, many Palestinians resisted
identification as Indigenous or comparison to Indigenous peoples of North America. For
example, the chair of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasser Arafat repeatedly
rejected the notion of Palestinians as Indigenous, as he saw Indigeneity as equated with
backwardness, primitivity, and a dependence on the settler state. 290 The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was ratified in 2007 and following its
adoption there has been a growing interest in thinking through Palestinian Indigeneity
and articulating Palestinian political goals through this analytic. While UNDRIP does not
fully account for the many forms of sovereignty expressed by many Indigenous peoples,
it does offer a framework through which to articulate Indigenous rights beyond a human
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rights framework. While this aspect of UNDRIP is frequently critiqued, scholars such as
Sheryl Lightfoot argue that UNDRIP’s framing of self-determination “is potentially
ushering in a broadening, and possible reshaping, of self-determination, which has been
increasingly decoupled from singular Westphalian notions of ‘sovereignty’ and
‘territoriality’ in ways that require ongoing negotiation between peoples and states.” 291
Therefore, UNDRIP offers Palestinians and others an alternate language through which to
express self-determination and sovereignty, including but not limited to Westphalian
sovereignty.
Discussions of Palestinian sovereignty that engage Indigeneity often center
Indigenous identity as deriving from the experience of settler colonialism. Amara and
Hawari refer to “the process of Israeli settler colonialism that created Palestinian
indigeneity” and insist that what the Palestinian liberation movement needs is “an
understanding of Zionism as a settler colonial project that rendered the Palestinian people
indigenous. It is the colonial encounter that created the native.” 292 They define
Indigeneity as “those who have suffered the settler colonial invasion and continue to
suffer the subsequent structures of elimination.” 293 They refer to a move to understanding
Palestinians as Indigenous as “harnessing indigeneity as a tool to achieve Palestinian
rights and sovereignty.” 294 For Amara and Hawari, Indigeneity is primarily a political
category that can make clear the violence of the state of Israel as well as Palestinian
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affinity with other Indigenous peoples globally. Palestinian organizations take up similar
definitions of Indigeneity and place Israel’s occupation of Palestine in a global context.
For example, a 2018 statement by six Palestinians human rights organizations expressed
support for the commemoration of Indigenous Peoples Day in the United States.
Comparing the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the Americas in 1492 to the
Palestinian Nakba, the statement expresses a solidarity between Palestinians and
American Indians based on their shared experience of settler colonialism. 295 Steven
Salaita terms these comparative approaches “inter/nationalism,” a way to compare
nationalisms that emphasizes “how the invention and evolution of national identities
necessarily rely on international dialectics.” 296 Salaita extends this to argue that taking on
the category of Indigeneity to describe a community’s relationship to colonialism
simultaneously “recognizes Indians as the rightful indigenes of North America” and
appropriates Native political movements while invalidating their agency. 297 Instead,
Salaita analyzes how American Indian involvement in the BDS movement goes beyond
comparison to a true solidarity where both Palestinians and American Indians exercise
agency within a global struggle against colonialism. 298
As discussed in the introduction, rather than shift international understandings of
the Palestinian struggle as an Indigenous struggle, the recognition by the United Nations
of Bedouin Palestinian Indigeneity risks dividing Palestinians, marking Bedouins as
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unique from other Palestinians. 299 This recognition of Bedouin Indigeneity emphasizes
cultural distinctiveness and continuity of cultural practices while ignoring Palestinian
political claims. 300 Furthermore, it plays into preconceptions of Indigenous primitivity
and tribal-ness, seemingly calling for performance of cultural authenticity as a
prerequisite for recognition of Indigeneity. 301 In contrast, Indigeneity as a political
relationship, as defined by Amara and Hawari, is one aspect often used to define
Indigeneity. However, to limit Indigeneity to a specific experience of colonialism or a
specific political relationship to the state, without regard for other cultural and land-based
aspects of Indigeneity, introduces a problematic for defining Indigeneity and for global
solidarity building.
Transparency and Opacity
“We clamor for the right to opacity for everyone,” writes Édouard Glissant in the
brief chapter “For Opacity” in Poetics of Relation. 302 Glissant theorizes difference
through the twinned concepts of transparency and opacity. Transparency, he writes, is a
prerequisite for the Western desire to understand people and ideas. Transparency allows
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one to measure, compare, and judge the Other, reducing the Other to a scale that is
comprehensible, identifiable, categorizable, and for which there are defined boundaries,
beginnings, and endings. Glissant admits that, by acknowledging and accepting
differences, transparency can elicit an unsettling of hierarchies. But ultimately, he writes
“perhaps we need to bring an end to the very notion of a scale. Displace all reduction.” 303
This is a task, Glissant argues, that can be accomplished through opacity.
Nassar’s work eschews transparency by highlighting its impossibility. Though his
creative practice involves the precision and detail of digitally designed embroidery
patterns, he introduces uncertainty throughout the process. Describing his process, Nassar
engages not in a practice of transparency, but his narrative description highlights how
even transparency cannot reveal everything about how the embroidered paintings are
made. From the color and design choices of the Palestinian embroiderers, to the empty
spaces Nassar fills in, to the insistence on imagined landscapes rather than factual
landscapes, the potential for redirection and confusion propagate throughout the process.
Rather than allowing viewers to dissect the individual parts of the embroidered paintings,
the photocopies of embroidered patterns in the zine obscure further. Individual stitches
are blurred and smudged. The zoomed in view of the photocopy alienates the
embroidered patterns from their places in the whole of the embroidered painting. The
more the viewer tries to comprehend and analyze the process, the more opaque the
paintings become. Even as one feels they can understand the form of the embroidered
paintings, the next painting surprises by breaking the format of the previous paintings.
New color schemes emerge, representational figures appear where geometric shapes
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dominated earlier. A gallery is strewn with embroidered pillows, simultaneously
historical and contemporary, utilitarian and aesthetic.
In the context of neoliberalism, transparency is evoked to denote trust and
accuracy, a disrupting of hierarchies. Colloquial phrases like “showing your cards” or
“evening the playing field” suggest that this ability to not only see the inner workings of
an institution, but to see through them, makes that institution accessible, or at the very
least, less threatening. Transparency claims to allow one to be known to the other and
promises no absences or gray areas. In her work on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
documents and redaction, Anjali Nath interrogates the “implicitly assumed link between
visibility and transparency” through an examination of the visual politics of redaction and
debate around transparency in FOIA requests. 304 While transparency is seen as a mode of
citizen empowerment, through which the liberal government is held accountable, the
documents associated with detainees in Guantanamo and other U.S military prisons
instead highlight a necropolitical governmentality; transparency does not prevent
violence. Nath takes on a contrapuntal reading of redacted FOIA documents, not for the
“transparent” information within them, but examines how the redactions amplify the
necropolitics of U.S. military prisons. “Even as we may desire a full reveal,” Nath writes,
“the experiences of reading itself inadvertently undermine the logic of government
transparency. The dispassionate rationalization of governmental forms of violence that
work within legal definitions of what interrogation practices are legally permissible sit
next to that which is manifestly hidden.” 305 While FOIA requests seem to be a process of
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transparency and, therefore, accountability, the unintended effect of redaction is a visual
emphasis on the violence of the state.
Transparency is also a foundational element of quantitative geospatial analysis.
Within Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software, spatial analysis occurs through
the overlaying of transparent layers. At the risk of oversimplifying, to understand the
relationship between two different spatially occurring phenomena, one could map (and by
this, I mean geolocate) the occurrences of one phenomenon in a single layer A and the
occurrences of the other phenomenon in a single layer B. This would result in two
transparent layers, each only containing spatial data in the form of points in colors A and
B that appear as dots on the transparent layers A and B. Overlaying these two transparent
layers over a satellite image or other georeferenced map then allows the technician to
examine, both visually and mathematically, the distribution of the points of each layer in
relation to each other and in relation to the georeferenced base map. (Though, as
discussed in chapter three, even the base map is a nebulous construction of layers, not a
solid objective unit.) This analysis could lead to conclusions about the spatial distribution
of and relationship between phenomena A and B. Visually, we might see a familiar image
of map overlain with dots of two different colors, to represent the two different
phenomena. Transparency, in a literal sense, is essential to this kind of spatial
representation and spatial analysis. This process, both spatial and transparent, enables
technicians to consider questions at a much larger scale than would otherwise be possible.
Using this process, technicians can query data across a vast area of space that would be
impossible, expensive, or time-prohibitive for a research team to examine through field
work or survey. Similar to Glissant’s understanding of the relationship between

171

transparency and hierarchy, spatial analysis through GIS promises a means through
which to do powerful research using software and tools accessible on a home computer,
making transparent and interpretable spatial relationships that would be otherwise
undetected. 306 Thus, the transparency of GIS is often portrayed as a disruption of
hierarchies of data collection and analysis. That this assumption is a reduction of complex
spatial relationships and hierarchies of knowledge production is obvious. What then of
opacity?
Glissant argues that while transparency ultimately encloses the Other within the
bounds of the viewer’s determination to understand the Other, opacity is “subsistence
within an irreducible singularity.” 307 An insistence on opacity makes futile the grasping
to break down knowledge of the Other into comprehensible, digestible pieces. Glissant
writes: “The opaque is not the obscure, though it is possible for it to be so and be
accepted as such. It is that which cannot be reduced, which is the most perennial
guarantee of participation and confluence.”
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of changing demographics and landscapes as essential to Palestinian experience and
irreducible to nationalist formations.
In contrast to the objectivity and quantifiability suggested by the term “unit,” both
pixels in an aerial image and repeating embroidered patterns in Nassar’s work instead
introduce the unknown and the opaque to an image. The pixel is a representation of a
space in a moment in time. Its resolution does not convey exact detail, but instead
provides an impression of a space, limited by the quality of the image. In other words, the
pixel in an aerial image does not convey objective fact. Even the pixel is influenced and
limited by geopolitics, imperialism, and colonialism. In Nassar’s embroidered paintings,
each segment of a repeating embroidered pattern operates as an irreducible element; it is
the smallest unit to which his paintings can be reduced. Even these patterns are more
complex than the viewer expects. While riffs on traditional embroidered patterns, these
embroidered units are drawn on paper, on a screen, and then printed on paper again
before they are ever embroidered. But their materiality belies the multi-layered process
that generates them.
Like GIS, Jordan Nassar’s embroidered paintings are based around layering of
images, creating windows through which to overlay his imagined landscapes. A digital
design is printed, stitched by one person, then stitched again by Nassar, photocopied, and
printed. Rather than create a transparency of process, these layers introduce uncertainty
into the process and product. Furthermore, Nassar’s landscapes present a multitude of
imagined futures in which the future is not fixed but is co-created by Palestinians in
Palestine and Palestinians in the diaspora. In this future, contemporary artists play with
traditional forms to create visions of what might be, where imagined landforms, flora,
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and the sky take on new shapes and colors. Although both aerial imagery of Palestine and
Nassar’s embroidery play with pixels as irreducible elements that make up an image of a
landscape, the former attempts to control the image by reducing what information is
available while the latter attempts to add complexity to the image by visualizing
Palestine(s) that are obscured by Israeli representations. However, what Nassar
accomplishes by rejecting the politics of the literal and quantitative in his landscapes is
limited by his emphasis on multicultural inclusion, representation, and recognition in the
framing of his work. In so doing, his work to represent “Palestinian cultural heritage”
does not engage the politics of this erasure or the literal violence of the settler state.
Ultimately, Nassar’s play with pixelation in embroidered paintings re-enacts the process
of obscuring the facts on the ground to create a particular representation of Palestine.
Conclusion
In closing, this chapter has examined how colonial control of the resolution of
aerial imagery serves to limit what can be seen of colonizing processes. However,
permitting distribution of high-resolution imagery in a process of increasing transparency
does not necessarily instigate greater production or distribution of visual spatial
knowledge of colonization. Nor does the assimilation of specific cultural forms into the
colonial project. Nassar’s embroidered paintings resist assimilation and categorization as
modern or traditional, pre- or post-colonial, but are not contextualized as fundamentally
anti-colonial.
This chapter has read Jordan Nassar’s embroidered landscapes as projections of
Palestinian futures that neither adhere to past mappings of Palestinian territories nor
subscribe to current border formations over Palestinian land. As I have shown, Nassar’s
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work rejects an ethnic binary between settler and native, Israeli and Palestinian. Instead,
Nassar sees Palestinian territory and identity as in relation to other ethnic, cultural, and
demographic populations in the Middle East North Africa region. In this way, Nassar’s
work functions as a rejection not only of state narratives about who is natural to the
landscape, but also functions as a rejection of the state itself. Palestine is the land
between the sea and the river, topographic borders which suggest movement both
between the sea and river, and upon the sea and river.
In this context, I have argued that image resolution and pixelation of satellite
imagery serves to bolster the Israeli state’s occupation of Palestinian territory, literally
blurring the evidence of projects of physical occupation such as the removal of trees or
construction of buildings. I also contend that United States imperialism functions in
tandem and cooperation with Israeli interests to obscure evidence of physical occupation,
in its creation and enactment of legislation that polices the distribution of aerial imagery
of areas occupied by the state of Israel. While United States legislation only applies
within the United States, U.S. domination of the industry of remote sensing and satellite
image collection means that this national legislation effectively limits the entire global
industry from producing and distributing high resolution imagery of Israel-occupied
territories. U.S. imperial interests in the Middle East and in relationship with Israel are
well documented, but more clear forms of collaboration between these colonial projects
dominate these scholarly discussions. This chapter argues that the policing of the
resolution of aerial imagery affects how people around the globe see or rather, do not see,
this project of colonial occupation. Colonial control of image resolution and pixelation
obscures the occupation. While up-to-date aerial imagery is frequently used in
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journalistic reporting or human rights campaigns to document violence, limiting the
resolution of aerial imagery prevents human rights abuses or colonial projects from being
seen.
My focus in this chapter and the previous chapter has been on contested
representations of the surface of the earth in Israel-occupied Palestine. Satellite imagery
is based on the aerial perspective, while Nassar’s paintings borrow the effect of pixelation
from satellite imagery without adopting its God’s-eye-view. Engaging the surface as a
political project, this chapter focuses on the quantification and representation of the
surface of the earth. As the next chapter explores at length, the use of the aerial
perspective also serves to obscure what is below the surface of the earth. I turn now to the
surveillance and representation of the subterranean for the final section of this
dissertation. In the following chapter, I examine digital projects that represent Indigenous
territories in the U.S. in contrast to colonial norms around the subterranean, marking the
subterranean as a site of struggle and meaning making about Indigenous territories.
Attention to the subterranean, as discussed in the next section, decenters geopolitical
boundaries and representations of land to show the attempt of colonial projects to fluidly
move dispossession out of sight.
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Chapter Five
Sensing Remotely: Indigenous Landscapes in 360˚
In May 2016, The Telegraph published a story about 15-year-old William
Gadoury, of Santi-Jean-de-Matha, Quebec, who had discovered a lost Mayan city without
ever having set foot in Mexico or central America. Hypothesizing that the Maya built
cities to line up with major constellations, Gadoury compared satellite imagery from the
Canadian Space Agency to constellation maps. Gadoury found that 117 known Mayan
cities matched the positions of stars in the constellation maps, but he noticed that one
constellation with three stars had cities that matched with only two of the three stars.
Using satellite imagery, Gadoury found a square shaped area that aligned with the third
star in the constellation and hypothesized that this square shaped area could be a former
Mayan pyramid. 309 As this story hit the news, it was met with widespread controversy
and critique by archeologists and remote sensing specialists. These experts argued that
the very premise of Gadoury’s hypothesis was unfounded, as the Maya people mostly
likely did not choose to settle based on constellations and that, lacking a ground-truthing
field expedition, the square shape was most likely an abandoned corn field. Furthermore,
archeologists argued that extensive field work in this area since the 1930s did not suggest
that there was a “lost” Mayan city at this location. A paper published in the journal
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Remote Sensing stated: “There is no denying that the teenager’s discovery is a squareshaped mark resulting from a spatial anomaly in the forest cover.” 310
The potential of satellite imagery to know contemporary Indigenous peoples has
also captured public attention. Researchers at the University of New Mexico and
University of Missouri have used satellite images to track an “uncontacted” tribe in the
Brazilian Amazon near the Peruvian border. Inspired by aerial photographs released by
the Brazilian government in 2008 that show a small village with rectangular houses with
thatched roofs, and five people painted bright red and holding what appear to be spears,
researchers used satellite imagery available from Google Earth to identify small
uncontacted villages in the Amazon and estimated the “demographic health” of these
villages, meaning the number of people needed to sustain the community. They identified
conditions that could threaten the demographic health of these villages such as
deforestation, mining, and ranching. 311 The researchers asserted that contact would have
existential consequences for these communities, but that remote surveillance could
protect the communities: “Given the grim history of previous contacts with the outside
world, forced contact seems ill-advised. We suggest that an active remote surveillance
program is needed to track the movements and demographic health of isolated peoples in
hopes of ameliorating their chances for long-term survival by guiding future policy
decisions of national governments.” 312 Active remote surveillance, they argued, would
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enable policy interventions to reduce destructive activities that might force contact and
threaten the lands and villages.
The central conceit of geospatial surveillance technologies is that they remain
invisible or unnoticed and thus can reveal otherwise unknowable information or collect
the most intimate moments of daily life without intrusion. Surveillance technologies
allow something distantly removed via geography or context to be observed and known
to another and enable the observer to draw conclusions or even to imbricate that distant
knowledge into their own lives. The above examples illustrate how remote surveillance
technologies rely on the aerial perspective as an objective mode through which to
“discover” Indigenous villages, historic and contemporary. This chapter engages with
two Indigenous digital projects that represent Indigenous territories without and against
the aerial perspective. If the aerial perspective of satellite imagery orients the viewer to
look down from above at the surface of the earth, the following digital projects,
Poise/End and Thunderbird Strike, disorient the viewer with less familiar angles and
reorient viewers to ways of understanding Indigenous territories that integrate the air,
surface, and subterranean in an Indigenous ontological relationship to land.
This chapter asks: How might reorienting spatial representations towards
Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies change our understanding of colonial territorial
dispossession and Indigenous-led movements for decolonization? What does this
reorientation tell us about the relationship between the aerial perspective and colonial
dispossession? I examine digital projects that decenter the aerial perspective to bring to
light to what happens under the surface. I argue that colonial surveillance continues to
center and emphasize the aerial as a means to obscure extractivist exploitation of
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minerals, oil, and gas under the surface. This serves to delink what is below, on, and
above the surface, breaking these zones into discrete blocks, thereby attempting to
destabilize Indigenous epistemologies and political formations that are not based around
formal borders in two-dimensional space. In this chapter, I analyze two digital projects
that take on Indigenous representations of space that present and advocate for more threedimensional forms of spatial representation. First, I analyze Poise/end, a virtual reality
that invites the viewer to experience the surface and atmospheric effects of subterranean
uranium mining. Second, I analyze Thunderbird Strike, an Indigenous video game that
addresses extractivism in the Great Lakes region and articulates the relationship between
air, surface, and subterranean via a thunderbird who cuts through a cross-sectional view.
These two digital spatial representations disorient the viewer from normative ways of
seeing and surveilling Indigenous territories and reorient the viewer to be emplaced
within the landscape, embodied as a thunderbird or a visitor on foot. Finally, both make
clear the relationship between air, surface, and subterranean as intimately linked,
inseparable, and indiscrete.
What does it mean to be oriented as we locate ourselves in colonial atmospheres?
How do Indigenous representations of space, place, and territory disorient and reorient us
slantwise from the colonial orientations to which we are accustomed? What happens to
our understanding of colonialism when we view it obliquely, vertically, or from below?
In this chapter, I consider two digital projects that represent Indigenous territory by
disorienting the viewer to colonial territorial representations and reorient the viewer to
ways of seeing that colonial perspectives disavow. Poise/end, a virtual reality, disorients
viewers in an attempt to envelop them in the devastation of uranium mining on the
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Navajo Nation. Thunderbird Strike, an Indigenous video game, uses a cross-sectional
view to expose how environmental destruction links air, surface, and subterranean. “What
does it mean to be oriented?” Sara Ahmed writes:
How is it that we come to find our way in a world that acquires new
shapes, depending on which way we turn? If we know where we are, when
we turn this way or that, then we are oriented. We have our bearings. We
know what to do to get to this place or to that. To be oriented is also to be
oriented toward certain objects, those that help us find our way. These are
the objects we recognize, such that when we face them, we know which
way we are facing. They gather on the ground and also create a ground on
which we can gather. Yet objects gather quite differently, creating
different grounds. What difference does it make what we are oriented
toward?” 313
Ahmed examines the phenomenology of orientation to understand sexual orientation,
articulating disorientation and reorientation as processes that respond obliquely to
normative orientations. Thus, the spatial and geometric oblique or slantwise perspective
is a queering of the “straight” orientation, in terms of geometry, spatial orientation, and
sexual orientation. Ahuja responds to Ahmed’s question “What does it mean to be
oriented?” by examining “relations between reproduction and extinction” via the
mosquito and the settler to generate “an ecological dimension of queer critique.” 314 Ahuja
asks how questions of orientation queer approaches to the atmospheric pressures of
climate change. Following Ahmed and Ahuja, I am interested in how questions of
orientation, disorientation, and reorientation change the way we approach studies of
colonialism and decolonization. How might disorientation and reorientation address the
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subsuming nature of colonialism’s aerial perspective? How might disorientation and
reorientation be processes of decolonization?
Subterranean as Political Project
How is the subterranean theorized in Indigenous cartography? To reorient this
discussion of territorial volume and the aerial perspective, in this chapter I turn my
attention to the subterranean as a political project and site of struggle. As this chapter will
show, colonial law severs the subterranean from the surface, making each zone distinct
and therefore able to be claimed, sold, and surveilled separately from the other. This
distinction is so naturalized within the law as to shape popular understandings of the
relationship between the subterranean and the surface. In my analysis here, I demonstrate
how the subterranean functions as a site of political struggle for Indigenous territorial
claims. It is also a site of epistemological and ontological contestation in which
Indigenous peoples assert understandings of land and human relation to land that are not
comprehensible within colonial legal logics.
Free-entry, a principle that shapes subsurface rights to minerals, oil, and gas,
allows prospectors and companies to explore for minerals and stake a mineral claim on an
area of subsurface and obtain subsurface property rights without prior informed consent
of neighboring property owners. While Indigenous nations must produce data providing
evidence of historic land use in order to make socio-historic land claims, the free-entry
principle means that corporations’ claims to subsurface mineral rights are seen as
legitimate without accompanying data. 315 The free-entry principle is enabled in the
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United States, Canada, and Mexico by governance systems that make a distinction
between property surface rights and subterranean rights. Thus, prospectors and
companies have claimed sub-surface rights without seeking the consent of Indigenous
peoples with historical connection to those lands. In the United States, the General
Mining Law of 1872 authorizes development of mining projects of locatable minerals
(e.g. uranium, gold, silver, molybdenum, copper, and zinc) on public lands by private
individuals and stipulates that the subsurface property rights may be purchased. This law
enabled exploration of uranium by mining companies at Tsoodził/Mount Taylor in
western New Mexico, for example, despite Tsoodził’s status as a sacred space for the
Diné. 316 Historical claims of the Navajo Nation to Tsoodził were superseded by the law’s
protection of private rights to mineral exploration. Bruce Braun examines nineteenth
century mining rights politics in Canada to show how geological, and in particular
stratigraphic, ways of seeing territory led to a colonial understanding of territory as
vertical. However, rather than seeing the surface and subterranean as co-constitutive, this
colonial understanding of territory’s verticality meant a severing of the surface and
subterranean, such that they could be claimed, owned, and sold separately from one
another. 317 Altamirano-Jimenez describes how the Mexican constitution upheld the
Iberian division of surface and subsurface ownership: “While the state claimed the
subsoil, Indigenous peoples maintained full ownership of the surface.” 318 This stood in
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contradistinction to Zapotec understandings of territory in which the subsurface
represents the roots of plants, mountains, water, and other aspects of life and is therefore
intimately tied to the surface. “Thus, the subsurface is part of the spiritual, symbolic, and
material life of Indigenous communities,” writes Altamirano-Jimenez. 319
Attention to the subterranean is also crucial for Indigenous peoples in the United
States making certain kinds of political, legal, and territorial claims. What lies beneath
the surface of the earth is literal historical sedimentation documenting Indigenous claims.
What is beneath the surface is quite literally what came before, made evident through the
presence of human remains, architectural ruins, and archeological evidence such as
historical roads, dumps, tools, materials, and art. This archeological data is used to
provide evidence for the traditional land claims and land use of Indigenous peoples
inhabiting the United States today. 320 The 1990 Native American Graves and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) acknowledges the right of descendant peoples and tribes to
these subterranean historical data. NAGPRA requires that all agencies that receive federal
funds must repatriate Native American human remains and cultural items to the lineal
descendants and tribes. 321 However, archeological knowledge production assumes the
unsettling of the subterranean as justified for scientific knowledge production. Despite
NAGPRA’s important function, within the act, exhumation and repatriation are
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represented as legal processes rather than as affective experiences of trauma and grief. 322
And while this sort of data collection is used to reveal the violences of the past, the
evidence collected is often treated as a revelation that provides new insight into the past,
rather than further evidence of something already known to be true. For example, the
2021 exhumation of the remains of Native children at residential schools in Canada and
the United States only provided evidence for the history of forced removal, assimilation,
and death that Native peoples already knew to be fact. Even the technology used to
identify these unmarked subterranean graves is modelled around aerial imagery
technology. Ground-penetrating radar (GPR) uses pulses of radar to generate an image of
the subsurface. GPR does not create an x-ray like image, but instead generates
radargrams that indicate disturbances within the layering of soil below the surface. While
naturally occurring disturbances, such as a boundary between soil layers, follow a
predictable pattern, human-made disturbances such as graves break up the patterns visible
in the radargram. Disturbances identified in ground-penetrating radargrams can then be
avoided to avoid disturbing culturally sensitive sites or investigated using more invasive
techniques of extraction and human remains found may be exhumed. 323 This sort of
subterranean archaeological evidence is often necessary to validate Indigenous claims to
historical land use and land tenure as well as Indigenous claims to historical violences
and experiences at the hands of the state.

322

Deondre Smiles, "Review Essay: Repatriation and Erasing the Past (Elizabeth Weiss
and James W. Springer)," Transmotion 7, no. 1 (2021): 221-228.
323
Gabriel M. Sanchez et al., "Sensing the Past: Perspectives on Collaborative
Archaeology and Ground Penetrating Radar Techniques from Coastal California."
Remote Sensing 13, no. 2 (2021): 285.

186

I turn now to an Indigenous-made virtual reality that exhumes the violences of
uranium mining on the Navajo Nation to demonstrate the impossibility of separating the
subterranean from the surficial.
Poise/end
Klee Benally’s virtual reality Poise/End begins with a countdown. An alarm clock
flashes onto the screen, a radioactive symbol covering the face of the clock, as text on the
screen says “Loading.” When the alarm clock rings, it blends with an industrial alarm
sound as a landscape fades in. The surface of the earth is brown dirt with small brown
grasses and the sky, which takes up half the screen, is cloudy and gray. We can see
powerlines in the background. As the viewer moves around in their own physical space,
circling while holding their smart phone, or clicking buttons on a computer screen to
toggle the view, the landscape looks the same from every direction: brown surface, gray
sky. A light appears on the horizon, then quickly grows and explodes, creating a
mushroom cloud. Now the ground at the horizon breaks into pieces and moves in a wave
towards the viewer, obscuring the horizon, mixing the gray of the sky with the brown of
the surface into a haze.
Produced in 2017, this 8:25 minute virtual reality documentary film links the
imagined explosion at the opening of the film to the personal stories of people affected by
uranium mining on the Navajo Nation. While perhaps best known for being the lead
guitarist and vocalist of the Navajo punk band Blackfire which he formed with his
siblings in 1989, Benally is also an anarchist activist involved in multiple Indigenous
organizations including Indigenous Action and Outta Your Backpack Media Project. In
recent years, Benally has produced several short films on Indigenous environmental
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justice and the 2016 feature length film Power Lines. Like Power Lines, the virtual reality
Poise/end documents lived experiences of people on the Navajo Nation.
Uranium was mined on the Navajo Nation from 1944-1986, with the United
States Atomic Energy Commission as the sole purchaser of uranium from 1944-1966.
After 1966, both the federal government and commercial entities bought uranium mined
on the Navajo Nation. 324 These mining operations occurred on Navajo land and were
primarily staffed by Navajo workers who subsequently suffered high mortality rates from
lung cancer and other respiratory diseases. 325 After the Cold War, uranium mines on the
Navajo Nation were abandoned without any protections or remediation, uranium
processing sites were decommissioned, and mill tailings were covered with rock and left
in situ at the mill sites. At present, there are 524 uranium mine sites and four uranium
mill tailings sites on the Navajo Nation, as well as one tailings site on private land
adjacent to and directly upstream of the Red Water Pond Road community on the Navajo
Nation. The dam at this abandoned uranium mill tailings pond broke on July 16, 1979,
causing the largest release of radioactive material in U.S. history. People living on the
Navajo Nation continue to experience a high rate of uranium-related health effects
including cancer, respiratory disease, and renal disease, among others. 326 The Navajo
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Birth Cohort Study documented that the children of women who lived near former
uranium mines had a higher rate of birth defects. 327 The legacies of uranium mining on
the Navajo Nation also include an enduring political movement against uranium mining
and nuclearism. An annual remembrance walk in the Red Water Pond Road community
brings together Navajo, Latinx, Japanese, and other people affected by uranium and its
afterlives to mark the anniversary of the mill tailings pond spill by following the path the
water took from the dam to the Rio Puerco. To participate in the remembrance walk is an
embodied experience; at points along the walk, members of the Red Water Pond Road
community recount the events of the day in 1979 and describe the environmental, health,
agricultural, and cultural effects experienced in the community in the subsequent
decades. 328
The description on the unlisted YouTube page for Poise/End states that the virtual
reality “allows the viewer to experience lands contaminated by abandoned uranium
mines, follow personal stories of Indigenous peoples impacted by nuclear colonialism,
and ultimately witness how deadly the nuclear fuel cycle is.” 329 Poise/end is part of the
exhibit “Exposure: Native Art and Political Ecology” which was on display at the
Museum of Contemporary Native Art in Santa Fe, New Mexico from August 20, 2021
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through January 23, 2022. The exhibit brings together international Indigenous responses
to the impact of nuclear tests, nuclear accidents, and uranium mining on Indigenous lands
and peoples. The exhibit included work by Indigenous artists from Australia, Canada,
Greenland, Japan, Pacific Islands, and the United States from a variety of mediums
including sculpture, beading, painting, photography, and video. Surrounded by
sculptures, sound, paintings, and beadwork, Poise/end is easy to miss in the exhibit.
There is no physical object to look at, other than a small card attached to the wall with the
name and one sentence description of the virtual reality with a QR code. It is best viewed
via VR headset or smart phone, with the ability to physically move in space and more
naturally navigate the virtual reality, but it can also be viewed via computer and
navigated by toggling buttons.
After the opening scene, the camera in Poise/end returns to the original landscape.
This time, there is a person in view wearing a hazmat suit and carrying a Geiger counter
that beeps constantly, the beeps increasing in frequency as the person approaches the
viewer. Turning around in the virtual reality, the landscape looks the same from every
angle; the only sign of human presence are power lines in the distance. Behind the
viewer are footsteps as a woman comes into view wearing jeans, a t-shirt, and moccasins.
She tells the viewer that she used to live here, nearly fifty years ago, and describes the
house and yard she later evacuated when the level of radiation in that area was
pronounced too dangerous for human inhabitance.
Poise/end denaturalizes the landscape’s vastness and “emptiness” marked by the
lack of trees, houses, or other objects protruding from the surface. As the woman
describes what used to be on the homesite where she stands, we learn that the surface has
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been denuded as the radioactive materials below the surface endangered all life on the
surface, from the family in a three-bedroom house with an attached garage and wood
flooring, to the trees growing in the front yard, to the fledgling birds who died in their
nests. While located geographically on her old homesite, the affective, felt experience of
the place has changed in the intervening years. What was a safe, welcoming home has
been denuded and turned into a radioactive wasteland. 330
As the viewer moves through the virtual reality, the viewer approaches the
abandoned mill site, recognizable by a single line of train tracks and cement blocks that
formerly grounded mill equipment. The woman describes how contamination at the
surface entered the ground water, spreading radioactive material deep below the surface
and moving with the groundwater, beyond the boundaries of the closed uranium mines
and mill.
Rather than orienting the viewer to this nuclear landscape, Poise/end successfully
disorients the viewer. The places and events described by the people in the virtual reality
are no longer visible, having been abandoned, cleared, and covered with rock and dirt in
an attempt to provide a barrier between the radioactive material and the surface. There
are no markers that place the viewer in a particular geographic location, nor are there
landmarks that give the viewer a sense of an archetypal geography of “home” or “forest”
or “desert,” for example. When the film cuts away to a scene of the Grand Canyon, the
voice of Uqualla of the Havasupai tribe narrates how nuclear extraction upstream affects
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his nation in the Grand Canyon. This spatial leap reorients the viewer with a direction and
a familiar location. The viewer is following the path of groundwater downstream from an
old uranium mill into the Colorado river.
Poise/end begins with an aerial explosion and closes with subterranean currents,
both literal, in the form of ground water, and metaphorical, in the form of protestors and a
pair of wire cutters used to cut an animated chain that represents the nuclear chain of
production. While the opening scene was marked by desaturated gray and brown, by the
end of the virtual reality film, the sky is a brighter blue and the ground is a warm rust
color. The last view in the film is of the sun setting behind a person in a hazmat suit.
While not currently inhabitable, human presence in the last scenes of the film gesture
towards human survivance and recovery of Indigenous landscapes.
Documentary Virtual Reality
To whom is in Poise/end meant to speak? There is a fine line between inspiring
empathy through the dissection of violent colonial processes and separating the viewers
from that violence. A viewer unfamiliar with the landscape or histories of the places
depicted might find the seemingly barren expanse alien and otherworldly, separating their
own here and now from that which they experience in the virtual reality. The results of
colonial extraction are visible, but the perpetrators are unnamed and invisible, so far
removed from the virtual reality as to suggest that those institutions themselves are
unreal. Rather than implicating the viewer in these colonial processes, Poise/end seems to
hold the viewer at arm’s length. The viewer remains a silent observer, unable to act or
affect the scenes they experience, remaining witnesses rather than actors with agency.
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The term “Virtual Reality” (VR) has been used throughout the history of the
internet to refer to things from online role-playing games to contemporary usage referring
to immersive digital experiences designed to be viewed through a VR headset. 331 First
developed for use by the military to prepare people for war and rehabilitate them
afterwards, VR of the 1990s was inaccessible to most people and was seen as a way to
access environments and situations that the viewer would not otherwise experience. In
other words, VR would enable people to experience the inaccessible, imaginary, and
fantastical. In this vision, VR offered an alternative to the “real” world, marking a
distance between virtual and real life. In the 2010s, “VR 2.0” emerged, shifting the
purpose and meanings behind VR. Now, VR offered new ways of experiencing digital
connections already linked via social media and the internet more generally. Furthermore,
VR 2.0 recast the fantastic possibilities of VR to perceive it as a mode through which to
increase empathy, promote compassion, and create intimacy between people and
communities far removed from each other, where connection is only possible remotely,
via the internet. 332 Unlike VR 1.0, which intentionally created a separation between the
virtual and the real, VR 2.0 sought to blend the virtual and the real more intricately and
enable people to experience the “real” lives of others. Lisa Nakamura traces this
transition, beginning with Facebook’s purchase of the virtual reality headset maker
Oculus VR in 2014. “Virtuous VR,” celebrated by Facebook and other media technology
giants, is represented as being an “empathy machine,” putting some people in the shoes
of others in order to produce feelings of intimacy, connection, and compassion by
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experiencing the pain and suffering of others. Engaging with documentary VR created by
white producers about the lives of Black and Middle Eastern women, Nakamura argues
that while virtuous VR purports feelings of empathy and masquerades as a form of
political activism, virtuous documentary VR does not engender the connection or
intimacy it claims to stimulate. Instead, virtuous VR often reifies the inequities it
documents, bolsters the profile and earnings of large corporations such as Facebook and
media outlets such as BBC, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, and The New York Times. 333
Nakamura argues that virtuous VR promotes “the idea that you cannot trust marginalized
people when they speak their own truth or describe their own suffering, but you have to
experience it for yourself, through digital representation, to know that it is true.” 334 VR
renders public the private lives of those it documents. One’s suffering is not merely a
personal experience or evidence of a structural issue; it is a product for consumption and
entertainment, a means through which viewers come to feel politically engaged, active,
and more compassionate. Keith Feldman argues VR attempts to move beyond empathy to
humanization of its subjects, such that empathy results in a recognition of political
personhood. Feldman writes: “In the face of a form of state violence, whose space and
time seems uncontained by modern conceptions of warfare, and whose effects seem
unimaginable, or exceed our normative frames of reference, these works rely on empathy
as a generator of political recognition predicated on liberalism’s longstanding
conceptions of personhood.” 335 However, this process of humanization-through-empathy
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obscures state violence, the viewer’s participation in that violence, and the agency of the
subject.
Sensing Remotely
Documentary Virtual Reality claims to offer access to an embodied knowledge
from a distance. In a you-are-here virtual reality documenting war, violence, and other
suffering, you participate as an observer, getting a first-hand look at a reality from which
you are far removed. The viewer may walk away from the VR feeling that they have
experienced, and thus have intimate knowledge of, the suffering that they observed. As a
visual, imagery-based tool, virtual reality is based on assumptions and understandings of
knowledge creation as other technoscientific modes of understanding the world, such as
remote sensing. Remote sensing is defined by the presence of three main characteristics:
visual image, the aerial perspective, and the electromagnetic spectrum. In Introduction to
Remote Sensing, Campbell and Wynne write: “Remote sensing is the practice of deriving
information about the Earth’s land and water surfaces using images acquired from an
overhead perspective, by employing electromagnetic radiation in one or more regions of
the electromagnetic spectrum, reflected or emitted from the Earth’s surface.” 336 As a
technological process, remote sensing is the mode through which images of the earth’s
surface are produced.
Derek P. McCormack critiques this understanding of remote sensing for
privileging ascension and elevation, vision and imaging as the primary ways though
which geographic knowledge is generated, and for affirming cartographic abstraction
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rather than engaging with the specific, situated, and embodied. 337 McCormack argues
instead for “understanding remote sensing not so much as a technology of distanced,
elevated image capture but as a set of mobile and modest techniques through which
affective materials are sensed without direct contact or touch.” 338 McCormack engages
with geographic scholarship from the 1970s that defines remote sensing as the practice of
gathering or sharing information about something without touching or interacting with it.
Thus, remote sensing is a practice through which we gain (or seek to gain) understanding
of something from a distance, without needing contact or first-person experience of that
thing. Drawing on Spinoza, Deleuze, and Massumi, McCormack theorizes perceptions of
the spectral as a form of remote sensing, asserting that the spectral, like the atmospheric
or electromagnetic, is not visible but can be sensed.
Remote sensing attempts to make intimate what is remote. This ability to sense
without direct contact suggests a relationality between sensing bodies. McCormack’s
theorization of remote sensing of the spectral, or that which can be felt but may not be
visible, runs in parallel to Dian Million’s theorization of felt knowledge. There are two
key elements to felt knowledge that pertain to this discussion. First, felt knowledge is
based an understanding that the felt experiences of colonialism are a legitimate form of
knowledge that informs our understandings of history. Second, this implies that history is
not a collection of abstract apolitical facts but is something lived in the current moment
through felt knowledge. While Virtual Reality seeks to enable an affective response to
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and understanding of something far removed or distant, felt knowledge grounds
knowledge production in affective response to one’s lived experiences and inherited
stories. Felt knowledge is based in the intimate and personal, mapping relationality
between the person sensing and that which is being sensed, contradicting claims of
remoteness. Whereas normative understandings of remote sensing suggest an option to
sense and an ability to distance oneself as desired, felt knowledge is embodied and
relational, it cannot be unmoored at will. For Million, felt knowledge is not just a result
of bearing witness. Felt knowledge disrupts and disturbs colonialism, confronting
dominating powers with intimate affective experience. McCormack’s vision of remote
sensing imagines it not as a discrete technoscientific process of capturing images of
objects and surfaces, but as a process of relating what is felt to generate knowledge. This
attention to relation and affect as essential to remote sensing offers a lens through which
to situate felt knowledge. Here, “remote” is antithetical to affective experience. Instead,
what normative logics categorize as remote can become intimate only through affective
experience.
However, what appears to be remote is already intimate. Arboleda theorizes the
mine as a transnational infrastructure that links geographically distant sites in a global
network of extractive capitalism. “The mine is not a discrete sociotechnical object,” he
writes, “but a dense network of territorial infrastructures and spatial technologies vastly
dispersed across space.” 339 While perhaps invisible in a virtual reality, uranium mines on
the Navajo Nation are already intimately connected to other sites of nuclear mining,

339

Martín Arboleda, Planetary Mine: Territories of Extraction Under Late Capitalism.
(New York: Verso Books, 2020).

197

processing, weapon development, and war. And what could be more intimate than death?
Iyko Day argues that uranium mining is a deeply colonial endeavor, creating global
linkages between colonized places. Day describes how “uranium from the Belgian Congo
and the Northwest Territories in Canada was used in the atomic bomb that was tested in
New Mexico and detonated over Hiroshima.” 340 What links sites of the nuclear fuel
cycle, Day asserts, is that Indigenous peoples around the globe disproportionately
experience the negative consequences of nuclear development and proliferation. Uranium
and its associated nuclearism move across the globe, devastating Indigenous life in its
wake. 341
How do viewers of Poise/end see themselves in the virtual reality? Do they
picture themselves in a hazmat suit? Do they squint in the sun? Do they wonder if the
level of ionizing radiation changes as they move through the landscape? Virtual Reality
attempts to use virtual spaces to not only share knowledge about the remote, but to create
an embodied experience of the remote for the viewer and to engender an affective
response in the viewer. However, documentary virtual realities such as Poise/end remain
scripted and storyboarded narratives, more akin to viewing a stage performance than
experiencing something firsthand. In this failure, virtual reality remains in line with
representational and cartographic technologies that seek to make the other known and
familiar. Scholars of feminist geopolitics highlight the need for attention to affect and
performance in the use of geospatial technologies. Mei-Po Kwan writes: “Geospatial
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technologies are designed, created, and used by humans, and a large proportion of their
application is for understanding or solving problems of individuals and social groups.
Bodies, however, are often absent or rendered irrelevant in contemporary practices of
[geospatial technologies].” 342 When these technologies include people, the affective,
embodied experiences of people remain obscured. Colonial territoriality and spatial
representation are inseparable from the lives of people upon whom those borders are
traced.
Colonial territoriality is always an intimate process for both colonized and
colonizer; spatial representations are made with a choice to obscure or narrate that
intimacy. While documentary virtual realities like Poise/end seek to narrate and
demonstrate that intimacy, they fall short of creating an embodied experience of that
intimacy for the viewer, instead implicating the viewer as a bystander who can observe
violence, but cannot intervene, even in a virtual reality. Documentary virtual reality can
memorialize colonial, imperial, and other violences. But in doing so, it relegates those
violences to the realm of the virtual, the imaginary, and the distant. As virtual reality
subsumes colonial and imperial violence within a narrative of global connectivity and
technologically mediated empathy, it acts as what Lisa Lowe terms an “economy of
affirmation and forgetting.” 343 While virtual reality can script feelings of horror and
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empathy, it does not translate those in the daily lives of either the viewers or those being
filmed.
In attempting to manufacture a false sense of closeness and stir feelings of
empathy, virtual reality reifies the imagined disjunctures between the colonizer and the
colonized, between geographically distant locations, or temporally distant events. While
you can be placed into a scene to experience via virtual reality, the space-and timejumping of virtual reality blurs the connections between U.S. imperialism and the
experiences of oppressed others. In the introduction to this dissertation, I engage Edward
Said’s notion of contrapuntalism as a methodology through which to understand
competing and collaborative colonial projects. Contrapuntalism as a frame asserts that
things which appear to be remote are in fact intimately linked, affecting and affected by
processes and events outside of what appears to be relevant. Through a contrapuntal
framing, we can understand that the violence experienced by the narrators of Poise/end is
a process set in motion by U.S. imperialism, making the viewer and the viewed
intimately linked. Virtual Reality allows the viewer to enter and leave the experience at
will, with the ability to kindle feelings of empathy upon entry and sever feelings of
intimacy upon exit.
Thunderbird Strike
Whereas in Poise/end the perpetrators of volumetric devastation are unnamed and
far removed, video game Thunderbird Strike exposes the tools that enable subterranean
colonial extraction. Created by Anishinaabe and Métis scholar and artist Elizabeth La
Pensée, Thunderbird Strike features a thunderbird who protects the Great Lakes
waterways from the Enbridge Line 5 oil pipeline. The player is the thunderbird,

200

collecting lightning by flying through clouds and striking objects on and below the
surface of the earth. Striking can destroy pipeline materials and machinery and can
simultaneously bring life to other objects on the screen, for example, reanimating the
remains of caribou and buffalo. Unlike the aerial or oblique perspectives common in firstperson shooter games, Thunderbird Strike is a 2D side-scrolling game, marked by a
cross-sectional view that allows the player to see what is above, on, and below the
surface of the earth, reminiscent of geologic cross sections that indicate stratigraphic
layering. In this way, the imagery connects what is below the surface – pipelines, fossils,
water – to what is on the surface – excavators, herds of caribou, and sign-carrying water
protectors.
While the movement against the Dakota Access Pipeline at Standing Rock
brought international attention to oil and gas pipeline development in Canada and the
United States, Indigenous organizing against oil and gas pipelines preceded the
#NoDAPL movement. Rather, political movements like #NoDAPL and Idle No More,
which started in Canada in response to the federal government’s removal of
environmental protections, are punctuated moments in a long history. In these moments,
ongoing resistance to colonial extraction coalesces in time and space around a particular
colonial incursion. 344 Thunderbird Strike was in development during the #NoDAPL
protests and was released shortly after and discussed within that context, despite not
being directly connected to the movement. The Enbridge Line 5 and Line 3 pipelines
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have been the object of pointed resistance from Indigenous nations as these pipelines
crosscut tribal lands, treaty areas, and water bodies, putting land and water at risk. Any
leaks of the pipelines could lead to environmental contamination that could also affect
Indigenous nations’ ability to exercise their treaty rights to hunting, fishing, and
harvesting on their traditional territories. The United States and Canada have responded
to Indigenous protests by increasing policing and surveillance, and extractive industry
companies have hired private security firms to further surveillance, such as the use of
TigerSwan at the #NoDAPL protests. This has resulted in highly militarized federal and
corporate responses to Indigenous movements against pipelines. 345 So it is in this state of
heightened surveillance of Indigenous land defense that the video game Thunderbird
Strike was released.
Thunderbird Strike is made up of three levels. In level one, the player begins in
the Alberta Tar Sands. The cross-sectional landscape is dotted on and below the earth’s
surface with infrastructure and machinery used to extract oil from the tar sands, both
surface open-pit mining, as well as in situ mining through steam-assisted gravity
drainage. The thunderbird flies through the clouds to collect lightning and navigates
down to strike. When the thunderbird successfully strikes a piece of extractive equipment
and infrastructure, referred to in the game as a “fatal strike,” the machinery bursts into
flames and disappears, gaining the player destruction points. When the thunderbird
strikes animal remains under the surface, the remains are reanimated as an animal above
the surface, similar to animals already on the surface, except with a slight glimmer of
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blue around the reanimated body. This is “activation” and earns the player “restoration”
points. The thunderbird can also strike animals that are already on the surface, earning
neutral points. At the end of each level, the game displays the players destruction,
restoration, and neutral points, as well as a total score comprised of points earned in all
three categories. Players may choose what types of points to earn or emphasize. It is not
necessary to earn a particular type of point in order to move to the next level. In level
two, the thunderbird flies over the Saskatchewan prairies. Level two functions like level
one; there is oil infrastructure, machinery, and vertebrate animal remains below the
surface which the thunderbird strikes to earn destruction or restoration points. In this
level, semi-trucks carrying pipelines move across the surface and parts of a pipeline are
already placed underground. Humans walk along the surface of the earth, holding signs
with protest slogans. Level three takes place in the Straits of Mackinac which connects
Lake Huron and Lake Michigan. Now, the thunderbird flies through the clouds above the
Great Lakes. A large black snake appears across the left side of the screen, jointed like
pipes, with the pipe fittings visible in regular lengths along its body. The snake’s head in
the clouds at the level of the thunderbird and its body weaves as it spits out large gray
rocks that the thunderbird must strike to stop them from polluting the lakes. Early in level
three, a small leak of black oil begins to seep out of one of the pipe joints of the snake.
The oil disperses and spreads over the course of the game. By the game’s end, the water
of the Great Lakes has changed color from a light turquoise green to a dark green-black.
Indigenous Aesthetic as Counterinsurgent Threat
Upon its release in 2017, the game was met with a vocal backlash, as oil lobbyists
and a state legislator attempted not only to shut down the game but proposed new
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legislation that would closely regulate state grant funding for artistic projects. 346 For
these lobbyists and legislators, the two-dimensional world of Thunderbird Strike posed a
greater threat to life than any of the dangers of oil production or transportation. By their
representation, the video game’s thunderbird became an aerial insurgent, instigating “ecoterrorism,” attempting to twist game play into violence against capitalist ventures in the
colonial state. 347 LaPensée situates this video game in relation to Gerald Vizenor’s
theorization of survivance, beyond survival to a “nourishing [of] Indigenous ways of
knowing.” 348 While the lobbyists and legislator see the thunderbird and the game itself as
a technological attack by insurgents, for LaPensée, the thunderbird, clouds, and fauna
reanimated through lightning strikes gesture towards a future in which Indigenous ways
of being and knowing flourish.
Joanne Barker argues that representations of Indigenous peoples, such as those
representations of Thunderbird Strike by lobbyists and legislators, are a reenactment of
the “social relations and material conditions of invasion, occupation, exploitation, and
appropriation” and that this reenactment is necessary for the state to continue to
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expand. 349 Identifying Indigenous peoples as terrorists, or Indigenous video games as a
practice of aerial insurgency, provides the state with a threat upon which to act, an
opportunity to justify its own violent expansion.
Inherent to the construction of Indigeneity is a state of opposition. 350 Indigenous
peoples have a historic and contemporary relationship to the lands they inhabit, in
conflict with colonial states, a tension that is amplified by a political consciousness
against dispossession and colonization. This creates what Alfred and Corntassel term an
“oppositional, place-based existence…that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous
peoples from other peoples of the world.” 351 While foundational to Indigenous political
struggle, this understanding of Indigeneity is coopted by the state to see Indigenous
presence as an ongoing threat to colonial territoriality. The oppositional is always a threat
to the state, linking Indigeneity to insurgence, Indigenous to terrorist. Barker theorizes
the Indigenous terrorist via two key framings, the Murderable Indian and the Kinless
Indian. Of particular importance to the discussion here of Thunderbird Strike, the
Murderable Indian is a terrorist by nature of their threat to settler/state safety, stability,
and security. Already a terrorist before acting, the threat of the Murderable Indian allows
the state to frame colonization not only as inevitable but necessary to ensure the safety of
the state.
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Byrd engages founding documents of the United States to query the nation-state’s
correlation of Indigenous with terrorist. Byrd quotes the Declaration of Independence:
“He…has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian
Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages,
sexes, and conditions,” arguing that this exemplifies the nation-state’s construction of
Indigenous as terrorist, as both foreign and subordinate to the colonial state. 352 For Byrd,
U.S. colonialism and imperialism is predicated on the “becoming savage” of those whom
the state sees as a threat to empire: “This notion of becoming savage is what I call the
transit of empire, a site through which the United States, with ties to Enlightenment and
Victorian colonialisms, propagates itself through a paradigmatic “Indianness” tied now to
the global ascendency of liberalism.” 353 Making the Other savage justifies and enables
colonial expansion, dispossession, and other violences.
The possibility of sensing remotely is stymied by the ways in which the terrorist
other is construed as less than human, unfeeling, and savage. While Poise/end attempts to
make the remote intimate for those who do not have personal experience of nuclear
colonialism, and Thunderbird Strike attempts to place intimate political struggle into an
imagined world, both goals are precluded by the colonial association of Indigenous with
terrorist. For Poise/end to evoke empathy for the people who visit the virtual reality, it
must also challenge assumptions of Indigenous peoples as savage, ungrievable, and
murderable such that the losses the viewer observes are seen not as inevitable, but as
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terrors themselves. If Thunderbird Strike is to activate a feeling of intimacy in political
struggle, it must expose colonial assumptions of Indigenous as equivalent to terrorist.
Navigating the Vertical
In Thunderbird Strike, the player-as-thunderbird flies both horizontally and
vertically, crosscutting the boundaries between air, surface, and underground, gathering
energy in the clouds and releasing it as targeted hits on and below the surface. In its
navigation of the horizontal and vertical, as well as its facility for precision hits, the
thunderbird is reminiscent of drones used in U.S. imperial warfare. Recent scholarship on
colonial surveillance of Indigenous movements pays particular attention to the drone and
its use for colonial surveillance as well as Indigenous countersurveillance, sousveillance,
and territorial self-representation. 354 For both surveillance and countersurveillance, the
drone is favored for its ability to blend in and be almost unnoticeable. It can capture wide
angles and physically zoom in for a close-up image. The operator of the drone may be
close by or operating the drone remotely. The operator is protected from any assault on
the drone and can even remain anonymous. Images collected by drone can be shared
quickly and seamlessly, making evidence public that can affirm or contradict dominant
narratives.
Indigenous countersurveillance via drone extends the contestation over
Indigenous territories from the surface into airspace. Kaplan argues that the rise in
354
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civilian use of small drones, and in particular the use of small drones in Indigenous
protests, produces an understanding of airspace that “does not reinforce the state violence
of no-fly zones and regulatory restrictions.” 355 Caplan describes the contested airspace
over the camps protesting the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, a proposed
11,712-mile pipeline that would transport oil from North Dakota to Illinois. The airspace
above the camps was populated by small drones operated by the police, journalists, and
water protectors, who both documented their daily life in the camps and conducted
countersurveillance of the police forces nearby. Kaplan writes: “Claiming airspace,
carefully surveying the land itself, referencing landmarks of special interest, noting
places of significance to tribes, establishing a landscape aesthetic based on Indigenous
sacred and political values, and sharing these images and narratives via social media –
such practices not only disturbed the usual liberal discourse of ‘public order’ but
introduced new political actors, human and non-human, and an Indigenous
‘mediacosmology.’” 356 As a form of witnessing, drone vision invites the viewer into an
affective relationship with the images and videos produced and may potentially introduce
viewers to new ways of seeing. 357
Horizontal and vertical navigation of a drone does not necessarily have to
replicate settler ways of knowing and seeing land. Instead, as Tuck asserts, the use of
drones by water protectors at the #NoDAPL protests offers the “potential of drone vision
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to produce new forms of relational experience.” 358 How a drone operates and what it pays
attention to is dictated by the drone operator and the ontologies and epistemologies that
shape their ways of seeing and representing landscapes. However, critical surveillance
studies scholar J.D. Schnepf cautions that the distribution of images collected via drone
surveillance is inseparable from global media networks and state infrastructure regardless
of its intended purpose. 359 For example, as discussed in Chapter 1, India’s shutdown of
the internet in occupied Kashmir and Indigenous territories in India’s northeast prevents
any distribution of digital images, severely limiting the effectiveness of
countersurveillance via drone. Any images collected by drones and shared via global
networks and infrastructure are always at risk of being coopted and used by the state,
implicating those in opposition to the state in their own surveillance.
Perhaps what cannot be seen through the aerial perspective offers greater potential
than an Indigenizing of the aerial. LaPensée’s play with the cross-sectional view of the
thunderbird’s flight takes on this tension, generating an image from a perspective that
cannot be achieved through drone, aerial photograph, or remote sensing. Though acting
as the thunderbird, the player can see a vertical display of everything happening above,
on, and below the surface of the earth, a perspective more expansive than the aerial
perspective can claim to be.
“Digital navigations,” writes Anjali Nath, “generate both the world users create
through their interactions (and the interface with that world), as well as the subject
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positions that emerge from these navigational practices.” 360 As a practice of witnessing,
Poise/end and Thunderbird Strike attempt to make the remote intimate. Rather than
simply offering a window into another’s experience, these digital projects engage in a
world-making vision where the intimacy of spatialized colonial violence is not only
exposed but challenged.
Conclusion
In closing, this chapter reads Indigenous landscape representations that center the
subterranean as epistemological challenges to colonial divisions between the surface and
subsurface. While technologically mediated remote sensing attempts to make the remote
intimate, what differentiates Poise/End and Thunderbird Strike from normative forms of
remote sensing is the reorientation to the linkages between the surface and the
subterranean. Rather than see these as discrete sites which can be claimed and capitalized
upon in distinction from each other, these virtual spatial representations seek to expose
the intimate connection and co-constitution of these vertical relationships. As I have
shown, contemporary surveillance technologies are built around an assumption that
spatial data can be collected on and about Indigenous lands without engaging in those
places or with the people surveilled. The Indigenous digital projects discussed in this
chapter attempt to make the remote intimate not through aerial surveillance, but by
placing the viewer and player within the political landscape to be confronted with the
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material reality of colonial subterranean extraction. Extraction is not merely under the
surface but has rippling effects across the surface.
I have limited my analysis here to the digital both as a means of settler colonial
land claims and as a site of Indigenous meaning-making and expressions of territorial
sovereignty. In the next chapter, I discuss Indigenous cartographic approaches to spatial
justice that also challenge colonial systems of recognition of Indigenous territory, and
that further highlight the connections between surface and subterranean.
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Chapter Six
Putting Indian Country on the Map: Indigenous Practices of Spatial Justice
In October 2013, subsidiaries of Google Maps kicked off the first annual “Map
Your Indigenous Community Month,” inviting so-called “affiliates” of Indigenous
nations to make edits, add landmarks, and use native languages to enhance Google Maps
products. This initiative was cast as an opportunity for Indigenous peoples around the
world to take control over representations of their communities. 361 In this chapter, I
examine Google Maps’ initiative in the context of two mapping collaborations based at
Zuni Pueblo in order to understand how ongoing colonization of Indigenous lands can
masquerade as self-determination. These projects challenge resource extraction on Zuni
territory and represent Zuni sovereignty outside of settler notions of tribal sovereignty.
Indigenous feminist spatial representations challenge settler sovereignty and practice
accountability to Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies. In doing so, they challenge
normative practices of counter-mapping to assert Indigenous nationhood. Furthermore,
the mapping practices analyzed here engage the subterranean, the volumetric, and the
oblique in ways that add complexity to representations of Indigenous landscapes and
articulate a volumetric understanding of territory and Indigenous sovereignty.
The purpose of this chapter is to bring key theorizations of Indigenous studies
about territory in conversation with scholarship on mapping and justice to examine how
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mapping is co-constitutive of both the dispossession of Indigenous land through
extractive industry and of articulations of Indigenous sovereignty. I take up Sherene
Razack’s notion of “unmapping,” Mishuana Goeman’s notion of “(re)mapping” settler
cartographies, and Laura Harjo’s theorization of emergence geographies and propose a
methodological intervention in which Indigenous feminist spatial practices are viewed
and put into action as tools in struggles for Indigenous nation-building, a process and
practice that I refer to as Indigenous spatial justice. 362
I argue that unmapping and (re)mapping offer a method through which
Indigenous nations assert their nationhood and claims to territory, even at the risk of
illegibility to the settler state. I consider three questions: First, what risk does countermapping pose to Indigenous nations as they seek to make claims legible to the settler
state? Second, how do Indigenous feminist landscape representations expose the fallacy
of settler innocence and re-politicize representations of Indigenous landscapes? And
third, how do Indigenous peoples re-center Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies to
assert claims to Indigenous nationhood? Finally, I conclude by considering the practices
of unmapping and (re)mapping within the context of Laura Harjo’s four tools of
Mvskoke futurity as a model for how we might map Indigenous spatial justice.
The visual archive I analyze here comes from visual cultural production in the
public domain created through community initiatives at Zuni Pueblo, a tribal nation in
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northwestern New Mexico. My method is rooted in visual analysis as a methodology of
cultural studies. I consider the images in this visual archive, including maps, photographs,
paintings, and billboards, as artifacts which, to paraphrase visual culture scholar Nicholas
Mirzoeff, speak for and about Indigenous spatialities, rather than simply illustrating
them. 363
This chapter is indebted to two strands of Indigenous knowledge production:
First, the tremendous creative, technological, scholarly, and community-based knowledge
production around mapping, Indigenous archives, and data sovereignty that has been
developed by Zuni Pueblo in collaboration with Indigenous nations, scholars,
cartographers, and community practitioners around the world. Scholarly interest in
cartographic representations of Zuni Pueblo was crystallized in the publication of A Zuni
Atlas, a collection of 44 maps accompanied by narrative text describing the maps’
subjects, from hunting grounds to traditional mineral collection areas, houses and clans,
and non-Zuni settlement in areas of Zuni sovereignty. 364 Since then, Zuni Pueblo has
become a recognized leader in global Indigenous mapping movements, from work with
the Indigenous Communities Mapping Initiative and the A:shiwi A:Wan Museum and
Heritage Center. 365
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Second, this chapter relies on scholarship from Indigenous, feminist, and
Indigenous feminist theorizing about territory, sovereignty, and mapping. Drawing on a
rich genealogy of geographic scholarship on counter-mapping as well as political theory
on sovereignty, state, and territory, Indigenous feminist scholars relate how normative
assumptions of cartographic production are challenged by Indigenous and feminist ways
of understanding space, place, and mapping. In turn, Indigenous feminist approaches to
spatial justice challenge scholars and practitioners of counter-mapping to critically
examine approaches to mapping Indigenous territories, even those that attempt to resist
colonial boundaries, representations, and ways of understanding space and place. Here, I
focus on the understandings of Indigenous space, place, and mapping articulated in the
work of Mishauna Goeman, Sherene Razack, and Laura Harjo, through their respective
concepts of remapping, unmapping, and emergence geographies. Rather than
categorizing instances of Indigenous mapping as either feminist or not feminist, I am
interested in how Indigenous feminist approaches to Indigenous spatialities shift, add to,
or challenge our assumptions about Indigenous space, place, and mapping.
Google Maps Indian Country
Perhaps the most well-known organization to initiate Indigenous counter-mapping
is Google Maps. Collaboration between Google Maps and the National Congress of
American Indians (NCAI) resulted in an event on August 9, 2013, to mark the United
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Nation’s International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. Google Maps and NCAI
encouraged Indigenous people in the United States to gather on August 9 and use
Google’s mapping tools to edit Google Maps’ current spatial data on Indigenous
communities. NCAI’s goal was to “empower tribes and tribal citizens to actively
participate in how tribal lands and communities are represented on Google Maps.” 366
Two months later, Google Maps independently organized and advertised October as an
annual “Map Your Indigenous Community Month.” 367
Google Maps staged online trainings about Google Map Maker tools and
recruited communities to host MapUps, in-person mapping events within classrooms or
communities. Google Maps argued that Indigenous communities are “underrepresented in
the world of digital maps” and offered its initiative as a call to action to “build the most
comprehensive, digitally preserved maps of Indigenous lands across the globe.” 368
Google Maps suggested that this initiative would right a wrong of underrepresentation of
Indigenous communities and make individuals’ lives easier by having more accurate data.
MapUp trainings focused simultaneously on data security and on converting data from
proprietary to open formats.
Counter-mapping refers to cartographic work created in opposition to colonial
cartography, but by working within the terms and framing of colonial cartography, it is
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always at risk of cooptation. Primarily used to describe maps created by Indigenous
people to contest colonial claims to resources and territories, counter-mapping has been
taken up to describe both Indigenous and non-Indigenous efforts internationally and used
to advocate policy change and make claims to territory and resources. 369 Countermapping intersects with methods such as participatory mapping, in which mapping
efforts draw on the knowledge and experience of people who are generally not conceived
of as cartographers. These counter-mapping efforts often involve the use of methods and
tools such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Geographic Positioning
Systems (GPS) to make the claims of Indigenous nations legible to the structures they
contest. 370 Critics argue that counter-mapping empowers a few while further
marginalizing those it claims to benefit, particularly overlooking the knowledge and
experiences of women, children, and other disenfranchised groups. Counter-mapping has
also been critiqued as a product of neoliberal governmentality, as “these strategies do not
reverse colonial social relations so much as they rework them.” 371 Counter-mapping is
also at risk of engaging Indigenous peoples in surveillance of their own communities and
territories, as occurred during the Bowen expeditions in which the US Department of
Defense funded community mapping projects in Indigenous communities in Mexico and
used the data collected as counterinsurgency intel. 372
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In the early twenty-first century, developments making digital mapping
technologies more widely available popularized technologies such as Geographic
Information Systems (GIS). For Native nations, GIS was heralded as a panacea which
could aid land and natural resource management, develop and support legal land claims,
strengthen services such as emergency response systems, and catalog and archive cultural
knowledge and language. 373 In geographic literature, much has been published about the
contested nature of cultural knowledge and language within maps, with great attention to
privacy, access, and sources of data. 374 In the wake of the “wikification of GIS” and
emergence of a “geography without geographers” spurred on by interactive web-based
mapping programs such as Google Maps, questions about data privacy, access, and
sources continue to be raised in Indigenous mapping efforts. 375 Some scholars of
Indigenous geographies theorize counter-mapping through an “Indigenous GIS,”
combining Indigenous epistemologies with colonial cartographic technologies. 376

Wainwright, Geopiracy: Oaxaca, Militant Empiricism, and Geographical Thought.
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
373
Jay T. Johnson, Renee Pualani Louis, and Albertus Hadi Pramono, "Facing the Future:
Encouraging Critical Cartographic Literacies in Indigenous Communities,” ACME: An
International Journal for Critical Geographies 4, no. 1 (2005): 80-98.
374
Renee Pualani Louis, "Indigenous Hawaiian Cartographer: In Search of Common
Ground." Cartographic Perspectives 48 (2004):7-23; Renee Pualani Louis, Jay T.
Johnson, and Albertus Hadi Pramono, "Introduction: Indigenous Cartographies and
Counter-Mapping."Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information
and Geovisualization 47, no. 2 (2012): 77-79
375
Daniel Z Sui, "The Wikification of GIS and its Consequences: Or Angelina Jolie’s
New Tattoo and the Future of GIS." Computers, Environment and Urban Systems 32, no.
1 (2008):1-5; 375 Louis, 2004.
376

Johnson, Louis, and Pramono, 2005; Louis, 2004; Louis, Johnson, and Pramono, 2012.

218

Google Maps’ emphasis on the underrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in the
“world of digital maps” misconstrues Indigenous resistance in two ways. First, the
emphasis on underrepresentation within digital maps suggests that this “world” is one of
the few locations in which Indigenous peoples are not represented. Google skews the
conversation through the use of the word “underrepresented,” as though adding
landmarks on representations of Indigenous reservations will produce a more equitable
cartography and, perhaps, world. Indigenous peoples’ presence is erased in digital maps
such as Google Maps as Indigenous lands, peoples, and movements are replaced by
colonial boundaries, markings, labels, and inhabitants. In Google Maps and other colonial
cartographic representations, Indigenous lands are overlain by cities, subdivided by
highways, or re-represented as rural, isolated reservations. Second, by focusing on the
“wrong of underrepresentation,” Google Maps asserts that injustices against Indigenous
peoples are merely issues of representation. This language depoliticizes the landscape
representations Google Maps promotes, deliberately ignoring the conditions of genocide
and dispossession which created this “underrepresentation.”
For this initiative, Google Maps sought to recruit Indigenous “affiliates,” which
included not only those with citizenship in an Indigenous nation or membership in an
Indigenous community, but also government or non-profit employees who worked within
Indigenous communities. The term “Indigenous communities” was used exclusively, and
the political status of Native peoples as sovereign nations in the United States, for
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example, was noticeably absent. 377 The online form to register a MapUp privileged
categories of Indigenous “affiliate,” requesting that the registered MapUp host work with
a formal institution such as a non-profit or school. While there was extensive
documentation regarding how to participate in Map Your Indigenous Community Month,
following the event, there was no direct way to identify which Indigenous communities
were mapped as part of this initiative, what was mapped, or the affiliations of the
mappers.
The temporality of Google Maps’ initiative – Map Your Indigenous Community
Month – indicated that Indigenous spatial representation is extraneous to the business of
mapping. In this case, Indigenous presence is represented on a map only after the real
work of mapping boundaries of recognized nation-states, places of commerce, and the
structures that link them. This turn also marks the hierarchy of claims to territory and
nationhood. Google Map Maker’s Frequently Asked Questions for Map Your Indigenous
Community Month addresses Google Maps’ stance on Indigenous land claims succinctly:
Question: Can I edit the boundaries for my reservation, reserve,
Rancheria, pueblo, treaty area, etc.?
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Answer: No. In order to protect the integrity of your local maps,
boundaries and borders for Indigenous lands are locked in Google Map
Maker – similar to those of cities, states, and countries. 378
In other words, Google Maps reifies colonial territorial claims, prohibiting map
contributors from engaging in claim-making or decolonial imaginaries which challenge
colonial jurisdiction and cartographies.
While Google Maps originally collaborated with NCAI for “Indigenous Mapping
Day,” Google Maps independently designed “Map Your Indigenous Community Month.”
My critique here focuses on the administrative guidelines of the latter project and,
therefore, on Google Maps. The explicitly stated intentions of the two projects are
themselves contradictory. The tension between NCAI’s administrative language around
the first event and that of Google Maps for the second is striking. Google Maps FAQ for
“Map Your Indigenous Community Month” emphasized that the “boundaries and border
for Indigenous lands are locked” to “protect the integrity” of the maps. In contrast,
NCAI’s language around the first event centered Indigenous sovereignty and nationhood:
“Place is one of the most important values for Indigenous peoples – our place includes
our sovereignty, our culture, our resources, and our ways of connecting with each other
and other nations. This project is an exciting start to reclaiming and establishing our
rightful place in the world.” 379 Far from preserving the integrity of a map, to preclude the
re-drawing of Indigenous national boundaries implies not only that the colonial project is

378

“Map Your Indigenous Community Month FAQ,” Google Maps,
https://sites.google.com/site/mapyourworldcommunity/indigenous-mapping-day-faq
379
“NCAI and Google Maps Partner for Indigenous Mapping Day Today – August 9,
2013,” 2013.

221

complete and uncontested, but that Indigenous peoples are confined by those boundaries.
Google Maps’ focus on identifying, naming, and labelling public places such as hospitals,
schools, tribal buildings, and ATMS to improve Google driving directions is underlain by
its assumption that Indigenous people live in rural, isolated spaces. By Google Maps’
estimations, urban spaces where buildings and landmarks are already mapped, are not
Indigenous spaces. Google Maps’ practice of leaving Indigenous territory empty and
representing it as a space yet-to-be populated with landmarks reinforces the settler
colonial frontier imaginary. Initiatives such as Map Your Indigenous Community Month
further implicate Indigenous nations in the very process of colonial mapping. Here,
counter-mapping is complicit with colonial mapping. Google Maps claimed that this
project would “put Indian country on the map.” Where was it before?
Indigenous Feminist Approaches to Spatial Justice
Colonial processes may attempt to define the city as non-Indigenous space, but
cities, and other spaces, places, and scales in which Indigenous peoples live, are not
confined by these binary boundaries of Indigenous vs. non-Indigenous space. 380 Instead,
asserts Julie Tomiak, Indigenous peoples repurpose colonial and neoliberal arrangements
of space to contest their own marginalization, remaking sites such as urban reserves in
Canada as sites of potential transformation and exemplifying the complexity of
Indigenous spaces and places. 381 Added to this complexity are the tensions within
attempts to represent these places and spaces. Counter-mapping may reify, reinforce, and
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extend settler boundaries even as it seeks to challenge dominant mapping practices; and
still, counter-mapping may simultaneously create conditions of possibility for decolonial
ways of representing space and place, as Dallas Hunt describes in his analysis of settler
artist Sylvia Borda’s art installation “Every Bus Stop in Surrey, BC.” 382
An Indigenous spatial justice framework can help us identify how Indigenous
nations reclaim space and resist colonial violence. In "Subversive Spaces: First Nations
Women and the City," Evelyn J. Peters denaturalizes the city as a settler space and
refocuses attention on the city as a space of "alternative geographies of rights and identity
imagined by urban First Nations women." 383 Through an analysis of interventions at the
1992-93 Public Hearings of the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Peters demonstrates how the subversive geographies of First Nations women contest
emerging geographies of race and patriarchy through "nation talk" and "culture talk."
Through nation talk, First Nations women assert the need for partnership between men
and women in nation-building and self-government. Through culture talk, First Nations
women challenge settler geographies and claim urban spaces as legitimate spaces to
regain, recreate, and revalue cultural practices. Peters demonstrates how colonial
processes defined the city as a non-Indigenous space to highlight how First Nations
women reimagine urban spaces as sites of Indigenous nation-building and self-
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determination. Peters illustrates the spatiality of both violence against Indigenous women
and of Indigenous women's resistance and resurgence.
This focus on the spatiality of both violence and resistance is an essential question
of Indigenous feminist theorizations of space and place. In “Notes Towards a Native
Feminism’s Spatial Practice,” Mishauna Goeman articulates three characteristics and
goals of Native feminist spatial discourse: First, Native feminist spatial practices present
alternative methods of reading space, race, gender, and nation that link spatial practices
and political challenges to ongoing colonialism. 384 Second, Native feminist spatial
practices challenge the assumption of the “truth” of colonial spatial representations while
asserting Native epistemologies. And third, Native feminist spatial practices provide
paths to address the boundaries (urban/rez, men’s space/women’s space) that are drawn
by colonial maps. 385 The violence of colonial cartography extends not just to the
landscape or to the community or nation, Goeman suggests, but directly targets individual
lives. Spatial control, articulated through colonial cartography, directly affects the lives of
Indigenous women, as they experience physical violence, murder, rape, and imposed
gender and family roles. In contrast to colonial cartography that makes claims about land,
Native feminist spatial practice involves “sharing where one is from and learning to live
with each other.” 386 For Goeman, this sharing and learning mediates the impact of
colonial spatial claims. While Indigenous counter-mapping projects have been taken up
to demonstrate past occupancy or land use to make contemporary claims to land, a Native
feminist spatial practice pushes beyond the limits of counter-mapping to assert
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Indigenous space across scales of time. While historically rooted, “this Native spatial
practice is as much about the future as the past.” 387 In other words, Indigenous spatialities
are not static, but emerge and change over time and even take shape through projections
of desired futures.
Indigenous spatial justice appears in formative texts by scholars of race, space,
and gender. In "The Case of Pamela George: Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized
Justice," Sherene Razack narrates the story of the legal case against two white men who
murdered an Indigenous woman. 388 Razack argues that spaces are marked as respectable
or degenerate and, therefore, people within those spaces are marked as respectable or
degenerate, and surveillance of both spaces and people is seen as natural and necessary.
When Indigenous spaces are marked as degenerate, the death of Indigenous people within
those spaces is seen as an inevitable consequence of inhabiting those spaces. Razack links
the circumstances of this trial to the long and ongoing history of settler colonialism and
dispossession of Indigenous lands. Razack asserts: "I want to denaturalize the spaces and
bodies described in the trial in an effort to uncover the hierarchies that are protected and
the violence that is hidden when we believe such spatial relations and subjects to be
naturally occurring. To unmap means to historicize, a process that begins by asking about
the relationship between identity and space." 389 Using a spatial justice framework to
examine settler colonialism allows us to examine the interconnections between the
dispossession of Indigenous territory and violence against Indigenous women and
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girls. Unmapping, then, is the process of denaturalizing spatialized relations of power,
placing it in contrast to processes such as counter-mapping that articulate uneven power
relations without necessarily challenging the existence of the power relation itself.
Other scholars reject counter-mapping in favor of landscape representations
which challenge colonial cartography and re-center Indigenous methods. In Space, Race,
and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society, Sherene Razack interrogates how space
is racialized through law under settler colonialism. Razack argues that the process of
“unmapping” denaturalizes the presumed relationship between place and race: “Just as
mapping colonized lands enabled Europeans to imagine and legally claim that they had
discovered and therefore owned the lands of the ‘New World’, unmapping is intended to
undermine the idea of white settler innocence… and to uncover the ideologies and
practices of conquest and domination.” 390 Counter-maps propose an alternative
perspective to colonial maps; the process of unmapping rejects colonial cartographic
categories altogether.
Mishuana Goeman uses “(re)mapping” to unsettle imperial and colonial
geographies in Mark My Words: Native Women Mapping Our Nations. This term refers
to the use of new and traditional stories as a means of map-making and survivance of
Native women. Goeman intervenes in critical cartography, arguing that (re)mapping
means privileging Indigenous spatial practices over colonial cartographic methods: “To
begin to (re)map the settler nation,” Goeman writes, “we must start with Native forms of
mapping and consider Native-made spaces that are too often disavowed, appropriated, or
co-opted by the settler state through writing, imagining, law, politics, and the terrains of
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culture.” 391 Both Razack’s unmapping and Goeman’s (re)mapping require those who
make landscape representations to re-politicize spaces previously represented as
apolitical. These practices mark tensions between representations of nation-states such as
the United States and Native nations such as Zuni Pueblo not as settled, but as ongoing
processes of representation and resistance. Unmapping exposes the violence of colonial
landscape representations and the complicity of settlers in racializing Indigenous lands
and naturalizing the genocide of Indigenous peoples. (Re)mapping hails spaces as
Indigenous which have been stripped of Indigenous presence through colonial landscape
representations. Together, they constitute a rejection of colonial geographies and
assertion of Native nationhood.
In the 2019 monograph Spiral to the Stars: Mvskoke Tools of Futurity, Laura
Harjo proposes four tools of Indigenous futurity, articulated as methodologies emerging
from and theorized by Mvskoke practices. Harjo describes these practices as “wayfinding tools that operate to create a map to the next world.” 392 Radical sovereignty, also
called este-cate sovereignty, is an embodied sovereignty that exists outside of and prior to
contemporary notions of tribal sovereignty; it is shaped by people in relationship with
each other to structure and empower community and “enables us to see the power that we
already have.” 393 Community knowledge, then, is practiced, embodied, and valued as a
practice of knowledge production. Collective power is produced through everyday
community activities that have a potential to transform communities and social relations.
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Emergence geographies empower communities to reclaim Indigenous spatialities; they
“provide a framework for moving beyond prevailing settler geographies that enforce
particular types of spatialities.” 394 Based on her theorization of Mvskoke geographies,
Harjo suggests that emergence geographies can be concrete geographies, as in a specific
town or built environment, ephemeral geographies, such as an event that occurs
seasonally or intermittently like a festival or family tradition, metaphysical geographies,
such as a sacred site through which people connect to a spiritual realm, and virtual
geographies, which are shaped and mediated by technologies and exist in virtual space
rather than traced onto a map of a landscape.
Harjo’s emergence geographies, I suggest, take into account the complex
relationships between power, agency, goals, and methods of mapping Indigenous spaces
and places. Emergence refers not just to Indigenous emergence stories, but also provides
a map or plan for representing Indigenous spaces and places that exist in the past, present,
and future. Considered with Harjo’s emergence geographies, Goeman’s remapping and
Razack’s unmapping are methods through which Indigenous spatialities are made. While
Razack’s argument primarily challenges settler notions of racialized space, Harjo and
Goeman are both interested in how the complexities of Indigenous space and place are
identified, celebrated, and represented within Indigenous counter-mapping. I turn now to
two sites of Zuni emergence geographies to consider how Zuni spatial practices might
shift or expand our understanding of counter/un/re/mapping and emergence geographies.
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Mapping Zuni Sovereignty
In 1981, the Salt River Project (SRP), the third-largest electric producer in the
U.S., proposed an 18,000-acre strip mine to extract coal just ten miles from Zuni Salt
Lake. This project required pumping 85 gallons of water per minute throughout the
proposed forty-year duration of the extraction. While the coal mine would not be located
directly on Zuni land, pumping ground water from the local aquifer would lower the Zuni
water table, devastating water level and salt production at Zuni Salt Lake. 395 This
proposed surface coal mine would cover 16,800 miles and require construction of a 44mile railroad from the mine to St. Johns, Arizona, disturbing 8,432 acres of land. 396 Zuni
activists and government bodies held a twenty-two-year resistance to fight the SRP
proposal. In addition to conducting scientific data collection to document the damage the
proposed mining operation would cause, Zuni activists engaged in processes of spatial
representation which effectively unmapped the extractive capitalist effort, (re)mapped
Zuni nationhood through Indigenous spatial practices, and asserted both ephemeral and
metaphysical emergence geographies.
To raise awareness about the proposed coal mine, the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition, a
group formed by Zuni activists, the Sierra Club, and other Native activist organizations,
signed a contract and paid to rent several billboards in Phoenix located near Salt River
Project mining company headquarters. They hoped increased publicity would shame SRP
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into shutting down their operation near Zuni Salt Lake. When the billboard company
broke their contract with the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition, due to the billboard’s perceived
“negative political message,” Zuni activists rented a mobile billboard and drove it first
through Phoenix, then through communities in Arizona and New Mexico, asserting their
territorial sovereignty and encouraging others in the region to join their struggle.
This billboard challenged the Salt River Project’s right to mine by exposing the
depoliticized nature of colonial landscape representations. Half of the billboard contained
a black background with white letters reading: “SRP is targeting our Sacred Lands.
SAVE ZUNI SALT LAKE.” The other half held a black and white photo of Zuni Salt
Lake. In the foreground was a white shore next to the still lake, depicting the source of
salt harvested by Zunis. Behind the lake lay black volcanic cinder cones of the El Malpais
region against a sky with bright white clouds. Overlaying the photo were thin black
crosshairs, centered on the lake, capturing shore, water, volcanoes, and sky within the
target. By using a black and white photo, the activists reminded viewers of colonial
representations of Indigenous landscapes which confine Indigenous presence to the past,
aestheticizing Indigenous extermination and removal from the landscape, and preserving
Indigenous presence as a mystical, primitive haunting. Overlaying a gun’s crosshairs over
the photo juxtaposed colonial tropes of landscape representation with the lived reality of
Indigenous peoples, exposing the violence of colonial territorial claims. Magnification of
a target through the scope of a gun amplified Zuni protests of SRP’s proposal, bringing
into focus an issue not otherwise represented in public forums. Presenting viewers with a
representation of Zuni Salt Lake through a weapon’s scope called into question
aestheticized representations of Zuni lands and re-represented these landscapes as sites of
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political conflict. As a practice of unmapping, this image on a mobile billboard sought to
startle non-Zuni audiences and incite them to question assumptions about territory.
Who’s land? Non-Zunis are meant to ask. What violence is indicated by the image of a
gun’s scope? This image and the method of publicizing it were meant to reject the
colonial categories of space and place that shape the laws that allowed SRP to explore
extraction on Zuni territory in the first place.
As another method of landscape representation and claims to sovereignty, Zuni
activists ran 350 miles from Zuni Pueblo to Phoenix and ran for 24 hours straight around
SRP headquarters in Phoenix before running back to Zuni. Zunis were joined by runners
from neighboring Indigenous nations, including Navajo Nation, Hopi, and Taos Pueblo.
At a rally and press release with the runners, then-Governor of Taos Pueblo, Vincent
Lujan, marked the significance of this mode of spatial representation. In his speech,
Lujan linked the runners’ action of representation and resistance as part of the Zuni Salt
Lake Coalition to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. In this revolt, southwestern Pueblos
successfully defeated Spanish colonizers in the region in one swoop, orchestrating the
revolt and communicating across great distances by relays of runners carrying messages
between Pueblos. Over three hundred years later, celebrating the runners’ performance of
Zuni sovereignty, Lujan asserted: “Now [we] are embarking on a similar battle. There’s
meaning in what these runners do here. We were here before you. We’re going to be here
forever. This is where our ancestors shed their blood.” 397 Linking the actions of this
contemporary movement to successful resurgence practices suggests that the performance
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of Zuni spatial representation through running not only has historical significance but is
also a viable means to represent Zuni territory outside of the narrow specifications of
colonial cartography. To run is not just a marker of continued protest and resistance but is
a marker of the paths and geographies that have sustained Zuni life throughout time. To
understand what places are “here” for Zuni people, we could look at the maps in A Zuni
Atlas of Zuni cultural practices, federally-recognized territorial boundaries of Zuni over
time, or non-Zuni settlement in areas of Zuni sovereignty and, in doing so, perceive how
Zunis remap their own lands. 398 The run to Phoenix and back marked the same points:
traditional and ancestral places of Zuni life, a historicized relationship to territorial
infringement, and a re-envisioning of cartographic methods to create a conceptual map of
Zuni spaces and places. Furthermore, the run enacted an ephemeral emergence
geography, serving as a marker of Zuni spatialities in movement, assembled at
intermittent moments in time, whether to resist Spanish colonization or contemporary
resource extraction.
Other scholars mark Native running as a means to assert Native presence, survival
over time, and as political statement. In “Hopi Footraces and American Marathons, 19121930,” Matthew Sakiestewa Gilbert argues that success of runners from Hopi Pueblo in
formal running competitions such as the Olympics is an assertion of Hopi agency, a
challenge to stereotypes of Indigenous peoples, and an example of how Indigenous
peoples navigate the complexities of politics between the nation-state and the Indigenous
nation: “For the Hopi runners at Sherman, their accomplishments in U.S. marathons
reflected the beauty and complexities of Hopi culture, and their running victories
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compelled the athletes to consider the forces that pressured them and other Indigenous
people to become modern.” 399 In “To Bring Honor to My Village: Steve Gachupin and
the Community Ceremony of Jemez Running and the Pike’s Peak Marathon,” Brian S.
Collier asserts that at Jemez Pueblo, running is “not about ‘winning’ but about
representing their people.” 400 Collier narrates the story of Jemez Pueblo runner Steve
Gachupin’s earning first place in the Pike’s Peak Marathon in order to argue that that
running is a “ceremony of self and community” through which Pueblo nations assert their
own sovereignty and build relationships with other nations and communities. 401 Running
is an expression of lived presence: “For Gachupin running is a way to connect with the
traditions of the Pueblo and to remember those people from the community who ran
before him and those who will run after him; it is part of the continuity of life’s
cycles.” 402 But running is not only a symbol of relationship, Pueblos use running to
demonstrate political agendas. Collier describes how Gachupin ran with a group of
runners to petition the government to address teen alcohol consumption. Their run not
only made a statement about their political agenda, but also asserted the viability of
running as ceremony.
This performance was imbued with Zuni epistemologies and ontologies about
space, place, sovereignty, and territory. The Zuni Salt Lake Coalition opposed mining
occurring on land not federally recognized as Zuni land; the Indigenous runners
399
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demonstrated a vision of Zuni territory and sovereignty that runs counter to Western
notions of territory and sovereignty. Running from Zuni to Phoenix with people from
multiple Indigenous nations made a statement about relationships between Indigenous
nations, Indigenous ways of understanding territory and sovereignty, and spatial
representation through mapping as an unfolding process. Performance cartography, like
the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition running protest, highlights cartography as process. The
limited visible, physical evidence of this running performance in formal and informal
archives, made visible only through the legal response by the Salt River Project mining
company, demonstrates the processual nature of cartographic representations. For Kalani
Akana, Hawaiian performance cartography is not aimed at making Hawaiian landscapes
legible to the colonizer. Instead, Hawaiian performance cartography is an act of
legitimizing existence and hegemony, of strengthening Hawaiian identity, and of teaching
and learning Hawaiian epistemologies and ontologies. 403
While the performance of the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition was aimed at SRP, its
actions were part of an unfolding process of Zuni assertions of sovereignty, which are
limited to a specific time and place as recorded by traditional Western maps. At stake for
Zunis were the surficial and volumetric effects of the Salt River Project’s subterranean
extraction. The Zuni campaign was ultimately successful when, in 2003, SRP tabled the
project. 404 Zuni activists’ unmapping and (re)mapping of Zuni territory was not focused
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on using colonial cartographic techniques to make land and resource claims legible to the
Salt River Project, yet the use of Zuni spatial practices yielded the political results Zuni
Pueblo desired.
Here, I turn to Zuni Map Art Project as an example of Zuni practice of and for
spatial justice, emplacing people within and through the landscape. 405
Zuni Map Art Project
The A:shiwi Map Art Project, a project of the A:shiwi A:wan Museum at Zuni
Pueblo, is an art, language, and place name project created to “help Zunis connect to
places through artistic rendering of the Zuni cultural landscape.” 406 In this mapping
project, Zuni artists painted representations of the Zuni region, reservation, and village to
represent important places and spaces of Zuni. Only after an advisory group decided what
not to paint were artists commissioned to paint these multiscalar landscape
representations. 407 One painting by Ronnie Cachini of the Zuni region traces the
migration of the Zuni people from the point of emergence to the current Zuni village.
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I was introduced to the Zuni Map Art Project while teaching at Zuni High School from
2009-2012. The A:shiwi A:wan Museum distributed laminated prints of several maps
from the project to every classroom in Zuni Public School District and I built these maps
into a unit on mapping and critical cartography for my high school geology class.
Subsequently, I included these maps in the development of a place-based, culturally
relevant geology curriculum for Zuni High School, using Feminist Approaches to
Participatory Action Research (FemPAR) in collaboration with my geology students. My
analysis here is deeply informed by learnings from the FemPAR project and in particular
originates in class discussion with the geology students in which we discussed how our
individual understandings of the maps differed based on our social location, age, relation
to Zuni kiva groups, and initiation into Zuni cultural and linguistic knowledge and
practices.
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Another by the same artist shows significant landforms crosscut by paved roads which
are, in this landscape representation, unnamed and unlabeled. In his artist’s statement,
Geddy Epaloose said “I want my audience to feel my paintings…it’s going to be different
for a Zuni to visualize, or see my painting and take in that information. It might mean
more to them than it does to anyone else, but I’m okay with that.” 408 These art maps are
meant to be neither legible nor illegible to non-Zuni viewers, but rather to convey
different meanings and understandings based on the positionality of the viewer and the
viewer’s initiation into Zuni language, culture, and religion. The absences chosen by the
advisory group do not represent emptiness or availability for settlement as absences do in
colonial cartography. Instead, these absences imbue a depth of presence which is not
collapsed into a two-dimensional map. Ultimately, the intended audience of these maps is
Zuni. The maps are designed to make that purpose explicit, through the centering of
encoded “data” throughout the series of paintings, despite the fact that the Zuni Map Art
Project has been exhibited in galleries and museums all over the world. These maps
center Zuni spatialities, knowledges, and lifeways as both un-knowable and un-claimable
by non-Zunis, even as Zunis and non-Zunis alike view the exact same images.
In a public presentation on the Zuni Map Art Project, former A:shiwi A:wan
Museum director Jim Enote addressed the relationship between gender and landscape
representations. When the Zuni Map Art Project board received few proposals from
women, Enote talked to a female elder about what the board should do to take into
consideration the participation of women. The elder told him not to worry. Zuni women,

Jim Enote and Jennifer McLerran, A: shiwi A: wan Ulohnanne: The Zuni World (Zuni:
A:shiwi A:wan Museum and Heritage Center, 2011).
408
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she stated, also make landscape representations through three dimensional forms of maps
such as jewelry and pottery. Zuni pottery is a spatial practice emphasizing process
through place, as potters collect the needed ingredients in a particular order from a
variety of places to which potters have a historic relationship. Like the paintings in the
Zuni Map Art Project, the painted designs on the pots represent specific places, stories,
and processes that are coded so that they bear different meanings based on the
positionality of the viewer. 409 Since its initial call for submissions, the Zuni Map Art
Project has grown over time and now includes paintings by Zuni women as well.
Traditional western maps are usually depicted from an orthogonal perspective, or
view from above, such that paths between places become lines and specific locations,
such as towns or buildings, are represented by a point or perhaps as a polygon outline of a
building or place’s “footprint.” 410 The bird’s eye view masks the perspective of the mapmaker, as the geographic information is not presented as the specific, view-in-place of the
map-maker, but as an omniscient overview at an angle from which the viewer cannot see
the place. Not a single map in the Zuni Map Art Project presents this perspective. Several
maps, such as Larson Gasper’s “Migration of Salt Mother,” represent Zuni landscape as
an experience of multiple vignettes, painted from the perspective of a person on the
ground, viewing the landscape. In this painting, the viewer is led from the foreground,
which holds a representation of a landscape close to the current Zuni village, to a path
marked by piled stones, past petroglyphs carved on rock, to a new landscape marked by
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Jim Enote, “Indigenous Landscapes and Collaborations,” Public lecture, Albuquerque,
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410
Margaret Pearce and Renee Pualani Louis, "Mapping Indigenous Depth of
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the Salt Mother’s presence. 411 In discussion of how he painted this process of migration,
Larson said: “I saw the aerial photographs [of Zuni Salt Lake] and [heard] the
stories…from our ancestors – how the Salt Mother left the [Zuni] Village and how [she]
migrated, and the story of how she dropped the feather and then the pillars of salt became
a rock.” 412 Like the Salt Mother’s feather untethered the Salt Mother from one location
and began her migration, Larson’s painting unmoors representations of Zuni space from
the birds-eye-view of colonial cartography and re-maps the Salt Lake as an unfolding
process and relationship between Zuni people and landscape. In the description of the
iterative process of painting for this project, with a back and forth between aerial
photographs and Zuni metaphysical emergence geographies, Larson’s narrative denotes
an attention to the concrete points on a map and an intentional untethering from those
aerial images in order to map a Zuni sacred journey within the physical landscape.
Many of the paintings are painted from an oblique angle, as though the artist – or
the viewer – were standing at an elevated point, looking out across the landscape. Ken
Seowtewa painted “I remember…,” an oblique view of the Zuni village before the Zuni
river was dammed. In this painting, the river flows from the background – represented
here as Zuni mountains and Twin Buttes, to the village, which is flanked by traditional
Zuni waffle gardens, each surrounded by a fence. Playing on tropes of normative
mapping, Seowtewa included a zoomed-in inset in the painting to show four women
collecting water from a well, one holding an elaborately painted pot, one scooping water
into another pot, and one holding a pot on her head with a child strapped to her back.
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Writing about this painting, Seowtewa described making walls around waffle gardens
with his grandmother when he was a child. Seowtewa articulates how stories and
knowledge from his grandmother and mother determined the content of his painting: “On
the stories that my grandmother had told me, and even the plan that I did on my work, I
even remember being carried on my grandmother’s back as a young boy…I used my
grandson [as a model] for the young boy being carried by the grandmother. So my
mother, Odelle, again helped me with some of the locations where the wells were…I
would ask where the old wells were located. So this is what I wanted to do, the basis for
my first with the museum here.” 413 While Seowtewa’s painting is titled “I remember…,”
the narrative suggests that the memories represented here combine the artist’s memories
with those of his mother and grandmother, representing Zuni women’s stories. Here, Zuni
space and place is not just tied to the landscape, but is shaped through memory,
conversation, and relationship, a remapping of Zuni territory that privileges kinship and
memory in interpretation of the landscape.
Another painting which uses the oblique view is Geddy Epaloose’s
“Halona:Idiwana’a (The Middle Place),” which also depicts the village, river, and Zuni
landforms. 414 However, this painting depicts the village from a different perspective from
that of Seowtewa. While Seowtewa’s painting included the river on the left-hand side of
the painting, Epaloose depicts the river as cutting straight across the middle and
stretching toward the upper right-hand corner of the painting. In this painting, some
landforms are marked by black or white stars hovering over the landform and some of the
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buildings in the village have colored roofs or ladders, windows, and doors, while others
are left as blank, rectangular forms. The significance of these symbols is not described in
a key or in any text associated with the painting. Instead, meaning is inferred by an
initiated viewer whose own knowledge of Zuni place and space informs their
interpretation of the symbols on the map. The sun sits low in a dark blue sky towards the
southwest, suggesting that the time represented is a winter evening. The reappearance of
the oblique view throughout many paintings in the Zuni Map Art Project suggests Zuni
understanding of landscape as embodied and emplaced, mediated by a person’s lived
experience of that landscape.
Indigenous geographers Margaret Wickens Pearce and Renee Pualani Louis argue
that Indigenous landscape representations can communicate “Indigenous depth of place”
by representing time, season, and angle of perspective within landscape
representations. 415 They argue that the Western orthogonal perspective marks Indigenous
places as fixed in time and space, absent of people, and as being out-of-place, as “there is
no single point from which the map is projected.” 416 Pearce and Louis propose shifting
the perspective of representations of Indigenous places to an oblique perspective, to
represent places as they are actually experienced by Indigenous peoples: “The
conventional map of Nu’alolo Kai is oriented with north at the top, and the map reader
looks down at a shoreline, which appears to be accessed from the interior and whose
central place-making features, the cliffs, are invisible. But Nu’alolo Kai is only accessible
from the water, and thus it is always viewed from this angle, which looks toward
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shore.” 417 Shifting to an oblique view, they assert, allows the mapmaker to focus on the
dimension of light, animating the sun’s movement and including seasonality in a map’s
representation of Indigenous depth-of-place. Aerial photographs used in digital
cartography can indicate season by the presence of leaves on trees but differences in
season may be less overt in regions such as Zuni which are not dominated by deciduous
foliage. While advocating for the adaptation of Western geographic technologies to
account for seasonality and perspective, Pearce and Louis remain cognizant of the limits
of cartographic technologies, particularly with respect to these representations’ ongoing
erasure of story and people.
The Zuni Map Art Project presents alternative methods of reading space, place,
and race. It contests dominant ideas of nation and territory while centering Zuni notions
of reading gender on the landscape. The paintings challenge the assumed truth of colonial
representations of Zuni space as they present an expanded notion of Zuni space, linking
Zuni memory to Zuni present and futures, and asserting Zuni epistemologies through the
coding of Zuni knowledge. Finally, the Zuni Map Art Project provides a means through
which Zuni artists can address boundaries created by colonial maps, whether those be
boundaries of territories which are recognized/unrecognized, historical/present, or
modern/traditional. By representing women within the landscape and generating
landscape representations directly from women’s stories, the artists “move toward
geographies that do not limit, contain, or fix the various scales of space from the body to
nation in ways that limit definitions of self and community staked out as property.” 418
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Conclusion
I close by considering what these two examples from Zuni might offer to us as
scholars interested in decolonization and Indigenous geographies. How might we work
towards Indigenous spatial justice? How are we already working to enact spatial justice?
Both projects of Zuni spatial practices described here assert the relationship
between Zuni lives and Zuni land, articulating Zuni nationhood and mediating the effects
of the nation-state on Zuni lives and land. In the Zuni Salt Lake Coalition, Zuni runners
and drivers crossed through multiple geographies to challenge the colonial boundaries
which sought to confine them. Through multi-modal landscape representations, Zuni
highlighted the volumetric nature of Zuni sovereignty and territory and the surficial
effects of potential subterranean extraction. In the Zuni Map Art Project, landscape
representations were coded to articulate differently between viewers. While neither
project marked itself as specifically feminist, both projects unmapped settler spatial
boundaries, remapped Zuni relationships to space and place, and asserted Zuni space
through entangled concrete, ephemeral, and metaphysical emergence geographies.
Projects such as Google Maps’ Map Your Indigenous Community Month attempt to fix
Indigenous territory in place and to make it legible to outsiders. Resource extraction such
as the Salt River Project attempts to unmoor Indigenous life from territory. In contrast,
Indigenous feminist practices of spatial justice highlight the spatiality of unjust power
relations and consider space as a key locus of (in)justice.
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Keeping in mind the two examples analyzed in this chapter, the Zuni Salt Lake
Coalition enacted radical sovereignty through its claims to Zuni territory outside the
bounds of US-recognition of Zuni territory. The running protest functioned as a practice
of collective power and marking of Zuni emergence geographies. The Zuni Map Art
Project generated and shared community knowledge, enacted collective power through
community activities, reclaimed Zuni emergence geographies through map art, and
embodied Zuni radical sovereignty and spatialities beyond settler ideas of tribal
sovereignty.
American landscape representation contained within colonial cartographies is
premised on the systematic genocide of Indigenous peoples. By representing Indigenous
peoples as disappeared or disappearing, colonial landscape representations clear ground
for conquest and settlement. Recognition of Indigenous presence by settler colonial
structures demands that Indigenous peoples represent themselves through colonial
cartographic methods such as the Google Maps initiative to make themselves legible to
the settler state. But in doing so, Indigenous peoples become complicit in racialized
representations of their own supposed disappearance. In contrast, unmapping
denaturalizes settler cartographies and exposes colonial logics of conquest and oppression
while (re)mapping privileges Indigenous spatial practices to mediate colonial maps and
assert sovereignty, self-determination, and nationhood. Taken together, unmapping and
(re)mapping offer a critique and method of resistance against not only colonial
cartography, but of neoliberal empowerment initiatives such as Google Maps’ Map Your
Indigenous Community Month and other structures that demand legibility of Indigenous
claims above all else. While Google Maps’ representation of Indigenous nations and its
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Indigenous mapping initiatives serve to reify settler claims to Indigenous territory,
mapping initiatives such as those I describe at Zuni Pueblo assert Zuni nationhood using
Zuni spatial practices and, in the case of the Zuni Salt Lake, result in legal consequences
that assert Zuni sovereignty and nationhood.
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V.

CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
When my grandfather Vichazelhu Iralu graduated from secondary school in what
was then Assam, he was the top student in that administrative area of northeast India. The
British India administrators wanted Vichazelhu to attend a ceremony at which time they
would present him with an award to recognize this achievement. To receive the award,
they informed him, he was expected to attend the ceremony wearing regalia given to
respected and accomplished Angami headhunters. His father, my great-grandfather, was
furious and together he and my grandfather Vichazelhu responded to the administration
stating that Vichazelhu refused to wear regalia that was unearned, irrelevant, and a clear
attempt by the British India administration to fabricate a story of colonial success. The
administration wanted to create a narrative of native scholarly accomplishment and
English literacy while simultaneously highlighting the presumed primitivity and violence
of the natives in this remote territory. The top student wearing head hunting regalia
would be a visual symbol to justify British colonial efforts in the region in the ever
incomplete, and thus continually ongoing, project of civilizing of the native. My
grandfather’s refusal was one of the first decisive publicized moments of Naga refusal to
engage with schooling on colonial terms. He told the administrators that he had been
required to wear western clothing and a western haircut throughout his schooling and that
he would celebrate his mastery of western schooling in the way that he had achieved it.
A few years later, Vichazelhu’s younger sister Rano organized a student strike in
the American mission schools in the Naga city of Kohima. The mission schools “treated
us like coolies,” Rano told me, and the striking students refused to attend school until the
school administrators reformed their education system to focus on educating Naga youth
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in academic subjects. Rano said that her brother’s refusal to comply with the British
administration inspired the younger students to take action to improve their learning
conditions. Rano went on to become the first woman to represent the Naga people in
India’s Lok Sabha. Many decades later, Rano told me that the momentum from the two
publicized protests in secondary schools in Naga territory emboldened other Nagas to
speak up against the colonization of Nagaland. It was only after the student protests that
the Iralu’s maternal uncle Zapuphizo Dolie left the jungles of Burma where he had been
organizing villages for the Naga sovereignty movement and became known as the
charismatic Naga revolutionary leader Angami Zapu Phizo.
I share this story of Naga protest to reflect on the spaces of Indigenous insurgence
that contribute to our strength as communities while marking us as targets of the state. As
Indigenous elimination is the purpose of the settler state, any action that demands
attention to Indigenous life is a threat to the state. Our presence and assertion of self,
relation to each other, and relation to land will always be seen by the state as insurgent
threat.
This dissertation, an exercise in theory building and critical analysis, is an attempt
to build on the grounded knowledge and legacy of Indigenous ancestors like Vichazelhu,
Rano, and Phizo. It is an attempt to understand our individual and community
experiences of colonialism as connected with Indigenous struggles elsewhere. Theory
building is not distanced from reality; instead, it is a way of making sense of the world in
which we live and a way to scout out a route forward.
In this dissertation, I have focused on the aerial perspective as a technology of
colonial territoriality that enables the collaboration of multiple colonial states to further
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their goals of surveillance and control of Indigenous territories within the states’
individual boundaries. The aerial perspective, I have argued, is an integral element of
colonial territoriality in the twenty-first century. It shapes how colonial states and the
non-Indigenous public see Indigenous territory and sometimes, how Indigenous peoples
see ourselves. While Indigenous nations make use of cartographic technologies that are
built upon the aerial perspective, these maps often problematize the very nature of those
maps, as in the caveats regarding borders on the maps created by the Nagaland State GIS
office. Indigenous peoples also represent territories on their own terms, using
perspectives that challenge colonial assumptions about territory and property, such as use
of the orthogonal perspective in paintings of the Zuni Map Art Project which ground the
viewer in a very particular place in relation to the landscape represented, or in the crosssectional perspective of Thunderbird Strike, which links the air, surface, and subterranean
in one view.
Chapters one and two considered the aerial. In chapter one, I examined the
politics of Indigeneity in India and how the policing of Indigenous identity ascribes
colonial territorial boundaries onto people. In chapter two, I argued that the surveillance
of what Nagas eat is intimately linked to histories and ongoing experiences of
counterinsurgent warfare against Nagas. Chapters three and four focused on the surface.
In chapter three, I argued that Indigenous approaches to spatial data sovereignty offer an
alternative mode for mapping Palestine for Palestinians, while protecting spatial data
from cooptation by the colonial state. In chapter four, I considered pixelation as a method
of obscuring landscapes even while mapping under the guise of transparency. Chapter
five and six considered the subterranean. Chapter five examined remote sensing as a
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digital strategy to create affective connections between geographically distant places.
Chapter six argued that Indigenous cartographic practices represent Indigenous territory
without seeking legibility to the state. Taken together, these chapters demonstrate how
Indigenous and land-based peoples respond to counterinsurgent surveillance based on the
aerial perspective and how they represent their territories otherwise in both digital and
analog modalities.
English colloquialisms center being fixed in an identifiable place. To be grounded
is to have a grip on reality. To have the thirty-thousand-foot view is to understand the big
picture. To make our sovereignties legible to Western polities and cultural
understandings, formalized Indigenous political assertions tend to deal in the concrete,
the containable, and the measurable. Our territorial assertions become geocoded points,
lines, and polygons on a map. As I have described in the preceding chapters, colonial
territorial representations rely on our understanding of the aerial perspective as the
ultimate factual way to know land. It is not seen as one of many possible perspectives, it
is represented simply fact. The digital and analog Indigenous landscape representations I
have analyzed here challenge the supremacy of the aerial perspective, highlighting the
volumetric aspects of Indigenous territorial sovereignty and challenging colonial notions
of the aerial itself. The aerial perspective is not a fixed God’s eye view but is instead in
motion and changeable as the air which it inhabits. I have argued that these Indigenous
representations of space, place, landscape, and territory make colonial territoriality
movable and immaterial. Likewise, Indigenous landscapes that colonial states see as
unmoored and imagined are made material through visual representations of relation to
land, kin, and political movements. They establish the presence of these relations which
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cannot be contained by the normative geopolitical or scholarly frameworks we rely on to
make sense of the world.
In the Angami Naga language Tenyidie, the morning greeting begins with a
question: Nmho vi moga? Did you have a good dream? The evening ends with a wish:
Nmho vilie lo. Have a good dream. Centering our dreams as the first and last thoughts we
share each day signifies how our dreams are in conversation with our waking life, that
good dreams are something we share and wish for each other, and despite their
mysterious origin and purpose, dreams have real consequence in our daily lives. 419 I see
the Indigenous landscape representations discussed in this dissertation as similarly firm
material wishes for ourselves, our relations, and our shared struggles and joys. In the
imagined aspects of Indigenous landscape representation – for example, Jordan Nassar’s
future Palestinian landscapes or Thunderbird Strike’s confrontation between thunderbird
and colonial pipelines – I see a move toward making the immaterial real. These landscape
representations show not only what the future could be, but what we are making it to be.

Scholars note the significance of dreams in Naga cultural practice for interpreting
current events, political decision-making, and envisioning Naga relations to India. See
Arkotong Longkumer. "Indigenous Futures: The practice of sovereignty in Nagaland and
other places." In Indigenous Religion (s), pp. 89-119. Routledge, 2020; Arkotong
Longkumer. “”Lines that Speak:” The Gaidinliu Notebooks as Language, Prophesy, and
Textuality.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory. Volume 6, Issue 2. 2016. 123-147.
Michael Heneise. Agency and knowledge in Northeast India: The life and landscapes of
dreams. Routledge, 2018.
419
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